GLOBAL MANAGERIAL EDUCATION REFORMS AND TEACHERS

EMERGING POLICIES, CONTROVERSIES AND ISSUES IN DEVELOPING CONTEXTS

EDITED BY ANTONI VERGER, HÜLYA KOSAR ALTINYELKEN, MIREILLE DE KONING

Education International
Research Institute

Education and
International Development
IS Academie programme

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Mireille de Koning

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FOREWORD

Teachers are today at the centre of the scene in educational reforms. National governments, international organisations and even international non-government organisations (NGOs) assume that the quality and performance of education systems depend more and more on what teachers know and do in the classroom.

Although this assumption appears to be very simple, it is noteworthy that the politics of education has not always focused on teachers as the source of learning and the crucial actor of educational change. Some decades ago, education reforms talked, for instance, about the need to produce *teacher-proof materials* to ensure learning. Good materials should act as an antidote to the apparent low quality of teaching and as a mechanism to guarantee the *back to basics* approach. The best educational reform was seen as one that could neutralize teachers' diverse quality and especially teachers' ideology. The New Right, with UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the forefront, was especially active in pushing for these types of functionalist educational reforms resulting in a clear erosion of teachers' prestige and professionalism.

In developing countries, the Structural Adjustment Programmes undertaken by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s' decade assumed that educational reforms should save public funds by reducing teachers' salaries and by substituting qualified teachers with other professionals without credentials. The results of these policies are known, with devastating effects on the educational quality of public schooling and a high rate of qualified teachers' desertion in many countries of the world.

Today, the scenario seems to be different. Learning is the *new mantra* of educational reforms and is the crucial word of the last World Bank education sector strategy for 2020. Somewhat paradoxically, teachers are the only *input* that counts. The high correlation between teachers' quality and educational performance in the Programme for International Students' Assessment (PISA) is one of the salient characteristics of the Finnish education system, which is the model that most developed countries aim to follow. The new emphasis on teachers' quality as the factor for better performance is shown in the work of authors such as Eric Hanushek, who proposed an education policy of teachers' deselection. Removing less effective teachers, he argues, would undoubtedly produce a positive effect in student achievement.

It is not accidental that one of the new "scientific" methods that the World Bank and many national governments are using to analyse educational performance is to calculate the *added value* of human resources when comparing educational results. That is, all things being equal, such as the social origin of students or even the social context of the school, how much can be attributed to teachers' quality to understand differences in performance? The corollary is obvious in terms of educational policy responsibilities: if some schools from deprived areas and with poor students can perform well, then all teachers working in the same type of school could also perform well. So, teachers are back as protagonists, but what has not changed is the *blaming the victim* strategy used by many educational policy makers.

Thus, somewhat paradoxically, after decades of educational research on school effectiveness, on the effect of the introduction of information and communications technology (ICT) in the classroom, or on the effects of specific curriculum and teaching methods on the neural development of children (such as the so-called "Baby Einstein"), that is, after decades of ignoring the human factor in educational change, teachers seem to be back as crucial agents of the learning process. However, does the new discursive centrality of teachers and teaching means that teachers should be really autonomous agents? Does the new policy wave trust teachers as agents of educational change?

The book that Antoni Verger, Hülya Kosar Altinyelken, and Mireille de Koning have edited with several case studies of teachers' reforms in developing countries is an excellent example that the answer to those questions is clearly a *no*.

Educational reforms based on teachers' work fall mainly under the global tendencies of managerial and accountability reforms. New methods of teacher evaluation, new developments of competence-based curriculum, new decentralisation processes emphasising school autonomy increase teacher autonomy but put more pressure on teachers' everyday work and transfer the responsibility of student achievement onto teachers themselves. The vast majority of these policies ignore the social context of teachers' work and the structural conditions of the learning processes. What is more, incentive-based mechanisms are almost never related to work and performance in schools located in deprived areas. This tends to exaggerate the perverse effect of potentially sending the best teachers to the best schools and leaving the less brilliant professionals in the poorest ones (the ones that Hanushek certainly wants to remove).

As the different case studies in this book show, teachers' responses to the new global managerial education reforms are diverse and even contradictory. Responses are far from being uniform, and depend on multiple factors such as the teaching culture and tradition, the degree and type of unionism, or the nature of the reform itself. What appears to be clear, however, is that the recontextualisation process of any reform is a crucial stage in which educational reform can be minimised, transformed, selectively implemented, or neutralised. There is almost no reform that can be fully and exactly implemented as it has been previously designed.

The above-mentioned factors interact with the ways in which educational reforms are developed and implemented: teachers' involvement in the reform, the existence of experimental processes of reform implementation, the availability of resources, or the development of teacher training are variables that help us to understand how far the reform has gone and how internalised the reform is in teachers' minds and practices.

These empirical studies are therefore a beacon of hope, because they inform us that, after all, under certain conditions, teachers can be real agents that can question some reductionist understandings of their work and professionalism. This is a necessary and extremely useful book, especially as a self-portrait for those teachers who are currently facing the new wave of managerial reforms.

Xavier Bonal
IS Academie Professor. University of Amsterdam
November 2012

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FOREWORD

We are living in critical times in which many of the long-established assumptions about the role of public education are being challenged. Within developed countries, the current global economic recession has triggered a chain of events resulting in austerity policies and a reduction of public services including education. In developing countries, the likely failure to achieve the EFA and education-related Millennium Development Goals by 2015 has generated international debates on what constitutes success in achieving education for all.

The continual search for ways to demonstrate improvements in the quality and outcomes of education systems has become the policy focus for governments in developed and developing countries alike. In this context, many of previously tried and tested measures, including the reliance on standardized tests to measure students' progress, the management of schools as private enterprises, and linking teachers' quality to student outcomes, have resurfaced on education reform agendas.

This publication, which has resulted from a collaboration between the Education International Research Institute and the University of Amsterdam's IS Academie, reveals a global trend of educational policy borrowing. Based on empirical evidence, the case studies presented in this book analyse how education reform agendas are shaped and implemented, and why "cherry-picked" policy ideas from other contexts are often adopted despite inconclusive evidence as to their positive impact on learning outcomes.

The importance of this publication lies in highlighting how and why teachers have become the focus of global managerial and accountability reforms. While the majority of reforms addressed in this book entail policies that target teachers' work, teachers are rarely included in policy debates and development. Moreover, the implementation process of reforms often does not sufficiently take into account the local context in which they should be embedded, which unsurprisingly may give rise to apprehension or even resistance from teachers. Furthermore, managerial reforms require teachers to take on additional responsibilities, but at the same time undermine their professionalism and autonomy. The case studies in this book make a strong case for teachers as agents, rather than subjects, of educational change.

As a global federation of education unions, Education International (EI) amplifies the voices of teachers and other educational staff from around the world. For EI, this publication is timely and important. We hope that it will resonate with policy makers globally as a caution against ad-hoc policy adoption without adequate consideration for the contextual realities in which they will be implemented. We also hope that it will prompt action towards promoting integrity within education reforms that include the voice and leadership of teachers.

Fred Van Leeuwen
EI General Secretary
December 2012

ACRONYMS

AIPTF	All India Primary Teachers' Federation (India)
BERMUTU	Better Education through Reformed Management and Universal Teacher Upgrading Project (Indonesia)
BSNP	National Education Standards Agency (Indonesia)
CCP	Cluster Centre Principal
CLMC	Cluster Management Committee
CPD	Continuing Professional Development
CPM	Carrera Pública Magisterial (public teaching career) law (Peru)
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPEP	District Primary Education Programme (India)
DRE	Education Regional Boards (Acronym in Spanish) (Peru)
EFA	Education for All
EI	Education International
ESTP	Education Systems Transformation Programme (Jamaica)
ETP	Education Transformation Programme (Jamaica)
EU	European Union
FSGI	Indonesian Teachers Associations Federation
GMER	Global Managerial Education Reforms
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IFC	International Financial Corporation
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGNOU	Indira Gandhi National Open University (India)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JTA	Jamaican Teachers' Association
JTC	Jamaica Teaching Council
MBESC	Ministry of Basic Education, Sport and Culture (Namibia)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MENPAN	Ministry of Administrative Reform (Indonesia)
MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports (Uganda)
MONE	Ministry of National Education
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRLGH	Minister of Regional and Local Government and Housing (Namibia)
NCTE	National Council for Teacher Education (India)
NEI	National Education Inspectorate (Jamaica)
NEP	National Education Project (Peru)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NPM	New Public Management
NCERT	National Council of Educational Research and Training (India)
NUEPA	National University of Educational Planning and Administration (India)
OB	Operation Blackboard (India)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PGRI	Indonesian Teachers' Association
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PMPTK	Directorate General of Quality Improvement of Teachers and Education Personnel (Indonesia)
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PSMP	Public Sector Modernisation Programme (Jamaica)
RDE	Regional Directorates of Education
RTE	Right to Education Act (India)
SCP	Student-centred Pedagogy
SCS	School Cluster System
SSA	Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (India)
TE	Teacher Evaluation
TIMSS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
TVET	Technical, Vocational Education and Training
UGEL	Education Management Unit (Acronym in Spanish) (Peru)
UK	United Kingdom
UNATU	Ugandan National Teachers' Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UPPET	Universal Post Primary Education programme (Uganda)
US	United States
USE	Universal Secondary Education
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 1

GLOBAL EDUCATION REFORMS AND THE NEW MANAGEMENT OF TEACHERS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION

Antoni Verger and Hülya Kosar Altinyelken

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decades, a global movement of education reform has transformed education systems worldwide (Salhberg, 2006). The intensity of this movement is such that some observers even speak about an 'epidemic' of education reforms (Levin, 1998; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004). This reform movement emphasises a mix of market and managerialist policy solutions as the most effective way to solve old and new educational problems. As a consequence, choice, competition, incentives, and accountability are becoming increasingly central policy principles in the global education agenda and in the re-structuring of educational systems all around the globe.

The main objectives of the current Global Managerial Education Reforms (hereafter referred to as GMERs or managerial education reforms) are to improve countries' competitiveness by upgrading students' learning achievement and, at the same time, enhancing the efficiency of education systems. These reforms aim to drastically transform the way the public sector operates in education by introducing private sector participation, incentives and a new culture of competitive performativity. Overall, GMERs suggest that the public sector should learn from the private sector managerial culture and adopt their rules, values and techniques. The manifesto, *The Teachers We Need and How to Get More of Them,* promoted in 1999 by conservative groups in the United States (US), illustrates quite well the rationale behind GMERs. In this manifesto, it is stated that:

> *The good news is that America is beginning to adopt a powerful, common-sensical strategy for school reform. It is the same approach that almost every successful modern enterprise has adopted to boost performance and productivity: set high standards for results to be achieved, identify clear indicators to measure progress towards those results, and be flexible and pluralistic about the means for reaching those results. This strategy in education is sometimes called "standards-and-accountability"* [1].

Some of the most well-known policies being implemented in the context of GMERs are school-based management and related forms of decentralisation, accountability policies,

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[1] *See http://www.intellectualtakeout.org/library/research-analysis-reports/teachers-we-need-and-how-get-more-them*

teachers' evaluation, standards-based curriculum, target-setting and public-private partnerships (PPPs) in education. The main promoters of these policies into low-income contexts are international organisations such as the World Bank and regional development banks, but also bilateral aid agencies and corporate philanthropists. The last World Bank Education Sector Strategy, *Learning for All* (2011), or the book, *Making Schools Work*, published by the World Bank itself, depicts to a great extent the core beliefs and the main policy tools supported by the GMER movement (see Bruns *et al*., 2011; World Bank, 2011).

GMERs aim at transforming education systems in many ways, however, among other effects, their actual and potential effects on teachers are remarkable. Managerial reforms do not necessarily target teachers' work directly, but might affect teachers by altering the regulatory and normative environment in which they operate. GMERs tend to modify the working conditions of teachers and their responsibilities, as well as how teachers' performance is assessed and judged by the state and society. Managerial reforms also challenge the professional status of teachers, and reshape teaching as a profession. To some extent, this is the consequence of the fact that the managerial focus of GMERs converts teachers into objects of intervention and assets to be managed rather than to subjects of educational change (Welmond, 2002; Ginsburg, 2012). As Stephen Ball (2003) argues, these types of reforms, due to their disciplinary character, do not only change what teachers do, but also who teachers are or are supposed to be.

Overall, GMERs advocates tend to hold teachers responsible for many of the problems education systems face. On certain occasions, they even do so in a grotesque way. For instance, on the front cover of *Making Schools Work*, there is an image of a teacher "asleep at his desk, sandals off, legs outstretched" that tries to transmit the message of teachers as the "main culprit failing children and their learning" (Robertson, 2012).

This volume is an attempt to understand, from an empirically grounded perspective, the nature, scope and dimensions of the new global trend of managerial education reforms, and specifically the relationship between this type of reform and teachers. The different case studies included here analyse reforms aimed at introducing teacher evaluation (Peru) and teacher accountability measures (Indonesia and Jamaica), competency-based curriculum (Turkey), public private partnerships (Uganda), contract teachers (India) and decentralisation (Namibia).

This introductory chapter is structured as follows. In the first part, we present the main characteristics of GMERs and review the key policies and ideas that constitute them. We also discuss how these types of policies transform the relationship between the state and education, and why and how they are being disseminated and adopted in many parts of the world. In the second part, we explore the main issues and controversies of this type of reforms in relation to teachers. Specifically, we highlight some of the main paradoxes of GMERs in the way they understand teachers' labour and aim to transform it. In the third and last part, we present the book's structure and content, and outline the main questions that it addresses.

MAIN FEATURES OF GLOBAL EDUCATION REFORMS

The education reforms analysed here have a strong managerial understanding of what are the most important educational problems, how education change should be carried out and how educational systems should be organised. One of the main objectives of GMERs is to increase education quality standards, but without necessarily investing more resources in education systems. In fact, GMERs attempt to move the focus of education reforms further away from an inputs rationale to a reform agenda with measurable outcomes, governance and managerial solutions at its core. GMERs advocates insist that the relationship between spending and results in education is weak or that, instead of inputs, governance-driven solutions are the most appropriate way to address current educational problems, such as low efficiency and learning rates, that most countries face (Hanushek, 1997; Bruns *et al*., 2011; WB, 2011).

The growing centrality of this type of approach to education reform needs to be understood in the context of broader public sector reforms that are affecting all type of policy sectors, not only education, and that are shaped by the so-called New Public Management. According to West *et al*. (2011, p. 43), New Public Management ideas have important implications for service delivery since they mean:

> *A separation of purchaser and provider roles; a growth in contractual arrangements; increasing accountability for performance; increasing the flexibility of pay and conditions of staff; separating political and managerial processes; emphasising the public as consumer; increasing the role played by regulation; and changing the culture of public services towards a private sector culture.*

GMER focus on how schools should be managed, financed and made accountable, and on how conditional incentives should be introduced into the education system to reward or punish actors according to their performance. In particular, they are very supportive of school autonomy ideas, and of promoting competition between schools via standardised testing and demand-side interventions such as vouchers or other types of capitation grants. In general, GMERs are strongly framed by an economic rationality and assumptions coming from economic theory concerning families, principals and teachers behaving as self-interested and benefit-maximiser agents, and about the possibility of retrieving and sharing perfect information about schools' quality. The economic rationality behind GMERs is, to some extent, the natural consequence of the fact that the main carriers of this type of reforms are located in international development banks, in which most of their staff has a background in economics and, specifically, in neoclassic economics.

Interestingly, GMERs promoters' main aim is to improve the levels of student learning, but, in their analysis and prescriptions, they do not explore sufficiently how and why students learn. In other words, they want to transform education without engaging directly with the core business of education: the teaching-learning processes.

The new role of the state in education: Neoliberal reforms, or something else?

Educationists usually qualify the managerial type of reforms analysed in this book as 'neoliberal' (see, for instance, Hill, 2009). There are different and competing definitions of neoliberalism; however, we do not think that the neoliberal label completely captures the type of phenomenon discussed here. Neoliberal reforms are, first and foremost, finance-driven reforms. They are committed with efficiency, above all else (Carnoy, 1999). However, the managerial change of education system is not necessarily more efficient than conventional education provision. Even when spending arguments are used to advance this type of policy, organising a public-private partnership or a school clusters framework can be very expensive since it requires several parallel services to be organised by the state to make these policies work (Levin, 2002). In Chile, for example, the voucher system that has been running in the country for more than thirty years is not cheaper than conventional public delivery because, with the passage of time, the private sector has been able to pressure the state very effectively to increase the amount of the vouchers.

GMERs advocates are enthusiastic about importing market rules and using market analogies when promoting their policies, as neoliberalism is, but this does not mean that they advocate the pure marketisation/privatisation of education, or the retirement of the state. In fact, this type of reform requires the state being more active than ever in education, although by adopting different roles. Thus, according to GMERs, the state should not provide education directly, and focus on the regulation and funding of schools –preferably, under demand funding formulas–, as well as on the evaluation and control of the performance of schools. Moreover, as many accountability policies establish, the state should use evaluations to inform society about schools' performance publicly, and reward and punish schools according to their progress.

Pure neoliberals, including libertarians such as James Tooley, tend to conceive state interventionism as a barrier for human beings to develop their entrepreneurial instinct (Tooley, 2005). However, the new managerial reformers do not think that state intervention is an issue for competition in education. Rather, they think that the state, through evaluation and 'sticks and carrots' policies, should be the one that actively promotes (and, to some extent, constructs) teachers, schools and other education actors as self-interested and competitive entrepreneurs.

To sum up, in contrast to neoliberal beliefs, global education reformers consider that the state should actively intervene in the funding and regulation of education systems. However, this does not mean that the state should be in charge of all type of educational activities. Far from it, the state should move away from direct education provision and rather focus on developing a range of managerial policy tools, including competitive funding and evaluation, to steer and control education at a distance. Paraphrasing Osborne and Gaebler (1993), according to GMERs, the state should become thinner, but simultaneously more powerful by focusing on "steering" rather than on "rowing" educational services.

Why are managerial reforms globalised?

Managerial education reforms are not acquiring global status simply because of the dynamics of emulation between countries or because there is a general perception about how successful these policies are. In fact, to date, there is no strong evidence that GMERs work or, specifically, that they contribute to improving students' learning in a consistent way. Evidence is rather mixed in this respect and varies according to the policy in question and according to the way these policies are designed. Policies such as quasi-markets in education, school-based management, target setting, or merit-based pay for teachers have been extensively criticised for their uneven and even negative impacts, especially in terms of education equity (Luke, 2003; MacEwan and Santibañez, 2005; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2009; Thrupp and Hursh, 2006; UNESCO, 2008; Waslander, 2010). Even Diane Ravitch, a former advocate of managerial reforms such as testing and merit-based pay for teachers, and a signatory of *The Teachers We Need* manifesto, considers today that "it is precisely this policy mix of 'choice / accountability/ private-sector participation/ teacher incentives' that (…) is 'making matters worse'" (Ravitch, 2010, in Robertson, 2012). Paradoxically, however, this has not prevented GMERs from being insistently disseminated around the world.

The fact that the managerial approach to education reform has been globalised is, to a great extent, related to the material and ideational power of the organisations backing them. These reforms count on persistent promoters strategically located in very influential and well-connected international organisations, the World Bank being the most outstanding. These types of organisations count on the necessary skills to frame managerial education reforms in an appealing way, as well as on the resources to promote them effectively via international seminars, well-distributed publications, highly-ranked web pages and so on. However, they also have the necessary resources to finance this type of reforms. A quick look at the educational projects funded by the World Bank, but also by regional development banks in the last decades, shows how components such as school competition, school-based management, decentralisation, private sector participation and, more recently, accountability have been disseminated to all world regions.

The global education reform movement benefits from the fact that, especially in developing contexts, governments feel increasing pressure to achieve the Education For All (EFA) goals. Today, EFA is working as an important window of political opportunity for reformers to promote and sell their policy alternatives in countries that are still far from achieving their international commitments. However, rich countries are not exempt from international pressure either. For instance, it is interesting to see how countries such as Germany and the US have reacted to their low results in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (Martens *et al.*, 2010). In summary, due to the increasing international pressure stemming from international standardised tests, loan conditionalities, the EFA Action Framework and so on, more and more governments are open to experimenting with 'innovative' ways of education delivery and to adopting new managerial approaches.

However, GMERs do not have to be seen as an external imposition that always 'travels' from the global to the local in a unidirectional way. In many occasions, national governments are pro-actively interested in adopting them, and not necessarily to receive external funding or technical assistance. On occasion, adhering to global reforms, global commitments

and global educational discourses allows them to legitimise pre-established policy preferences and to make the case for education changes at home that would otherwise be contested (Grek, 2007). Also, from the point of view of legitimacy, GMERs could be seen as attractive for policy makers because they would allow them to distance themselves from the poor performance of the education system and make schools and teachers responsible instead.

Whatever the reasons are, the fact that managerial education reforms are being globalised does not mean that they take the same form everywhere they are adopted. According to Peck and Theodore (2010, p. 170), global policies "mutate during their journeys, they rarely travel as complete packages, they move in bits and pieces - as selective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesised models - and they therefore 'arrive' not as replicas but as policies already-in-transformation". Thus, the final form that global education policies adopt in particular contexts is mediated by domestic history and politics, and by the complex interplay between global and local forces (Verger *et al*., 2012). Comparative education literature is full of case studies that emphasise the mediating role of political and institutional factors in the re-contextualisation of diverse policies such as education assessment systems, teacher accountability or decentralisation (Benveniste, 2002; Rhoten, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi and Waldow 2012). Among these factors, the political ideology of the government of the countries (and the regions) in question, and the position adopted by veto players and key education stakeholders stand out (Martens *et al*., 2010). As several chapters in this volume show, among other type of contingencies, the role played by teachers and teachers' unions is critical to understanding whether external policies are actually adopted and enacted, to what extent and how.

TEACHERS IN GLOBAL EDUCATION REFORMS

In a globalised economy, education, skills and knowledge are increasingly seen as key assets for economic competitiveness, and most countries and regions in the world aspire to become "knowledge economies" (Gouvias, 2007). As part of this aspiration, education becomes more central in the development strategies of governments and, in particular, "schools and teachers are being asked to do more than they have done before, but also in a different way" (Sahlberg, 2006, p.283). Overall, the international development community pays increasing attention to the key role that teachers play in the provision of quality education for all (Leu, 2005). To illustrate the growing structuring power attributed to teachers' agency today, the UNESCO *Global Monitoring Report* (2005, p. 18) considers that teachers "are the strongest influence on learning", and the 2007 McKinsey report emphasises ideas like that "the only way to improve outcomes is to improve instruction" and "the quality of an education system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers" (McKinsey 2007, p. 4).

Similar ideas on the role of teachers are becoming central in both Southern and Northern countries' education debates. In the US, in the last decade, there has been a strong political campaign to make teachers more responsible for the education problems of the country. According to the National Commission on Teaching and America's Future, "what teachers know and can do is the most important influence on what students learn" (1996, p. 10). In fact, the role of teachers is expected to *determine* students' achievement independently of whether they operate in socially unfavourable contexts. Conservative groups,

under the George W. Bush presidency and the No-Child-Left-Behind reform, famously coined the expression "no excuses" to maintain that "all children can attain academic proficiency without regard to poverty, disability, or other conditions, and that someone must be held accountable if they do not". According to these education reformers, this "someone" is, of course, the teachers[2].

As Carnoy *et al*. (2009, p. 47) state, "societies that seriously want to improve their students' performance in school must improve the quality of teachers in schools". However, acknowledging that 'teachers make a difference' is far from saying that teachers 'determine' students' learning or that the socio-economic contexts in which teachers operate should be underestimated in our analysis of learning outcomes. In fact, the uni-linear arguments and, to some extent, educational optimism expressed in the "no excuses" campaign challenge decades of social sciences research in education in industrialised countries that points out the complex and mutually influential relationship between, on the one hand, socio-economic and environmental variables (such as school composition, urban and school segregation, socio-economic status, parents' cultural capital, low level of expectations of disadvantaged students, etc.) and, on the other, teaching-learning processes taking place at the school level (Barone, 2006; Montt, 2011; Nye *et al*., 2004; Sirin, 2005). They even challenge the most recent results of PISA that directly relate the levels of learning to the levels of education equity in countries (OECD, 2010). What social sciences research and, more recently, the OECD/PISA show is that, if education quality or learning outcomes are to be improved, society needs to take the equity between and within schools, as well as the social, economic and cultural conditionings that affect student learning more seriously. Unfortunately, managerial educational reformers tend to omit the importance of these types of elements when prescribing specific policy tools that aim at improving student learning (Verger and Bonal, 2012).

That being said, ideas such as those quoted above could be welcomed by teachers as they make teachers more visible and place them at the centre of the education debate. However, at the same time, and as outlined below, they make teachers more vulnerable and attribute more respon-sibilities to them, which are not always in their best interest (Klees, 2008; Tatto, 2009).

Main paradoxes in the relationship between GMERs and teachers

Global education reformers join the international consensus about teachers' performance as a key determinant of education quality and, very often, put teachers at the centre of their policy ideas and interventions. The policy interventions designed in the context of the GMERs movement have the potential to transform teachers' work in several ways. Teacher evaluation and related accountability policies aim to enhance the visibility of teachers' work vis-à-vis both the state and the rest of society; merit-based policies aim at regulating teachers' salaries according to their performance; standards-based reforms detail what teachers have to learn and teach; PPPs favour the deregulation of teachers' labour; and school-based management reinforces the role of teachers as both school managers and, to some extent, community workers. Thus, these types of education policies have the potential to alter the way teachers are paid,

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[2] *See http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/08/schools-we-can-envy/?pagination=false*

their duties and responsibilities, and the way their labour is regulated and evaluated. In other words, they have the capacity to alter the nature of teaching as a profession.

These policies are based on technologies that employ "judgments, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change – based on rewards and sanctions both material and symbolic" (Ball, 2003, p. 216). They are often designed under the assumption that teachers, above all those operating in the public sector, are self-interested actors who do not count on sufficient incentives to perform and give their best in the classrooms (Le Grand, 1996). Thus, contingent incentives and 'sticks and carrots' mechanisms, to sanction under-performance and award competitive behaviour, structure the type of policy interventions that global education reformers design. In these types of interventions:

> *Teachers are presented and encouraged to think about themselves as individuals who calculate about themselves, 'add value' to themselves, improve their productivity, strive for excellence and live in existence of calculation. They are 'enterprising subjects', who live their lives as an 'enterprise of the self' (Ball, 2003, p. 217).*

Overall, the way teachers are perceived and treated in GMERs often involves a multitude of paradoxes and shortcomings. Below, we highlight the most evident of them.

The **first paradox** consists of the fact that GMERs continuously stress the importance of teachers and emphasise the key role they play in education quality, but simultaneously disempower them in several ways. Specifically, they do so in three ways: a) by not sufficiently taking into account their preferences in policy processes, b) by treating teachers as assets to be managed rather than as agents of change, and c) by undermining their autonomy in front of the state and students' families.

a) GMERs do not take teachers' voices and needs sufficiently into account when designing policy interventions. Many countries that adopt managerial reforms generally work more closely with the international donor community than with national stakeholders, including teachers. Several chapters in this volume show how international organisations, even when they do not make policy decisions 'in the name of governments', are de facto very influential when it comes to agenda setting and benchmarking managerial policies. In contrast, the participation of teachers is limited at the moment of adopting and designing these types of policies (see, for instance, Gulpers and Broekman in this volume).

b) GMERs usually conceive of teachers as objects of intervention rather than as subjects of educational change. As Mark Ginsburg (2012) concludes in his analysis of the *World Bank Education Strategy 2020*, the managerial approach to education reform is deeply problematic due to the fact that it perceives teachers as "assets" instead of as professionals, learning actors, or political agents. He does so by showing that in the World Bank's new Education Strategy, 71 per cent of the references to teachers follow the notions of teacher as "human resources" (for student learning) and teachers as "employees" (to be managed). In contrast, there are no references to teachers as members of professional organisations and unions, and to teachers as learners/inquirers. It is worth

mentioning that this represents an involution in the World Bank conception of teachers in relation to previous Strategies in which the latter notions were not predominant, but at least were mentioned a few times (Ginsburg, 2012).

c) GMERs disempower teachers in front of families and the state. Tatto (2009, p. 3) states that the policies being implemented under the umbrella of GMERs "seem directed at taking control of education away from teachers". They often do so under efficiency arguments, by removing expensive structural measures that can contribute to teachers increasing education quality (labour conditions, high quality pre-service training, etc.), and by introducing conditional incentives and other contingent policies (Tatto, 2009). Another important source of teacher disempowerment can be found in the fact that, through GMERs, the state standardises what teachers need to do in the classroom and to which end. Thus, even when global reformers tend to adopt the rhetoric of active learning, autonomy and problem-solving (see Altinyelken, chapter 7 in this volume), they actually try to control what teachers have to teach in class via standardised testing, output comparisons, target-setting or competitive funding formulas (Ball, 2003; Feldfeber, 2007). Furthermore, managerial reforms, due to their pro-market bias, aim at enhancing client power (i.e. the power of families) above the power of teachers and schools (Delandshere and Petrosky, 2004; Brans, chapter 5 in this volume). Something similar happens with school-based management and similar reforms that involve the constitution of 'community councils' that give voting power and authority over budget and teaching personnel to parents (Gershberg et al., 2012).

The **second paradox** relates to the fact that managerial reforms request more responsibilities from teachers but, at the same time, advocate their de-professionalisation. Teachers are supposed to do more things than before and in a different way, even when their preparation and work conditions might be poorer. On occasion, global education reformers directly vindicate the deregulation of teachers' training and certification. For instance, the *Teachers We Need* manifesto (p. 2) states that:

> *A better solution to the teacher quality problem is to simplify the entry and hiring process. Get rid of most hoops and hurdles. Instead of requiring a long list of courses and degrees, test future teachers for their knowledge and skills. Allow principals to hire the teachers they need. Focus relentlessly on results, on whether students are learning.*

GMERs advocates also support policies that make teachers' recruitment more flexible, for instance, via contract teachers or charter schools, because they allow governments to expand schooling - and, tentatively, doing so without affecting education quality - in a cost-effective way.

> *In those countries where public sector staff is paid high wages as a result of belonging to strong unions, [in PPPs] there is a cost saving associated with the contractor being able to hire nonunionized labor (Patrinos et al., 2009, p. 11).*

> *It is relatively common for private schools and charter schools to recruit teachers with qualifications equivalent to those of public school teachers while paying lower salaries or offering less job security (Bruns et al., 2010, p. 144).*

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Of course, there are different types of GMERs and, consequently, they do not have always the same implications for teachers' professionalism. In cases such as those outlined above, they imply a more radical de-professionalisation, while, in others teachers qualifications and pre-service and in-service training are taken more seriously (Müller *et al.*, 2010).

In any case, under new managerial reforms, teachers are losing something more than labour rights, since they are also losing their professional autonomy and their status in society (Sahlberg, 2006). This is the consequence of the teaching profession becoming more subjected to public blame and to often-intrusive external inspection. Furthermore, their activity becomes more firmly dependent on a pre-defined set of professional standards of practice and very prescriptive teaching materials (Hargraves *et al.*, 2007)[3]. These trends are in contrast to the professionalism paradigm, which has prevailed in most European countries for decades, in which families, but also the state, trust teachers and accept that they have the necessary knowledge and expertise to know what is best for children's learning (Le Grand, 1996).

In general, GMERs advocates do not believe firmly in the possibility of teachers behaving as professionals; in fact, they do not believe that such behaviour can prevail within the public sector more broadly speaking. They see teachers in public schools as employees who do not have the necessary incentives to perform satisfactorily and, on occasions, even as "free-riders" who do not put enough effort and attention in their work. There is no doubt that problems such as teachers' demotivation or absenteeism are severe in several locations (Alcázar *et al*., 2006, Chaudhury *et al*., 2006) and should not be disregarded, nevertheless they need to be addressed by the state on the basis of accurate diagnosis of the problem. Addressing this and other problems via surveillance and other deprofessionalising policies could have even more harmful implications for education quality in the medium and long term. To a great extent, this would be a consequence of the fact that, if the work conditions of teachers are undermined, teaching will not be an attractive profession to the most capable people in society. Furthermore, these types of policies, due to their universal vocation, could undermine quality by separating teachers from their specific problems and socio-economic realities (Welmond, 2002).

The **third paradox** is related to how GMERs advocates use evidence in a very 'selective' way. On the one hand, they promote managerial reforms even when they are aware of the fact that evidence of the positive impact of such reforms in learning outcomes is still inconclusive (Bruns *et al*., 2011; Experton, 1999; Patrinos *et al*., 2009; Vegas, 2005). On the other hand, however, they seem to ignore that the level of learning outcomes is higher in countries where their policy prescriptions are very marginal (or, in fact, have not been even implemented yet). Thus, education policies in countries such as Finland, Canada or Cuba - the best learning achievers in their respective regions - are very rarely considered as 'good practices' that could contribute to guiding education reforms in GMERs documents.

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[3] *Interestingly, in many low-income countries, international organisations are promoting deprofessionalising policies, when teachers have never achieved the 'professionalisation' stage that has prevailed for decades in many western societies.*

In fact, according to Ravitch (2010), most probably, the reason why managerial reforms advocates do not consider Finland, the best performing country in the world for the last decade according to PISA, as an example of international good practice is that the Finnish system does not use teacher evaluation, merit-pay, census-based standardised tests, or ranked schools.

Finland, Canada or Cuba are very different in geographic, socio-economic and political terms, but implement teachers' policies that have many points in common. In all of these countries, teachers' work is highly professionalised and their professional activity is not driven by conditional incentives; teacher training is very demanding and the teaching profession is very prestigious (becoming a teacher is as demanding and counts on the same status as, for instance, becoming a doctor, a lawyer or an architect); and teaching is understood as a collegial work in which teachers solve problems together, and more experienced teachers are in charge (and feel responsible) for the development of younger teachers starting their career (Carnoy *et al.*, 2007; Sahlberg, 2011).

In line with this argument, a recent OECD study on performance-based pay for teachers concludes that "countries that have succeeded in making teaching an attractive profession have often done so not just through pay [and merit-pay schemas], but by raising the status of teaching, offering real career prospects, and giving teachers responsibility as professionals and leaders of reform" (OECD 2012, p. 4).

One of the main concerns with merit-based pay schemas is that they can undermine cooperation between teachers and promote individualist values within the education system (Schleicher, 2011). Pasi Sahlberg (2006), who worked for the education division of the World Bank between 2003 and 2007 and is an expert on the Finnish case, is sceptical about importing market mechanisms into education systems as the most straightforward way of improving quality and 'activating' teachers. In one publication, inspired by the Finnish experience, he concludes that:

> Rather than competition between education systems, schools and students, what is needed is networking, deeper co-operation and open sharing of ideas at all levels if the role of education in economic competitiveness is to be strengthened (Sahlberg, 2006, p. 259).

Other observers also challenge the idea of competition and 'pressure to meet targets' as quality education devices by arguing that these policies encourage schools to recruit the most able, and usually middle-class, students (Thrupp and Hursh, 2006). By adopting this type of strategy (commonly known as 'invested selection'), the schools in question might enhance their particular performance, but contribute to undermining the quality and the equity of the overall education system. When such dualisation of the education system happens, those teachers who are located in schools that do not select students have to teach in a more difficult and challenging environment.

The **fourth and last paradox** identified is that GMERs ask teachers and schools to assume new duties and more complex mandates, but without taking into account whether there are the necessary material and technical conditions to undertake them. Quite often,

GMERs are designed by international organisations on the basis of pilot cases that work usually because they generate high expectations and levels of motivation among the education agents, and are quite well resourced. However, they are very difficult to scale-up because it is not possible to provide the same level of resources and incentives and/or generate the same 'momentum' when policies are transferred to much higher territorial scales (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010). In other words, some GMERs policies may work well in pilot studies, but are difficult to translate into state policy.

An associated problem is found in the uncritical importation/ exportation of GMERs to very different territories with very different educational cultures and levels of economic development. Some types of managerial reforms are designed on the basis of past experiences that have been implemented before in rich countries, which count on technical and material conditions that are not matched in poorer countries. As Lewin (2007) warns in relation to quasi-markets in education, these types of policies are too often inspired by education models drawn from well-developed, very professionalised and coherently regulated education systems, and are not easily transferable to partly-developed, poorly-professionalised and largely unregulated systems.

In her *Literature Review of Teacher Quality and Incentives*, Ilana Umansky (2005, p. 49) highlights that incentive policies have uneven results because "teachers' logical behavioural responses are often quite different from those that policy makers had hoped for and analysts had predicted". Quite often, GMERs advocates, as many other education planners do, underestimate the challenges and the dimension of the problems they want to solve and, at the same time, overestimate the capacity of schools, especially of those schools operating within disadvantaged areas (Halpin *et al*., 2004). They write policy in relation to the best of all possible schools, and do not sufficiently take into account the stress and tiredness with which teachers often struggle, the emotions involved in the teaching-learning process, and moments of cynicism and frustration with the continuous reforms and policy changes they are subjected to (Ball *et al*., 2012). On other occasions, reformers underestimate whether teachers have enough preparation, resources or capacity to perform as successfully as expected in the context of new policy frameworks such as child-centred pedagogy reforms or the establishment of a new teaching career track. Thus, before countries consider experimenting with these types of policies, they would do better by investing in pre-service teaching training and on the upgrading of teachers' work conditions to make the profession more appealing (see Altinyelken and van der Tuin *et al*., chapters 7 and 8 in this volume).

However, in many other cases, the main problem with GMERs policies is that they are based on weak and/or simplistic assumptions about teachers' motivations and identities. In fact, the assumption of teachers as self-interested agents or as free-riders that is implicit in managerial policy discourses does not match the identities and self-perceptions of teachers in their complexity. As Welmond (2002) shows in an in-depth case study in Benin, teachers have a multi-dimensional identity that includes: teachers as 'beacons' for the community, teachers as civil servants (with the social status this involves), teachers as dedicated and self-sacrificing persons, and teachers as efficient professionals (who are responsible for ensuring that students learn). Managerial policy discourses and specific reforms, such as contract-teachers policies, which were imported into Benin via the international aid community, were met with

strong opposition because teachers felt that they were not being treated with respect and that some important dimensions of their identities were being challenged. Welmond (2002, p. 65) states:

> *Policy analyses based on purely technical evaluations, without an understanding of the pact between that state and the teacher, will generally lead to well-worn recommendations that have already proven their uselessness. In the case of Benin, any policy framework that does not include a coherent strategy for addressing teacher valorization or professionalization will not lead to the intended results.*

To sum up, GMERs advocates usually base their policy prescriptions on a very flat ontology of the nature of teaching and of the drivers of teachers' behaviour. And, on top of these premises, they aspire to build policy prescriptions with pretension of universality that, consequently, could 'work' in very different contexts and independently of the level of socio-economic development. The way GMERs usually treat teachers is profoundly paradoxical because, rhetorically, they conceive teachers as determinant agents for education quality and attribute new responsibilities to them but, at the same time, disempower them and undermine their professional status and autonomy. Moreover, GMERs ask teachers and schools to assume new duties and more complex mandates without giving enough importance to whether the necessary material conditions and capacities are in place to undertake them. Last, but not least, the evidence used to support GMERs overestimates their potential impact in education and, at the same time, ignores that the best performing countries in education according to international standardised tests regulate teachers' labour very differently to what they prescribe.

To a great extent, the paradoxes and shortcomings of global managerial education reforms pointed out in this section permeate and are reflected in the different case studies included in this volume.

ABOUT THIS BOOK

This book aims at understanding, from an empirically grounded perspective, the nature, scope and dimensions of the new global trend of managerial education reforms and, specifically, how these types of reforms relate to teachers. The case studies presented in the book have been undertaken primarily by junior researchers as part of their research for a Masters in International Development Studies at the University of Amsterdam (UvA).

All chapters are grounded on original research and primary data, and analyse how a range of global educational policies, including PPPs, competency-based curriculum[4], school clusters, teacher evaluation and teachers/schools accountability have been adopted, designed and

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[4] *The case study on 'competency-based curriculum' is the only one in the book that does not fit in strictu sensus in the category of managerial education reforms. However, it provides the same elements of the other case studies to think about the globalisation and re-contextualisation of education reforms.*

implemented in a number of Southern countries. They specifically focus on how these reforms transform teachers' work and on whether and how teachers are included in the policy process. From Indonesia to Jamaica, from Peru to Namibia, from Turkey to Uganda and India, we will see how a similar education reform jargon and a similar set or rules and principles are being adopted, consented or resisted by teachers and other education stakeholders, and why. The book draws on fieldwork conducted in the mentioned locations between 2009 and 2011 by using a mix of qualitative (interviews, focus group discussions and observations) and quantitative (questionnaire) methods.

The focus of the chapters is not on the particular effects of GMERs on, for instance, students' achievement, school efficiency or education equity. In some of the countries analysed, GMERs have been adopted only very recently and, in some cases, only pilot experiences have been implemented. The chapters rather focus on the so-called policy process and trace how the policies in question have been conceptualised and introduced in global agendas, the particular form they have adopted in specific countries, and whether and how they are being implemented and enacted by key stakeholders, including teachers. Specifically, the main questions that this book aims at answering are:

1. *How are global education reforms re-contextualised and translated into particular contexts? What are the mediating elements and institutions affecting the translation and re-contextualisation of GMERs to particular education contexts?*

2. *What are the specific difficulties associated with the implementation of global/managerial education policies in local contexts? Specifically, how are they received by teachers and other local education stakeholders? To what extent are GMERs enacted or resisted by them?*

3. *According to the key education stakeholders involved in the reforms, do GMERs bring about the intended results? What are the main challenges and opportunities of this type of reforms when it comes to achieve their expected outcomes?*

4. *To what extent are the main assumptions and 'theories of action' behind GMERs substantiated by the actual facts, once the reforms are implemented and translated into specific educational practices?*

Overall, this book is openly explicit of the limitations of basing education reforms on the mix of managerialist and market ideas that GMERs represent. The different case studies the volume contains caution practitioners and policy-makers who might be seduced by global managerial discourses, or who are tempted to adopt 'sticks and carrots' policies as a magic bullet to solve the complex problems that education systems face, especially in poorer contexts. However, it should also be pointed out that this is not an "anti-reform" book. Rather, it is hoped that the different chapters provide elements to teachers, practitioners, aid agencies and other education stakeholders to reflect on educational change processes that could be, on the one hand, more in line with the education realities and problems prevailing in their particular contexts and, on the other, more participatory and respectful in nature with teachers' needs and identities.

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CHAPTER 2

THE RATIONALE AND EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY POLICIES ON THE WORK AND MOTIVATION OF TEACHERS: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA

Art Broekman

INTRODUCTION

In the last decades, countries across the world feel the need to expand and improve their education system in order to become more economically competitive. In this context, teachers are placed in the 'policy spotlight', because most governments believe that improving the quality of teachers is essential for competitiveness (Tatto, 2006). This has led to numerous policies that mainly consist of developing a quality assurance framework, in which the obligations of teachers and other education standards are detailed to ensure that schools and teachers meet certain goals (Vongalis-Macrow, 2007). Recent developments in Indonesia demonstrate that policy makers in this country have joined this global tendency where setting standards, monitoring and appraising teachers, and forging closer links between performance and reward are considered as effective ways to increase the quality, motivation and accountability of teachers. Unsurprisingly, this has several implications for the work of teachers.

This chapter focuses on the global trend to enhance teacher accountability and explores the consequences of some new 'accountability policies' on teachers' work in Indonesia. The chapter is mainly based on empirical data, collected during fieldwork in Java (Indonesia) in spring 2010. Semi-structured interviews with 16 teachers, 12 head teachers and 19 other educational stakeholders (e.g. policy makers, consultants) were held to explore the views and opinions about teacher motivation and accountability. Additionally, a questionnaire was distributed among approximately 335 teachers in urban schools in Jakarta and rural schools in the district of Yogyakarta.

In the first section, the global 'accountability movement' will be explained. Subsequently, in the second section, the Indonesian situation concerning accountability will be addressed. Special attention will be given to some recent policy initiatives developed under the *Better Education through Reformed Management and Universal Teacher Upgrading Project* (BERMUTU). In the third section, the policy process for the adoption and development of these policies will be explained. Finally, in the fourth section, initial reactions and reflections concerning the implementation of these policies will be given. In the conclusion, some critical comments and questions will be raised to illustrate the potential shortcomings and risks of the policy choices made by Indonesian policy makers concerning accountability. It is

argued that the policies might not reflect an appropriate understanding of the factors that motivate and de-motivate Indonesian teachers.

MAKING TEACHERS MORE ACCOUNTABLE: A GLOBAL TREND

The desire to hold schools and teachers more accountable is not new, as this aspiration surfaced in most developed countries in the 1960s. However, the 'New Right', during the mid to late-1980s, gave new energy to this aspiration in some core developed countries (including Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom). From this ideological perspective, it was assumed that greater accountability would lead to a better correspondence between public goals and the objectives of schools. It was also believed that it would improve the performance of schools, typically defined and measured by traditional achievement criteria (Leithwood and Earl, 2000). Securing compliance with globally determined standards of quality in teacher learning and practice became another argument to create or reinforce accountability measures (Tatto, 2007).

A main feature of this '*new accountability*' (Tatto, 2007, p. 8) is the introduction of market principles in school systems. West *et al*. (2011) illustrate how these market principles have gained significant influence on accountability structures within the education system in England. They identify seven types of accountability, which are present in school-based education, and argue that hierarchical and market accountability have become the dominant accountability regimes in English schools. This, in turn, has led to a focus on performance data and examination results. As a consequence, other types of accountability that involve debating and questioning, such as 'participative accountability', are pushed into the background.

The new accountability is part of what some call the 'Global Education Reform Movement', because the values and assumptions of the accountability movement of the 1980s have spread out all over the world through more intensive dynamics of global educational borrowing and lending (Sahlberg, 2006, p. 264). In such dynamics, governments emulate the educational policies and practices of the more successful countries or adopt reforms legitimated by international organisations including the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in order to minimise the uncertainties that exist about the outcomes of education reforms (Tatto, 2006). A recent publication of the World Bank, called *Making Schools Work, New Evidence on Accountability Reforms*, is illustrative in this respect. The report includes a review of recent global experiences with two types of policies that are thought to make teachers more accountable for results: contract tenure reforms and pay-for-performance reforms. The authors synthesise the experiences with these reforms in various countries and conclude that these reform experiences "permit a preliminary typology of examples that merit consideration by any education policy maker concerned with raising student learning" (Bruns *et al*., 2011, p. 200). Both the World Bank and OECD are very influential on the way countries think about their education systems

and the policies they design in order to improve them. However, this does not necessarily mean these are the best policies to adopt in all type of contexts.

Leithwood and Earl (2000) provide a useful framework to discuss policy initiatives that try to make the teaching profession more accountable. They distinguish four different approaches to accountability. Each approach has certain assumptions about the amount of change required in schools, the nature of the change and how this change can be achieved. *Market competition* approaches are based on the assumption that increased competition for students among schools, for example by introducing a school voucher system, will lead to more accountability. The *decentralisation approach* focuses on failing teacher accountability to (higher) levels within the government. It is assumed that teachers are more responsive to local values and preferences of parents and the local community when the power to make decisions about curriculum, budget, and personnel is in the hands of the parents or the community. The *management approach* consists of the introduction of more rational administrative procedures to create more goal-oriented, efficient, and effective schools. A main consequence of this approach to accountability is that monitoring progress and financial incentives and rewards become more common in schools. Accountability strategies with a *professionalisation approach* assume that the contribution of professional practice in schools is essential to their outcomes. Solutions and improvements are sought in standardised professional practices (e.g., teachers' classroom instructional practices) and school-level decision-making in key decision areas such as budget and curriculum (Leithwood and Earl, 2000).

The implications of accountability measures on teachers´ work are manifold. Teachers around the world are confronted with predetermined learning targets, intensive monitoring through standardised assessment and testing mechanisms, tightened external inspection to control the performance of teachers and schools and more performance-related compensation and other reward-sanction structures (Sahlberg, 2004). Other related consequences are the development of standards for recruiting and selecting new teachers and new systems of accreditation and certification (Tatto, 2007). As will be seen, these developments have influenced teachers' labour in Indonesia as well.

THE CASE OF INDONESIA

For decades, the Indonesian education system was firmly centralised. This came to an end when Indonesia was severely hit by the Asian crisis at the end of the 1990s, forcing the government to initiate a series of large-scale reforms. In 1999, two decentralisation laws with an enormous impact on education made it possible for the central government to reduce its expenditure and give more responsibility to local governments and at household level. At that time, the country was also subjected to the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus. The World Bank advocated the devolution of responsibilities and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditioned the 'post-crisis rescue package' to the implementation of market deregulation and privatisation (Kristiansen and Pratikno, 2006).

The most recent legal framework in Indonesia for the development of education is Law N° 20, which was issued in 2003. On the basis of this law, the Indonesian government has

implemented several reforms to change education practices at school level and to provide quality education. The reforms include, among other things, the implementation of school-based management, a school-level curriculum, school-based teacher professional development, teacher certification, international benchmarking, and national examinations (Firman and Tola, 2008).

In the last few years, Indonesian teachers have been the focus of policy reform. With more than three million teachers, Indonesia manages one of the largest teacher workforces in the world and it has to deal with a number of problems and challenges. High absence rates among primary-school teachers seem to be common (Chaudhurry *et al*., 2006) and many teachers do not have the minimum qualifications required by the Ministry of National Education (Arze del Granado *et al*., 2007). Overall, the Indonesian government attributes the poor performance of Indonesian students in international student assessment tests to the poor quality of Indonesian teachers (Jalal *et al*., 2009). Therefore, massive reforms have been undertaken in recent years to try to improve the 'quality, welfare and performance' of Indonesian teachers. In particular, the 'Law on Teachers and Lecturers' (Law N° 14 in 2005, hereafter called Teachers' Law) and the 'Better Education through Reformed Management and Universal Teacher Upgrading Project' (BERMUTU) have had a major impact on teachers.

The Teachers' Law

The Teachers' Law is designed "to provide a much-needed incentive for teachers to improve their qualifications and professional skills" (Jalal *et al*., 2009, p. 17). The law determines minimum qualifications for teachers and outlines a new teacher certification process. Teachers need to have a minimum academic qualification of at least four years of post-secondary education and to obtain practical experience as a classroom teacher. Teachers also have to pass a certification examination that will test their skills in four competency domains (pedagogical, professional, personal and social) before becoming a certified teacher. Once teachers are certified, they will receive a professional allowance (equal to their base civil service salary), a smaller functional allowance, and a special allowance when working in areas where teachers are much needed (also equal to the base civil service salary). Overall, this means that teachers can see their salary doubled or tripled (Jalal *et al*., 2009). In return for this salary improvement, certified teachers are obligated to undertake professional development activities and they will need to be monitored more regularly.

The BERMUTU project

The implementation of the Teachers' Law is assisted by the BERMUTU project. This central government project is partly funded by the World Bank with a loan (US$86 million) and a grant of the Dutch government (US$52 million). Three Directorates of the Ministry of National Education (MONE) are responsible for its implementation. The objective of BERMUTU is "to contribute to the improvement of the overall quality and performance of teachers through enhancing teachers' knowledge of subject matter and pedagogical skills in the classroom" (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). The project runs from 2007 to 2013 and consists of four components: 1) reforming university-based teacher education; 2) strengthening structures for teacher improvement at the local level; 3) reforming teacher accountability and

incentives systems for performance appraisal and career advancement; and 4) improving programme coordination, monitoring and evaluation.

Both the Teachers Law and BERMUTU fit perfectly with the global accountability movement. Typical elements of this movement are picked up by policy makers and find their way into the Indonesian education system. In particular, the third component of BERMUTU can be considered as a typical 'new accountability' policy. It aims at improving teacher performance and accountability by developing a new incentive system and a new instrument for performance appraisal. Or, in other words, the state wants to motivate teachers to perform better by altering their career and salary progression and the way teachers are assessed. A closer look to this policy initiative will be given in the next section.

THE NEW SYSTEM OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

BERMUTU's third component on accountability and incentives tries to activate more directly what is legislated by the Teachers' Law. Its main objective is "to develop an integrated framework designed to sustain and continually enhance the quality and accountability of teachers after they are certified" (World Bank, 2007, p. 48). All the activities within the third component are coordinated and overseen by a taskforce of the Directorate General of Quality Improvement of Teachers and Education Personnel (PMPTK). In the process of designing policies, procedures and instruments, special attention is given to the career structure and career progression of Indonesian teachers. The career structure of teachers used to be the same as the civil service structure, but this will change because of the Teachers' Law. Another important element is that policy makers try to forge closer links between performance and reward.

In the new structure, there are four professional levels for teachers: *Guru Pertama* (Novice Teacher), *Guru Muda* (Junior Teacher), *Guru Madya* (Senior Teacher), and *Guru Utama* (Master Teacher). Each of these professional levels consists of several grades. In order to progress to the next grade, teachers are obligated to accumulate a certain amount of 'credit points' each year by participating in professional development activities. These credit points can be earned by attending seminars, writing an assignment that will be evaluated, participating in a workshop and so on. In addition, for each teacher profile there are standards that have to be met in order to progress to a certain level and thus to a higher salary scale. The achievement of such standards will be controlled through the assessment of individual teachers. The development of a system of performance appraisal is therefore an essential element of the third component. In addition, setting up a structure for *continuing professional development* (CPD) and dealing with underperforming teachers are important policy areas.

Performance appraisal and continuing professional development

In 2007, MONE defined 24 competency areas for public and private school teachers. The National Education Standards Agency (BSNP) did some further work on these competencies.

In 2008, the agency published the sixth version of the 24 competencies, which were eventually reduced to 14 groups covering four areas: pedagogical, professional, social, and personal. In the second half of 2010, MONE piloted a new performance appraisal system, developed under BERMUTU, whereby teachers are assessed annually according to these competencies. In order to do this, the competencies are described as performance indicators that can be observed and monitored, and teachers are ranked on a five-point scale for each competency group.

This performance appraisal process consists of two different assessments: classroom observations and audits. The classroom-based activities are assessed by three annual observations. Teachers are observed twice at the beginning of the year to identify their strengths and weaknesses. Then there is a continuing professional development system in place, which will help teachers to improve in those areas where they are considered to be below standard. Each school should have a CPD-coordinator who will help teachers to shape their CPD programme. The CPD coordinator can approach several sources, mainly the district's educational officer, to find out what can be made available. What is available within the school in terms of mentoring? What is available through the professional teacher working groups? What is available outside the school using additional funds? The coordinator and the teacher will then decide which activities the teacher will undertake. The third and final observation takes place at the end of the year, which will be the actual assessment. For those activities that cannot be observed in the classroom, teachers will be audited three times during the year and the score is averaged over the year.

The outcome of this performance appraisal will influence the amount of credit points that teachers earn during the year, and thus the speed of their career progression. This, in turn, will affect their salary. The 'best' performing teachers can multiply their earned credit points by 125 per cent, while 'under-performing' teachers see their credit points reduced by 75 per cent. Teachers are expected to spend a minimum of four years at each of the four professional levels, but if a teacher is appraised with 125 per cent each year, he/she can progress rather quickly. But if a teacher loses 75 per cent of the earned credit points, he/she can spend more than 10 years in the same grade. Therefore, the career progression and income of teachers is directly related to their performance appraisal.

Managing 'underperforming' teachers

At the moment, Indonesian teachers are considered to have 'a job for life', because they can only be dismissed for inappropriate behaviour. Teachers cannot be sanctioned for any professional deficiency. Underperforming teachers, mostly those who do not fulfil disciplinary conditions mandated by the government, can be transferred to another district. This, however, rarely happens. PMPTK is now proposing, through BERMUTU, a new system for managing underperforming teachers. This system is closely related to performance appraisal and CPD, as it should work together. The performance appraisal system will identify the proficiency level of teachers according to the legislated pedagogical, professional, personal and social competencies. If teachers are consistently underperforming on these domains, and do not take advantage of opportunities to develop, there should follow a disciplinary sanction. If teachers are unable to improve or unwilling to improve, given a fair chance, then they should be taken out of the profession. At the time of research, the policies and instruments for managing underperforming teachers were not very well developed. The

main reason for this is that the necessary legislation is lacking. A consultant, who is closely involved in the reform, presumes that this process will take a long time, because it is considered to be very contentious and in the vanguard of a very substantial social change. Besides, this approach to underperforming teachers requires adequate facilities and opportunities for teachers to improve their competencies. At this moment, these facilities and opportunities are often lacking.

Global ideas in a local context ?

It is not difficult to recognise the elements of the 'new accountability' global trend in the new policies developed under BERMUTU. To start with, increasing global economic competition seems to be the driving force behind the policy efforts. The higher-level objective, to which BERMUTU aims for, is "to increase Indonesia's productivity and its competitiveness in the global economy" (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). Moreover, international tests, like the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), are considered as important elements that motivate the Indonesian government to implement large-scale reforms such as the Teachers' Law and BERMUTU. The comments of an international consultant at the World Bank are illustrative:

> On the ranks of TIMSS, Indonesia is right down. And the worst thing of all is that Singapore is up ahead and so is Malaysia and they get a bit upset about that. They compare themselves very much with Malaysia, because Malaysia is like a sister or brother Muslim nation. So they are looking forward to the next TIMSS to see whether there have been improvements.

Furthermore, the designed instruments and their objectives show agreement with global tendencies. Indonesian policy makers appear to have a 'management-approach' to accountability. With the development of the new performance appraisal system, it seems that Indonesia is moving towards a situation where setting performance standards, monitoring progress and financial incentives and rewards are becoming more common in schools. Indonesian policy makers seem to believe that "if you measure teachers, using indicators that are not directly related to their classroom performance, then everything else will fall into place and teachers will perform as you want them to perform if you keep measuring them" (former international consultant at MONE). It seems that another perception among policy makers is that increasing teacher salaries will be a main motivator and that teachers can be motivated by creating hurdles that they need to jump before they can earn a higher salary. These developments and perceptions follow market rhetoric logic and can be linked to the new accountability movement as well.

Policy makers at MONE emphasised that BERMUTU is an Indonesian project, but the influence of international actors became visible during the research. There are, for instance, several international consultants who are hired by MONE and support the taskforce of PMPTK. They bring their experience and knowledge of 'international best practices' into the ministry. Other policy borrowing mechanisms have been involved as well, such as study visits to Sri Lanka, England, Scotland, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore. These visits, attended by policy makers at MONE, were organised by the World Bank and one of the international consultants working for MONE. The purpose of the visits was to learn about in-service development of teachers in the visited countries. In this way, international organisations

and consultants were able to steer the process of agenda setting and policy design, by introducing policy makers to certain ideas, concepts and strategies.

The World Bank is of particular interest in these terms, because it supports BERMUTU, not only at the ideational level, but also materially, through a loan. Clearly, the main ideas behind the third component reflect an approach that is in line with the current education agenda of this organisation. Economical and managerial rationales are central to the World Bank and accountability, management, promotion and career progression fit within such rationales. An international education development specialist explained the focus on these topics as follows:

> Many projects tend to neglect the teachers in terms of teaching and learning. Why? Well, part of the answer lies in the background of the people who design these projects. Quite often, they are economists or development specialist, particularly in finance and planning, but not teachers. So, in many cases, you don't have someone with a strong background in education or teaching. As a result, things are conceptualised as a problem in planning, finance, accountability or management.

Eventually, these themes find their way into the ministry, and policy makers pick up the views and ideas propagated by donor and lending agencies. For example, a former international consultant at the World Bank commented that:

> In the past, the World Bank did this basic education project and they often leveraged its loans. They said for example: "We lend you money to repair schools or to build primary schools, but the money has got to be managed by the local community in a transparent manner". This was an attempt by the Bank to introduce better and more transparent management procedures.

The same mechanisms are at work in the case of BERMUTU. In addition to providing funds, the World Bank officially has a supervising role: it makes sure that the activities and the process are on track to achieve the development objectives. The World Bank also makes recommendations and gives technical input when necessary. Several informants, however, give more weight and influence to the Bank. Recommendations are taken seriously, because the Indonesian government relies (at least partly) on the World Bank's funds and expertise of international best practices in the process of policymaking. An example shows that the World Bank is pushing its own ideas and visions. A former international consultant at MONE, for instance, stated that:

> More recently, I began to feel that the World Bank was beginning to have an impact again. They feel that we have neglected one aspect, which is promotion of teachers. Their view is when teachers become head teachers or a head of department, it is a form of promotion. Therefore it needs to be looked at in a way which will encourage these appointments to be merit-based. But I don't think that Indonesia is ready for that. I think that there are many other things that need to be sorted out first. The Bank has got this idea that schools will advertise posts and the school committee will interview candidates and make an appointment based on the results of the interviews, as they do in Australia. But, in Indonesia, it does not work like that. I know that they are not happy with the fact that we did not address this. I know that there is going to be an extension of the project and I guess this is something the Bank is going to address.

Finally, the World Bank is also considered as a 'complicating factor', because it is pushing for its financial timeframe. As a result, the project is characterised as a process of rushing to meet immediate deadlines and spending money. According to an international consultant at MONE, it often happens that this rush to spend money takes over and becomes the predominant factor in decision-making. This is a disadvantage because, without this pressure, things would have been developed in a more thoughtful way.

SOME INITIAL REACTIONS AND REFLECTIONS

In several countries, efforts to introduce performance-based systems have not been very successful. The main reason for this is that appraisal instruments are too complicated and that major changes in pay structures are absent. As a consequence, new appraisal systems are seen with scepticism by most teachers (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

Therefore, it is interesting to look at the reactions of Indonesian teachers on the new policies developed under BERMUTU. Unfortunately, at the time of this research, the policies were not yet piloted or communicated to the teachers. This is in itself already an interesting fact, as BERMUTU started in 2007. However, it is possible to give some initial reactions and reflections on the policy efforts. In order to do this, Fullan (2001) provides a useful framework. Fullan argues that the implementation process is influenced by several factors divided in three categories: the characteristics of the policy itself (characteristics of change), the local context of the policy (local characteristics), and the context of the broader society (external factors).

The factors included in the characteristics of change are need, clarity, complexity and quality/practicality. This means that, in order to achieve a successful implementation, the policy (a) has to correspond with the priority *need*s of schools and teachers, (b) has goals and outcomes which are clear for teachers, (c) does not require a difficult and *complex* change of teachers and individuals responsible for implementation, and (d) should be considered by teachers to be of good *quality* and *practical* issues need to be covered. The four factors included in local characteristics are district, community, principal and teacher. Fullan argues that the implementation process will be more difficult if school districts and communities have had negative experiences with implementation processes in the past. Next to this, the attitude and role of principals is essential for a successful implementation as they manage the changes at the school level. Finally, the psychological state of teachers can make "him or her more or less predisposed toward considering and acting on improvements" (Fullan, 2001, p98). If teachers are open to changes in life, for example, they will be more likely to accept the new policy. External factors refer to the opinions of actors in the broader society, like the government and other stakeholders such as teacher unions. When the ideas of policy makers and teachers vary too much, the implementation process will be difficult (Fullan, 2001).

With Fullan's implementation theory in mind, there are several pitfalls to discern that may impede a successful implementation of the policies developed under BERMUTU. If these pitfalls are not addressed successfully, paradoxically, the implementation of the new performance appraisal system could act as a huge de-motivator for teachers, rather than a motivator.

Needs

In this study, teachers were asked about factors that will influence their motivation positively (see Box 2.1). The results show that teachers consider their salary, their skills and competencies, and the opportunities to improve themselves as important determinants of their motivation. However, higher priority is given to the availability of teaching and learning resources, which are often lacking or inadequate in Indonesian schools. Indeed, 49 per cent of the respondents strongly agree with the statement: "I will work harder if the school conditions will be improved". The percentages are much lower for the statements, "I will work harder if the head teacher visits my classes more often" (14 per cent) and "I will work harder if I would be evaluated more often" (13 per cent). Promotion opportunities are considered to be of less importance as well (20 per cent). The same conclusions can be drawn from the in-depth interviews. These findings indicate that the priority needs of teachers and the priorities of the policy makers do not match. While teachers especially need better school conditions and more teaching and learning facilities, the policies focus mainly on evaluation and promotion. The improvement of school facilities and learning materials are not foreseen in the reform, while they are considered by many teachers as crucial elements in improving education quality.

BOX 2.1: Teacher responses to statements concerning several motivational factors

Teachers were asked to respond to the following statements:

S1.   I will work harder if I get a higher salary.

S2.   I will work harder if the head teacher visits my classes more often.

S3.   I will work harder if I have more opportunities to upgrade my teaching skills.

S4.   I will work harder if I will be evaluated more often.

S5.   I will work harder if the school conditions (good study materials, adequate classroom conditions etc.) will be improved.

S6.   I will work harder if I have a better chance of promotion.

Complexity

If we look at the complexity of the policies, some critical comments can be made as well. First of all, the danger exists that performance appraisal becomes proceduralised and bureaucratised. Within the Ministry and the schools, there is much resistance against an appraisal system where actual decisions concerning teachers are made by an individual who assesses whether a teacher is performing well or not. An international consultant from MONE commented that:

> *Nobody wants to make a decision about things. They asked: "Can we just count indicators?" And we said: "Ok, we will try to make the system more procedural, but somewhere along the line you have to observe performance and assess it against a standard." But it is very strongly resisted. Teachers don't value a process whereby they have to think about something. They want it to be proceduralised. And I think that's the major risk with this whole system. That it just becomes a meaningless checklist.*

Bureaucratisation is lurking, because the new procedures demand a lot of paperwork. The whole process starts with a self-evaluation, then teachers should make CPD plans and, finally, there is a formative appraisal. There has to be an audit trail, because an evaluation team within the district has to decide on the credit points and any promotion opportunities. On paper, it might seem feasible, but the success of this whole system depends upon whether the procedures and actual activities can be made realistic, practical, useful and acceptable enough to the users. Teachers might experience the additional paperwork and CPD activities, next to their teaching job, as a burden.

Even more pressing, however, is the credit point regulation. This regulation was designed by the Ministry of Administrative Reform (MENPAN) and has a severe impact on what BERMUTU can do, because policy makers are bound by this regulation. The implication of this regulation is that CPD becomes a 'credit point earning activity'. Teachers have to pursue the accumulation of credit points, which is very quantitative, rigid and hierarchical in order to get promoted to the next level. It is argued that very little attention has been given to the way teachers are actually performing in the classroom and that it effectively blocks any self-motivated development. The following experience from a former international consultant at MONE is illustrative:

> *People know something about these regulations and they are already collecting credit points. To certain extent, this also happened in the past, but it becomes more extreme now. If you attend an international seminar, for instance, you get more credit points than a national seminar. Last weekend, I was invited to be a speaker at an international seminar in a small town in West Java, organised by the teachers there. And they could say it was 'international' because I was there. I was the international element. And 250 teachers spent their Sunday listening to talks so that they get a certificate. Who knows whether they heard anything that has been said, or whether they were changed in any way by what was said? Only two people got an opportunity to ask questions, so it was completely unidirectional. This is happening all over the place. And BERMUTU made it worse.*

Another concern related to the credit point system is the amount of credit points that can be earned with a certain activity. A national consultant working for MONE argued that the credit point system should be more proportional. The CPD activities, which are major tasks, yield relatively few points. This can de-motivate teachers, especially when these CPD activities are pushed by the government and not undertaken because of an intrinsic desire to develop.

The teaching working groups, which managed themselves quite successfully in the past, are now also bureaucratised from the top down. The modules, which teachers have to use whether they need them or not, will be designed in the centre. And each teaching working group has to have a constitution and a bank account that has to be audited every year. It is too early to tell if this will influence the success of these working groups, but there are concerns that, if teachers are not allowed to decide for themselves what the working groups will do, they will lose their spontaneity and their ability to respond to local needs. Because of this quantitative and top-down character of the policies, some people even perceive BERMUTU as "a wonderful opportunity that has been lost" (a former international consultant, MONE).

In Indonesia, most teachers consider a motivated teacher as someone who is disciplined and comes to school on time. Professional indicators, such as good class management, and creative and effective teaching were mentioned less by the teachers to indicate motivated teachers. This is understandable since Indonesian teachers have never been assessed on and adequately trained in their qualities and competencies before. Therefore, the new system will mean a major shift for teachers in their thinking about performance and motivation, or even about their profession. This shift, however, can only be achieved if there is a shift in thinking about the process of teaching and learning and the profession as a whole among all involved stakeholders (policy makers, government officials, head teachers, etc.). In this light, it is essential that the government values teachers primarily for their commitment to be excellent and involved educators, instead of for their willingness to serve the government. It is important that, during this complex change, teachers get the support and encouragement they need through CPD and adequate teacher training. Policy makers should not underestimate this. At this moment, the CPD structures and training opportunities for teachers are not well developed and definitely need more attention.

Quality and practicality

Some main assumptions behind the policies are that teachers can be motivated by evaluating them more often, by rewarding better-performing teachers (by paying them a higher salary), and by punishing poor performing teachers (by postponing promotion opportunities). Based on the questionnaire, it seems that Indonesian teachers support these assumptions in some way. Of all teachers, 89 per cent indicated that regular teacher evaluation will motivate them to perform better and 94 per cent indicated that paying a higher salary to better-performing teachers is a good policy to motivate teachers. The opinions are more divided when it comes to punishing poor performing teacher (by postponing promotion opportunities): 67 per cent of the respondents think this is a good policy to motivate teachers.

However, the current study also shows that regular classroom observation by the principal is not considered by many teachers as a good method to motivate them and provide feedback. Therefore, it is important to know how teachers perceive classroom observations, because these observations can only be effective if teachers consider them as a helpful instrument to develop their skills and achieve personal growth. In order to develop any commitment among teachers to the objectives of the new appraisal system, it is important that teachers have the confidence that these observations and assessments are subject to accurate and objective measurement, and they will be supported and not punished on the basis thereof. Otherwise, it can become a source of stress instead of a moment of reflection. In this respect, it is also important that principals are committed and enabled to constructively observe classroom practice and to fulfil a supportive function. More and better training for principals in this respect is essential.

Related to this issue is the hierarchical character of Indonesian society. The Javanese political elite can be considered as "the most status conscious and hierarchically minded in the world" (Liddle, 1989, cited in Boyle, 1998, p. 99). This is reflected in the orderly structure of power and authority within the government and the civil service. In daily practice, this means that each government official or civil servant is either the superior or the inferior of another (Boyle, 1998). Therefore, it should be taken into account that only a superior would have the authority to conduct the performance appraisal. At the time of research, policy makers believed that teachers should be trained as evaluators because it is unmanageable for supervisors and head teachers to do all the observations and assessments themselves. However, there are doubts about whether a teacher, trained as an evaluator, will have enough authority to do the assessments. Of all questioned teachers, a majority (92 per cent) indicated that the evaluation should be done by the head teacher. An Indonesian educational specialist even argued that assessments can only be successful and fair if teachers are assessed by someone who is external and impartial. A former international consultant at the World Bank suggested that "otherwise it will be corrupted, because that is the culture here".

Another important matter is the availability of resources to offer teachers enough support in their professional development process. Improving the performance of teachers by assessing *what they need to become better teachers*, will only be effective if teachers have access to several sources and facilities once their weaknesses are identified. If not, the performance appraisal will be an isolated element and it will lose its value. As a consequence, teachers might not take the annual appraisal seriously. This issue is extremely relevant in rural and remote areas, where resources and facilities are limited or even lacking. Good CPD structures should be in place, before the performance appraisal becomes an obligated activity within the teaching profession.

External factors

External factors might affect the implementation process as well, because resistance to the policies and reforms are to be expected. MONE is aware about the potential opposition from the teacher unions, because the management of underperforming teachers is very controversial and requires some substantial changes. An international consultant at MONE

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argued that:

> *My understanding of what happened in the past is that the teachers' union is large, very knowledgeable and therefore politically very powerful. And it won't like this for its members, the fact that teachers are going to be held accountable for their professional behaviour. Besides, this will be the first group of people, who for the first time will be told, "You don't have a job for life, your job depends on your ability to do the job and if you don't do it, you are not going to stay". The other parts of the civil service will probably see that if it applies to 70 per cent of the civil service, then the other 30 per cent will follow sooner or later. They won't like it either.*

The reason why the teacher unions might resist against the new performance appraisal system is probably more nuanced than this quote implicates. It is not that they necessarily oppose any attempt to hold teachers more accountable for their professional behaviour: the unions and their members are just as concerned with the quality of teachers as the government. Gunter Ismail, the president of the Indonesian Teachers Associations Federation (FSGI), argues that, "Promotions for teachers should be based on their teaching, personality, social behaviour and professional competency" (Jakarta Post, 6 October, 2011).

The resistance of teachers and their unions comes mainly from concerns about workload, poor CPD structures and the fairness of the process. In October 2011, the FSGI called on the government to review its teacher policies. The union argues that the current policies are not oriented on quality improvement, but reflect a fixation on quantity (Kompas, 5 October, 2011). Recently, the FSGI has also rejected a ministerial decree requiring publication or scientific work from teachers to qualify for promotion and argued instead that promotion should be based on the skills and competencies of teachers. In their view, the policy is also unrealistic and discriminatory against teachers. FSGI general secretary Retno Listyarti explains:

> *We understand that the policy aims to improve teachers' quality. But how can we be required to publish papers or scientific work while we must also handle up to 14 classes? (Jakarta Post, 6 October, 2011).*

According to the Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI) chairman Sulistiyo the government has not given its best in improving teachers' working conditions or providing protection, appreciation, education and sustainable training for teachers (Kompas, 5 October, 2011). The position of the unions is understandable: holding teachers accountable for their professional behaviour is risky, particularly when the measurements of their 'performance' is not always under their control, linked to financial reward and when the mechanisms for such evaluations are based on questionable methods.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Indonesian policy makers have joined a global tendency through which setting standards, monitoring and appraising teachers, and forging closer links between performance and reward are considered as effective ways to increase the quality, motivation and accountability of teachers. It can be questioned, however, if these policies reflect an appropriate understanding

of the motivators and de-motivators among Indonesian teachers. Some critical comments can be made to illustrate the shortcomings and potential risks of the path chosen by Indonesian policy makers in this respect.

First of all, policy makers tend to neglect the importance of adequate facilities for the motivation of teachers. Indonesian teachers are convinced that better classroom conditions and the availability of more and better teaching and learning materials will have a big influence on their job satisfaction and motivation. Many teachers in Indonesia do not have the necessary tools and materials to do the job well. This impedes the quality of education and can give teachers a feeling of being incompetent. This in turn, can be demoralising and de-motivating. Therefore, the facilities should be in place, before teachers can be motivated by actively using motivators like 'growth' and 'job advancement'. It is useless to create committed and competent teachers, without giving them the right tools. The same applies to good CPD structures. If these are not in place, the performance appraisal will lose its value. This issue is extremely relevant in rural and remote areas, where resources and facilities are limited or even lacking.

Second, policy makers need to bear in mind that money does not work as a motivator in a straight-forward way. If teachers are not paid enough, they might not be sufficiently motivated. But once teachers are satisfied with their salary, money might lose its value as a main motivator. Indonesian policy makers give the impression that they mostly believe in the idea of 'carrots and sticks'. Teachers are obligated to undertake activities to earn credit points in order to get promoted to a higher salary scale. This top-down and quantitative character of the performance appraisal has a potential risk, as other important motivational factors are neglected. Research shows that autonomy, mastery and purpose lead to better performance and personal satisfaction instead (Fisher, 1978; Lock, Cartledge and Knerr, 1970; Rainey, 2001; Ryan, 1982). Indonesian policy makers must recognise that the profit motive (earning a higher salary) gets unmoored from the autonomy, mastery and purpose motive when teachers undertake continuous professional development activities reluctantly. In this situation, there is no question of self-motivated development and, consequently, it will not be very effective or it will even demoralise teachers. Therefore, policy makers should take the sense of ownership and professional autonomy among Indonesian teachers as starting point when designing new policies to increase the motivation and accountability of teachers. Listening to their advice, using their expertise and giving them freedom and scope to take initiative would be a good start to engage and motivate teachers.

Third, it appears that Indonesian teachers and policy makers have a different understanding of the concept of 'motivation'. This difference arises from two different paradigms that are dominant within both groups. It can be argued that Indonesian teachers perceive motivation and performance from a 'discipline' paradigm, due to the institutional cultures within the education system. Policy makers are starting to approach motivation and performance from a 'professionalism' paradigm. If teachers continue to approach their job from the discipline paradigm, the danger exists that there will not be much understanding for the ideas and objectives of the new policies. This, in turn, means the policies might not achieve the desired results or will have even a demoralising and de-motivating effect on teachers. Teachers,

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for instance, might experience the new appraisal system and observations by the head teacher as a source of stress instead of a tool to develop their own professionalism. Hence, it is desirable that a paradigm-shift will take place among teachers and that teachers consider themselves above all as professional educators. As argued in this chapter, this change requires much support for teachers and a shift in thinking of all other involved stakeholders as well.

Another important issue is that this kind of policy can worsen the daily work of teachers, as increased bureaucratisation and a related increase in workload for teachers is lurking. The designed policies and instruments seem feasible on paper, but in reality, things work out differently. In order to design instruments which are valid, reliable, practical and acceptable, it is important that policy makers have a good understanding of the reality within schools. Most teachers spend the bulk of their time in the classroom or doing classroom-related activities. What will happen if these teachers, all of a sudden, need to spend several hours a week on activities that are not directly related to classroom activities? Besides, where can a teacher in a remote area get access to support and advice? Where are the in-service opportunities going to come from? Who is actually going to do the performance appraisal? These questions are especially important when the career of teachers is going to depend on this, because a lack of clear answers can be very de-motivating for teachers.

Finally, policy makers should get away from the traditional understanding that in-service training for teachers involves taking them away from the school and putting them in a training centre a long way from the reality of schools and lecturing them. The new continuous development process for teachers consists mainly of activities for which teachers have to leave the classroom. This is unfortunate, because teachers are probably much more involved when their professional development takes place in their own school or classroom. Moreover, it will be more effective and useful as well. When there is, for instance, a strong mentoring system in place within the school, teachers can be assisted with their own professional development in a more direct and personal way. Teachers will be encouraged to look at themselves, to look at their classrooms, to work with and support colleagues, and to think about what they can contribute to the development of their school.

Indonesian policy makers need to be well aware of the (possible) consequences of their policies. It can even be questioned if the new performance appraisal system is the most desirable form of reform that the Indonesian system needs to increase the quality of education. Developing opportunities for teachers to upgrade their qualifications and setting up a structure for continuing professional development is desirable, but sanctioning teachers, especially if the CPD structures are not well developed, is not an ideal policy. Besides, one of the most dangerous consequences of education policy based on 'market rhetoric logic' is that teachers are treated like 'education units' and, as a result, they are performing as such and not as involved and committed professionals (Vongalis-Macrow, 2007). Furthermore, these policies can stimulate competition and can lead to a lack of co-operation among teachers. This is not desirable, because teaching is a team task and teachers have a shared responsibility. Therefore, when importing market and hierarchical models of accountability uncritically, Indonesian policy makers have to be careful that they do not demoralise the Indonesian teachers rather than empowering them to teach better.

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CHAPTER 3

TEACHER ACCOUNTABILITY IN AN ERA OF FINANCIAL SCARCITY: THE CASE OF JAMAICAN PRIMARY EDUCATION REFORM

Emmelie Elisabeth Gulpers

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, *accountability* has become one of the main watchwords in education. Accountability measures are often implemented with the aim of strengthening and improving education quality and efficiency. Education quality is perceived as a necessity for countries taking part in a globalising world, where knowledge and skills are increasingly seen as the driving force behind national economic competitiveness (Sahlberg, 2004). Low-quality education is an endemic problem in most developing countries; children who succeed in completing primary schooling often leave with low levels of knowledge and skills (O'Sullivan, 2006b; World Bank, 2011). Consequently, the improvement of education quality in low-income countries is considered to be critical by governments, multi-lateral and bilateral aid agencies, and non-government organisations (NGOs) involved in education (UNESCO, 2010).

In order to provide children with high quality education, governments and donors need to make substantial investments in educational inputs such as teacher training, learning materials and physical infrastructure. However, efficient education provision has been a policy imperative for the past decades, since public resources have generally been restricted in developing countries. Also, donor-steered reform programmes and projects that are often tied to loans have pushed for 'efficient' education provision since the 1980s and 1990s (O'Sullivan, 2006b). The global economic crisis has further restricted the availability of public resources in some countries. This generates a contradictory situation in which educational systems are required to improve so that nations can stand firm in facing the global crisis, but the crisis itself urges economies to reduce their educational resources. Arguably, the crisis is also often used as an argument for national economies to further reduce public spending. In this context, concepts such as efficiency, cost-benefit and accountability are increasingly used in education policy documents, and are filtering down to the school and teacher level (Odhiambo, 2008). This focus on efficiency and performance of teachers is contested, as it is part of a discourse and practice in which teachers are increasingly treated as "a quality product that can be nudged into shape to best fit what schools need in order to meet the demands for future employment and economic imperatives" (Vongalis-Macrow, 2007, p. 430).

The predominance of accountability in the educational reform agenda leads to the assumption that there is solid evidence about the positive effects of increasing accountability at the school and teacher level. However, Fuhrman (1994, p. 336), in a broad review of

existing literature, concluded that "much current policy (…) assumes a great deal about how the strategies actually work and how [educators] are likely to respond", while responses to accountability reforms are, in fact, very context- and case-specific. Day (2002) argues that a wide range of centrally imposed initiatives associated with accountability reforms are shown to have several negative effects, including an increase in teachers' workload and working time, low morale, and a continuing crisis in teacher recruitment and retention. An explanation for the latter is that new monitoring, inspection and public accountability systems, together with the associated intensification of work, lead to increased pressure on teachers to achieve, and consequently lowers their commitment to entering or remaining in the teaching profession, especially in those schools located in challenging socio-economic contexts.

Jamaica, a small island developing state in the Caribbean, has recently introduced accountability reforms in primary education. With ambitions to become a developed country by 2030, the Jamaican government considers it necessary to transform the education system in the country. The Education Transformation Programme (ETP) was introduced in 2004, later changed its name into the Education Systems Transformation Programme (ESTP), and is now moving towards implementation. This reform package lays out a range of accountability measures for teachers. Today, almost a decade after the start of this transformation, Jamaica is still struggling with the implementation of a new educational accountability system.

Based on the findings of fieldwork conducted in the autumn of 2010 in Kingston, Jamaica's capital, this chapter will give insight into the factors that hinder the successful reform of accountability relationships in this country's education system. For this study, 25 stakeholders in the Jamaican education system were interviewed, including 10 (head) teachers and 15 policy makers. Secondary resources in the form of policy documents and media sources were used to supplement the interviews.

The chapter will discuss the currently formulated accountability policies, as well as the genealogy of these types of policies in the country. It is revealed that tensions among teachers and other educational stakeholders are connected to the process of the reform implementation, and to discrepancies in their ideas about what accountability means and should entail. The study shows that Jamaica is applying a bureaucratic approach to accountability reforms, mostly strengthening the accountability relationship between teachers and the state by installing various quality control mechanisms. Successful implementation of accountability systems would require a substantial outlay of funds. Moreover, teachers are not fully supportive, and are sceptical about the availability of resources for the correct implementation of this type of reform. Going back one step, it is even questionable whether accountability reforms should have priority over other means of improving education quality in Jamaican education.

ACCOUNTABILITY REFORMS AROUND THE WORLD

While accountability is an unclear concept that has been defined in countless ways, it can generally be described as "the means by which individuals and organisations report to a

recognised authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions" (Edwards and Hulme, 2006b, p. 8). Accountability is intended to ensure that the behaviour of every member of an organisation is largely functional (Odhiambo, 2008). Accountability was traditionally a business principle. The notion of accountability in education can thus be traced back to influences of business leaders on education policy. In the US, for example, attempts to strengthen the national economy in the 1980s triggered the notion that many ideas used by corporate leaders to improve a company's performance would be applicable to the public sector as well, including the education sector (Fuhrman *et al*., 2004, p. 6). This blurring of distinction between public and private institutions is a common effect of neoliberal policies. The wave of reforms in public services in line with ideas taken from private business is often referred to as New Public Management (NPM).

Globalisation and policy convergence

As explained by Leithwood (2005), "the timing of calls for greater accountability on the part of schools and school systems has been remarkably similar across many countries, although the reasons for those calls have not always been the same" (p. 9). This 'policy convergence' suggests that reforms take place as a consequence of structural forces, such as an increasing similarity in economic, social and political organisation between countries. In developed countries, the preoccupation with educational accountability has intensified since the mid to late-1980s. Accountability measures have been implemented in many countries, including the US, New Zealand, and England. A well-known more recent example is the No Child Left Behind Act that was introduced in 2001 in the US (Linn *et al*., 2002). An important explanation for the heightened interest in accountability in education is the fact that it is perceived by many reformers to be "a springboard to school improvement" (Adams and Kirst, 1999, p. 463). However, this type of policy also resonates with the increasingly popular sentiment that teachers and administrators have to provide more visible results in return for the investment being expended on education, especially during financially restrictive times (Odhiambo, 2008).

Education systems across the world are increasingly affected by globalisation processes. On the one hand, the doctrine of globalised neoliberal economic policies has contributed to redefining education in terms of its contribution to the economy; consequently, educational expenditure is increasingly seen as an investment in human capital (Hursh, 2001). On the other hand, "globalisation has also accelerated international collaboration, exchange of ideas and transfer of education policies between education systems" (Sahlberg, 2006, p. 19). The trend of increasing teachers' accountability through educational reforms is no longer a 'Western phenomenon', but has travelled to developing countries. In these countries, measures that are intended to make teachers "work harder" receive a lot of attention, due to concerns about teachers' low performance and cost-efficiency arguments. In addition to national governments, whose interest in accountability reforms is based on premises of quality improvement and cost efficiency, international institutions, including the World Bank and the OECD, also play an important role in policy formulation processes by their support for, and promotion of, accountability principles. For example, the World Bank's Education Strategy 2020 promotes the reform of accountability relationships among various actors and

participants in education systems. According to the report, "accountability relationships among them should be clear, coordinated, and consistent with their assigned functions in support of national education goals. Performance and learning outcomes should be monitored and measured so that a robust feedback cycle linking policy, financing and results is established" (World Bank, 2011). The World Bank expects that strengthening accountability relationships will strengthen the education system as a whole, so that it will "efficiently deliver better learning outcomes" (2011). The objective of attaining improved educational results drives both governments and international institutions to support accountability reforms.

Accountability became part of the education jargon in Jamaica in the early 1980s. The term 'accountability' was often used in donor agencies' strategic plans for countries such as Jamaica, which were borrowing from these agencies (Interview, National Education Inspectorate, Kingston, 15 September, 2010). Consequently, from one government to another, the term has appeared in different documents, including education policy documents.

To strengthen accountability relationships between teachers and the state, as well as between teachers and citizens, many countries are introducing the following components of accountability in their education systems: (1) the collection and publication of educational information, such as test results, enrolment numbers and class attendance figures; (2) the establishment of standards for assessing performance; (3) the formulation of consequences for success or failure of teachers; and (4) the establishment of an authority that collects information, judges whether or not standards have been met, and distributes rewards and sanctions (Newman *et al*.,1997).

Some argue that accountability measures can have drastic effects on the roles, status and responsibilities of teachers (Garrett, 1999). Moreover, they do not always lead to better teaching practices. Rewarding or sanctioning teachers based on their performance contributes to reducing education to what can be tested. When there is a divergence between the performance measures (student test scores) and the teacher's objective function (good quality teaching), a 'multi-task moral hazard' is created (Baker, 2002). In these cases, teachers can be pressured in focusing on achieving good test results rather than on activities that promote long-term learning and developing children's holistic skills. In order to explore one specific case, this chapter will explore accountability reforms in primary education in Jamaica, looking at the formulation and implementation phases respectively.

ACCOUNTABILITY REFORMS IN JAMAICA

Jamaican reform strategies introduced in primary education are complementary to a larger Public Sector Modernisation Programme (PSMP), which was inspired by the NPM discourse. In the last decade, the PSMP has placed the transformation of the Ministry of Education (MoE) at the top of the reform agenda. Jamaica's educational challenges have been set out in the Parliament's 2001 White Paper, *Education: The way upward*. This policy document defines Jamaica's intended shift towards tighter control structures in education, as is illustrated by the objective to "devise and implement systems of accountability and

performance management in order to improve performance and win public confidence and trust" (MOEY and C, 2004, p. 3). According to Puryear (1999), the trend in the Caribbean of an increased valuing of knowledge as a production factor has established an economic argument for reforms aimed at improving the quality of education.

Education quality is a pressing concern in Jamaica. As set out by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (2009), quality issues in the country are caused by a wide variety of factors, including a lack of school facilities and infrastructure, poor school leadership and management, low attendance rates, low levels of teaching resources and aids, violence and anti-social behaviour, and low levels of teacher training at the early childhood level. National learning assessments show educational outcomes that are considered unsatisfactory (Jamaica Gleaner, 2010)[1]. Teachers, especially those working in challenging socio-economic contexts, affirm the need for investments in infrastructure and teaching resources, such as schoolbooks. They indicate that education quality also suffers from low levels of parental involvement, high student-teacher ratios, and the lack of support for children with special needs, such as autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), who put a significant stress on the education system and the teachers working in it. Due to problems in the system, in each of the major transition points in the education system, a substantial number of children are insufficiently prepared to access the next stage ahead. Their lack of preparedness or 'readiness' affects the quality of the education system as a whole (UNCT and GoJ, 2006).

At the same time, the Jamaican government spends a relatively large share of the country's gross domestic product on education (around 6.5 per cent in 2007), with increased resources dedicated to education every year over the last decade (CaPRI, 2009). An increasing discontent with the status of the education system results from the notion that educational 'results' do not match 'expenditure' in education. According to the World Bank, "Accountability reforms are supposed to identify the problems in the Jamaican education system, and then address them on the ground" (Interview, World Bank, Kingston, 8 October, 2010). With different influential stakeholders pushing for reform and demanding improved educational outcomes, teachers are increasingly blamed for quality issues, including continued poor performance by students.

Teachers as targets of accountability

Demands for stronger accountability relationships in education and proposals that accompany them are often directed at teachers (Odhiambo, 2008). One explanation for the focus on teachers in accountability reforms is the important role they play in education systems; this is especially the case in developing countries where education systems tend to be under-resourced. Another reason why teachers are a likely target for reform is that most education investment is spent on teachers' salaries (VSO, 2002)[2]. In Jamaica, an additional argument for focusing on teachers, often used by local policy makers, is that accountability mechanisms for teachers are perceived to be non-existent in the current system. Jamaican

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[1] This is illustrated by the fact that up to a third of Jamaican children complete school as functional illiterates, and over 40 per cent of the students at grade four fail to master critical components of literacy and numeracy.
[2] Over 90 per cent of the Jamaican education budget represents recurrent expenditures, primarily salaries and wages (UNCT and GoJ, 2006).

policy makers consider that the reliance on teachers' professionalism for a proper delivery of education services has been excessive. Thus, according to them, instead of trusting teachers' professionalism, investments should be made in the installation of accountability mechanisms that should improve the quality of teaching through the strengthening of controls.

The trend of reforming education by increasingly managing teachers' work and making teachers more accountable, fits into what is known as a "discourse of performativity" (Ball, 2000; Jeffrey, 2002). In this discourse, there is a larger focus on 'efficiency', 'cost-benefit' and 'outputs', and teaching is being monitored based on collected 'evidence' of their performance. Teachers and the Jamaican Teachers' Association (JTA) comment that, instead of only focusing on teachers' accountability, responsibility for providing good quality education in Jamaica should be held by all education stakeholders. For the MoE, this would mean becoming more accountable for the services that it delivers. Schools widely indicate that they suffer from a lack of resources. According to one of the teachers interviewed during the research:

> *Accountability mustn't stop with us, because we are not the only player in the whole education chain. In marketing, they call it line operation, compare it to making a car, someone takes responsibility for one thing, the next for another thing. Those who make the frame of the car have to prepare that first in order for the shell man to make a shell to put on the frame. We as teachers cannot put on a shell if we don't get a base (Interview, Teacher 06, Kingston, 3 November, 2010).*

It is however problematic, as pointed out by the JTA, that there are few opportunities for teachers to hold the ministry accountable.

Were teachers not accountable before?

As stated previously, policy makers in Jamaica argue that there is currently no accountability in the culture of teaching. Teachers, on the other hand, do consider themselves accountable for their work. This incongruence could be due to the fact that policy makers are not well-enough informed about what goes on inside schools. It could also be due to a discrepancy between teachers' and policy makers' definitions of accountability: Teachers tend to focus more on internal accountability, and policy makers focus more on external accountability.

Jamaican teachers found it difficult to come up with a unique definition of accountability, which is in line with the reasoning of Ouston *et al*. (1998, p. 111) who notes that while the term is widely used as if it were straightforward, it must be viewed as vague and incoherent. Generally, Jamaican teachers understood 'being accountable' as 'being responsible'. While teachers indicated feeling responsible for the children's academic development and learning, they also expressed feeling responsible for children's social, spiritual, and mental development. This relates to teachers' definition of the value of education, which is much broader than its contribution to the economy.

When looking at accountability from the perspective of schools, many already existing accountability mechanisms can be uncovered (Webb, 2005). Teachers stressed attaching more importance to 'internal accountability' relationships within the school context. They indicated feeling high levels of accountability based on a combination of internal reporting

procedures, on consultations within the school, on their professional ethics and on feedback from students and parents. Internal reporting procedures include the 'internal appraisal system' for teachers, in which each teacher's performance is evaluated by peers or by the principal, based among other things on the lesson plan which every teacher is obliged to hand in and adhere to. Teachers report feeling most accountable to the education actors they are in direct contact with, namely their students, the parents, their peers, their grade coordinators and principals. Accountability relations with external stakeholders outside the school context are far less important to them, indicating that they experience low levels of external accountability (West *et al.*, 2011). In the context of current accountability reforms, efforts are being made to strengthen precisely these relationships of 'external accountability', mostly from teachers to higher levels of authority at different governmental levels, as well as to families and communities. West *et al.* (2011) show that some accountability systems weigh heavier than others, based on the sanctions that are attached to them. Consequently, one accountability regime can repress the other (Bovens, 2007). For example, Jamaican teachers fear that, with the introduction of a new accountability system which is characterised by data gathering, control and sanctions, there will be much less space for existing 'internal accountability' mechanisms characterised by internal consultation and debating. The introduction of more controlling accountability structures could possibly have a negative effect on the 'softer' internal accountability mechanisms in schools, and may also affect the development of an internal commitment by teachers (Robinson, 1992).

Educational transformation in Jamaica: The road towards accountability

A 14-member Task Force composed of education stakeholders was appointed in 2004, which had to critically evaluate Jamaica's education system and make recommendations for improvement. The resulting Task Force report (2004), based on consultations with citizens and experts, pointed out many areas of concern, including the lack of accountability 'at all levels' in the education system, hereby assuming a link between accountability and educational quality.

With the assistance of donors such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and USAID, and international consultants hired by the government of Jamaica, the recommendations of the Task Force were evaluated and reduced to what eventually became the ETP. It has taken Jamaica almost a decade to move from the Task Force report to the implementation of the reform. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the reason for this delay was, "There was really no buy-in, even from the Ministry, in terms of the reform" (Interview, Inter-American Development Bank, Kingston, 6 October, 2010). The Inter-American Development Bank added that the main reason for this delay was that the MoE and 'external policy makers', such as the Task Force and consultants, were not working together and had different ideas about the implementation of the reform. Discontent with the slow process towards implementation, the lack of stakeholder buy-in, and the amount of money that was spent on consultancy, played a key role in the transition of the ETP into the ETSP. The name change also marked the integration of the different transformation units into the MoE. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the expectation was that this would lead to a higher level of ministry ownership, as the ideas and knowledge of the transformation units were now incorporated into the MoE's policies.

The Education Systems Transformation Programme

The transformation of the Jamaican education system is meant to be implemented over a 10-year period (World Bank, 2009). While it has been claimed that the transformation began in 2005, right after the publication of the Task Force report, the MoE officially launched the ESTP in June 2010 (Jamaica Information Service, 2010). In the context of the ESTP, the Jamaican government has established two agencies that are meant to strengthen the accountability of schools and teachers, the National Education Inspectorate (NEI), and the Jamaica Teaching Council (JTC). These organisations are also expected to strengthen the accountability relationships between teachers and government actors. The decentralisation of education quality management from the central MoE to Regional Education Authorities (REAs) is expected to enable closer monitoring of teachers and to facilitate accountability mechanisms.

The NEI came into being in September 2008 as a project of the ETP, fulfilling one of the recommendations of the Task Force (2004) to create a national agency that would be responsible for ensuring quality in education across the system. The NEI is responsible for the performance of school inspections and collects, collates, and disseminates educational information. The latter is done through the publication of 'inspection reports' that cover different areas, including students' performance in national and regional tests and assessments, students' progression in relation to their starting points, and the effectiveness of teaching in supporting student learning. By providing this information, its main goal is the strengthening of government control over what happens at the school level, informing policy makers, helping to set targets for schools and selecting best practice examples, and steering corrective action (Task Force, 2004). Evaluation of school quality is done by NEI inspectors, parents and students, as well as through self-assessment of teachers and principals. During five-day school visits, data is collected by inspectors through classroom observations and questionnaires. Based on this evaluation, the NEI makes recommendations for improvement. Schools will have to make improvements in those areas, as the inspectorate later returns to check whether their recommendations have been successfully followed through. The areas for improvement must be included in the schools' 'improvement plans'. These plans should contain defined targets and processes for reaching these targets. Targets for individual teachers are also defined. In the case of a negative evaluation of a school by the NEI, combined with continued underperformance (not meeting the targets as defined in the improvement plans), corrective action follows. This can take different forms, ranging from training, professional development activities, closer supervision, control and support from the regions and the government or, ultimately, to closure of the school.

The application of rigorous standards for performance is likely to lead to a great increase in pressure on teachers and schools that have a negative evaluation, especially poor inner-city schools which often have shortages in (high quality) infrastructural, material, financial and human resources. It is therefore important that the established standards and targets will take into account the availability of educational resources. Evaluations, and the publication thereof, could potentially result in the 'blaming' and 'shaming' of underperforming schools, and the glorification of successful schools, which could lead to fragmentation and competition within the education system (Day, 2002).

With the establishment of the JTC, the teaching profession is becoming more regulated by the setting up of minimum standards, the introduction of a licensing system, and the coordination of professional development opportunities for teachers. The JTC collects information from the individual teachers, and combines this with evaluation information provided by the NEI. Based on this information, the JTC can detect where skill upgrading for teachers is necessary, and judge whether teachers are qualified enough to own a teaching license. Continued underperformance will eventually result in the removal of the teaching license. Professional development training will be offered to underperforming teachers as a first resort, and teachers will only be removed from the system after long and continued non-improvement. During the period of this research, the removal of teachers' licenses was legally not yet possible, although the process of securing the legal mandate was being worked on. What teachers will be judged on exactly is still being formulated, and will build on an existing document, *Professional standards for educators in Jamaica*. The indicators used to measure teachers' performance had not been established yet at the time of this research. According to the JTC, standards will focus on the process of teaching, rather than the outcome. This contradicts the current trend in education systems to focus more on test results when enforcing accountability (Kornhaber, 2004).

POLICY FORMULATION: WHO IS IN POWER ?

While a MoE representative argued that Jamaican accountability policies are "really home grown", influences from outside Jamaica in shaping these policies seem to be undeniable (Interview, MoE, Kingston, 15 October, 2010). As indicated by another representative of the MoE, Jamaica is looking closely at other countries such as Singapore and Finland for inspiration for its educational policies. She explained that this does not mean that entire policies are being copied literally, but instead that international policies are being used as a guide, and that elements are taken from different documents (Interview, MoE, Kingston, 23 September, 2010). Other sources of influence in accountability reforms that were mentioned are international (donor) groups, academic studies and 'big names in education' such as Linda Darling-Hammond (Interview, Mona University, Kingston, 7 October, 2010). Accountability reforms in Jamaica can be typified as 'middle ground', having elements of both voluntary and coercive measures (Dolowitch and Marsch, 2000). However, it needs to be recognised that the transfer of accountability policies is not an independent process but instead part of a wider policy reform process and is shaped by that process (Wolman, 1992). In Jamaica, the introduction of NPM since the 1980s has created the conditions for accountability to take root.

Most interviewed policy makers, as well as teachers, stressed the need to take the local context into consideration when adopting policies. This often seems to be lacking in Ja-maica, as illustrated by one teacher (Interview, Teacher 08, Kingston, 9 November, 2010):

> *The ministry is looking at foreign countries, and the research they are doing, and when they see a policy or strategy that is working abroad they adopt it and it's thrown on the Jamaican teaching force. We are supposed to make it work. Mostly that is the problem; policy is often not tailored to meet the Jamaican situation.*

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Attempting to transfer a policy that has worked well in a specific context at one period of time to another context in the same or different time, with little understanding of the present or the past, carries risks as the policy could potentially fail miserably (Green *et al.*, 2007). After the integration of the transformation units into the MoE in 2010, incorporating the ideas of the Task Force and the Education Transformation Team into the MoE's policies, policy formulation has become a more top-down endeavour in which the MoE is said to play a key role in the determination of policy directions. This development might negatively impact the policy process, as it is important that the composition of an education policy-making body is well balanced so that it represents the ideas of the most important stakeholder groups (Cheng and Cheung, 1995). In the current situation, the influence of these non-ministerial stakeholders, such as civil society groups, is likely to be limited.

International donor organisations have supported the idea of strengthening educational accountability in Jamaica in different ways. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, together with the Government of Jamaica, are the major funders of the ESTP (MoE, 2010). The influence of donors mostly manifests itself through target setting and assistance in the selection or refinement of policy ideas. It can be assumed that Jamaica's dependency on funding by donors for its reform efforts strengthens the position of the latter. While the role of these international donors is primarily funding at this point, they are interested in providing technical assistance. The MoE welcomes such assistance: "The financial support that they make available enables us to get the technical support that is required, (…) there is no resistance" (Interview, MoE, Kingston, 15 October, 2010).

The exact scope of influence of these international actors remains vague. Likewise, the role of international consultants throughout the process of formulating the Task Force report until now has been described by an academic as "*an area that is murky, not clear*". This was explained as follows: "The international consultants will say that their role is not to impose, but in fact they come with status, and money, and from abroad, and they do have a big influence. But they won't admit it, I think" (Interview, Mona University, Kingston, 7 October, 2010). The danger attached to this is that consultants have been found to push models, but pay little attention to contextual factors when proffering or imposing advice on 'best practice' (Dolowitz and Marsch, 2000). As confirmed by an official from the World Bank, international consultants have been involved in the formulation of the ESTP and have helped "boiling down [the recommendations of the Task Force] into the current programme" (Interview, World Bank, Kingston, 8 October 2010).

In contrast, teachers have been underrepresented in the policy formulation process. It is considered frustrating by Jamaican teachers that their voices are not directly heard in the process of policy formulation. One teacher noted that: "The ministry is up there, they get consultants from all over the globe, and they ignore the people on the ground. Where is our input? Teachers have ideas, and they are willing to share their ideas for free" (Interview, Teacher 10, Kingston, 17 November, 2010). All interviewed teachers stated that they were willing, and found it important, to play a larger part in the development of policies. However, teachers do not feel that there is a genuine intention to have them share their opinions and influence policy. Therefore, according to the definition of Bass *et al*. (1995), they do not feel as if they 'participate' in policy formulation.

While teachers share the frustration of feeling bypassed by national and international policy makers in decision-making, Jamaica does have an influential and politically important teachers' union. Representing the teaching force, the JTA is involved in all discussions about policy developments, and acts as a watchdog and advocates on behalf of its members. Reflecting on the role of teachers, the JTA admits that efforts to directly involve teachers in policy formulation can be greater. The JTA clarified the importance of teacher involvement as follows (Interview, JTA, Kingston, 10 September, 2010):

> *Teachers are the most critical group in terms of what is going to be the output of the system, and therefore they must be integrally engaged in all of the efforts to produce a quality system. You cannot expect to produce a quality education system, and exclude the practitioners.*

ISSUES AND CONCERNS SURROUNDING IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation is often the most difficult phase of a reform process, as theory has to be translated into practice, and unforeseen problems have to be dealt with. In Jamaica, according to a teacher, formulated policies often fail in the implementation phase (Interview, Teacher 06, Kingston, 3 November, 2010):

> *I call my government structure a trial and error structure. They try it, and if it doesn't work, they come up with something else. In a developing country where people suffer from large-scale poverty, we don't have space for trial and error. It's a waste of costly time and money.*

It is therefore not surprising that most Jamaican teachers tend to be sceptical about the actual implementation of the ESTP, and imposed accountability measures in particular (Muller and Hernandez, 2010). Fullan (1991) points out that teachers who have had negative experiences with implementation attempts are more negative or apathetic about the next change presented. Scepticism on the part of Jamaican teachers might also be caused by their past experiences with reform efforts. They indicated that both school inspections and the licensing of teachers, which are to be introduced under the reform, are not new initiatives. One teacher commented on the inspections: "There're just asking for more things now and it has a different name, but I don't think it's new, it's a recycled initiative, not a reform" (Interview, Teacher 07, Kingston, 9 November, 2010). Another teacher also confirmed that the idea to license teachers has been around for decades: "My first registration for licensing was in the '80s, I have certification saying that I'm a registered teacher, and that I'd soon be licensed, and now it's 2010 and they're still talking about it" (Interview, Teacher 01, Kingston, 22 October, 2010).

A number of concerns have been identified regarding accountability reforms in Jamaica, both by policy makers and teachers. The most important concern of policy makers is that not enough resources will be available for implementation of the reform. The work of the NEI and the JTC will require a substantial amount of resources, and it is not clear whether these will become available. Regarding the work of the NEI, non-ministerial stakeholders as well as teachers share the opinion that it would be unfair to punish schools that do not show improvement instead

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of providing them with the resources needed to work towards this improvement (Interview, JTA, Kingston, 10 September, 2010; Interview, Teacher 10, Kingston, 17 November 2010; Interview, Teacher 04, Kingston, 27 October 2010). According to the JTA, the accountability debate must not mask the discussion on resources. Extra investments for school improvement are perceived important, especially for poor inner-city schools. With regard to the inspectorate, the JTA fears that if the resources, necessary to follow up on the recommendations made by the NEI, do not become available, the NEI will just become an agency that points out weaknesses.

Teachers' concerns

Jamaican teachers are also pessimistic about whether the identification of problems in schools will be followed up. One teacher explained: "If problems are found, I want to hear a solution, not just hear that we have a problem" (Interview, Teacher 08, Kingston, 9 November, 2010). Indeed, as pointed out by Muller and Hernandez (2010), accountability and documentation needs are often experienced as having become an end in themselves that fail to trigger 'real' interventions (Muller and Hernandez, 2010). This is confirmed by Frymier (1996), who argues that accountability is, in most of its present forms, an instrument of control rather than a vehicle for improvement. Teachers therefore argue for a direct link between amassed educational information and the provision of support, and only consider accountability reforms desirable when linked to an increase in educational resources and training where necessary. This links up with the more general concern on the part of teachers that the ESTP will not address the most important problems of the education system as far as they are concerned, namely its lack of resources for investments in infrastructure and teaching resources, the low involvement of parents, the high student-teacher ratios and the lack of support for students with special needs.

In general, teachers feel that they are insufficiently informed about the details of the reform. For example, no clear information about the methods of evaluation of their work, or consequences thereof, has been provided by the ministry. This lack of information provision is problematic because it limits teachers' ability to critically review the accountability policies and to voice their opinion. It also causes teachers to experience high levels of insecurity about how these reforms are going to take shape, and how they will affect their day-to-day work. In particular, they oppose accountability measures that are solely based on outcomes and that introduce sanctions which could affect their job security. Teachers are also concerned about the type of standards that will be formulated. Teachers in poor inner-city schools share the concern that they will be measured against a general standard, insensitive to the fact that they work in worse conditions and teach students from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

As set out by the JTA, it is important that the realities of conditions in Jamaican schools are being acknowledged in this reform (Interview, JTA, Kingston, 10 September, 2010):

> *It is impossible to believe that what happens in schools is not influenced by whether the students are hungry, or that the social conditions under which they live do not have an impact on their emotional state; that as soon as they come into the classroom they are able to engage in the learning experience at the level of a developed country.*

While the overall readiness of Jamaican teachers for accountability reform is low, teachers were found to support the general idea of introducing school inspections and a licensing system. This support can be explained by their curiosity about the feedback, and their desire to improve the work they do and the image of the teaching profession. Another explanation can be found in the hope of teachers that increased quality control will be linked to increased government support, and will consequently result in better working conditions. However, overall, teachers are not ready for implementation at the moment. This lack of preparedness, together with their negative responses to accountability measures, could lessen teachers' motivation to implement such type of reforms (Leithwood *et al*., 2002).

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has given insight into the process of accountability reforms in the education sector of Jamaica. Driven by a focus on efficiency in education, as well as the need for quality improvement in a globalising world, 'accountability' has quickly become a mainstream word in education policy. The accountability of teachers is receiving extra attention, as the importance of teachers' work for the educational achievement of students is widely acknowledged, and strengthened teacher accountability is expected to trigger quality improvements. Traditionally in Jamaica, the accountability relationship between teachers and the government has been rather implicit: While there was a certain level of control over teachers' work, it was not well structured. In line with the global trend of a strong focus on accountability in education, there is now more attention for explicit mechanisms of accountability for Jamaican teachers.

Jamaican education policy has traditionally been influenced by international actors. This has also been the case in the formulation of accountability reforms. The basis for the current education reform is the Task Force report (2004), which was a result of a participatory process where a wide variety of local education stakeholders came together and made suggestions for improvement. However, teachers felt under-represented in the formulation of policy while the influence of international development partners and consultants was perceived to be substantial.

This chapter has shown that Jamaica is following the global trend of implementing an accountability model in which the collection of educational information, the establishment of standards for teachers and schools and the formulation of consequences play an important role (Newman *et al*., 1997). However, unlike 'stronger', more individualistic, accountability systems, focused on test results and with high stakes for underperformance of individual teachers, Jamaica is applying a more 'gentle' and bureaucratic accountability model with a focus on evaluation, improvement planning and teacher training. In doing so, it predominantly attempts to strengthen, first and foremost, the accountability relationship between teachers and the government. This is done through the establishment of two new institutions, the NEI and the Jamaica Teaching Council. Together, these institutions will be responsible for school inspections and teacher licensing. Teachers' responsibilities will be defined in development plans, where rules and procedures for

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teaching and criteria for good performance are specified. The MoE is confident that the introduction of quality control agencies can address weaknesses in the public education system. However, the lack of confidence on the part of teachers, and concerns about the ability of the Jamaican government to respond to the material needs of the system, indicate low levels of stakeholder preparedness, and could cause gaps between policy planning and implementation. Thus, while there is strong commitment 'from the top' for the implementation of accountability policies, several concerns were identified among non-ministerial stakeholders.

The most widely-shared source of concern, as pointed out by non-ministerial policy makers (e.g. international development partners and the JTA) and by teachers, is the lack of resources to make accountability mechanisms effective in Jamaica. Based on the argument that 'you can't hold people accountable without providing support for improvement', resources are going to be needed, especially for poor inner-city schools. Teachers argue that they should be provided with the necessary materials and training, but at the same time they are sceptical about the allocation of these resources by the MoE. The JTA argues that installing accountability measures for teachers without offering sufficient support makes it a punitive exercise and is very unlikely to result in quality improvement. Extra investments are thus needed to avoid following in the footsteps of other education reforms where accountability was sold as a solution to quality deficits, but turned out to be an instrument of control (Frymier, 1996).

Jamaican policy makers argue that teachers are not accountable in their work. They often use this argument to justify the introduction of accountability reforms. In doing so, they sustain a rather subjective perspective on the issue. As described in this chapter, teachers already tend to experience high levels of accountability. They refer mostly to 'internal accountability' mechanisms and relationships within the school context. Policy makers, for their part, share the opinion that no, or very little, accountability exists for teachers, interpreting accountability as something that is externally enforced by actors outside of the school context. The difference between teachers' expressed focus on 'internal accountability' and a ministerial effort to strengthen 'external accountability' deserves attention in further research. It is questionable what 'imposed' external accountability measures as part of the ESTP will 'add' to existing internal accountability mechanisms in schools in terms of quality improvement. It is also unclear how the introduction of external accountability will affect both internal accountability measures in schools, as well as teachers' internal commitment (Bovens, 2007; Robinson, 1992).

Teachers were shown to be very hesitant towards the ESTP. Not only were they sceptical about the availability of resources for its implementation, they also felt concerned about the ways the reform would affect their day-to-day work. Poor communication flows from the government down to the individual teachers caused insecurities about the methods of evaluation being used, the licensing procedures, as well as the standards they would be measured against and the possible consequences of underperformance. The MoE would benefit by improving their communication with the schools, as it could enhance teacher involvement and take away some of their insecurities.

In choosing indicators of teaching quality to judge teachers' work on, and in the establishment of standards, some crucial decisions have yet to be made. Listening to what the Jamaican teaching force believes is a fair and equitable method for quality evaluation will facilitate the implementation process. The JTA has an important role to play in protecting teachers against interventions that limit their control or autonomy. The application of rigorous standards is likely to heighten pressures on teachers and schools that have negative evaluations and could have a negative effect on their work motivation. In particular, teachers in poor inner-city schools that suffer from a lack of educational resources are likely to be affected by general standards that do not discriminate between different school situations. Taking into account the limitations and uncertainties attached to accountability reforms in Jamaica, it is questionable whether these reform measures are the best means to reaching the objective of delivering better learning outcomes. As emphasised by teachers as desirable, investments in education infrastructure and teaching resources, and reforms that increase parental involvement and the support for children with special needs, may be better means of improving education quality in Jamaica.

It is too early to evaluate the effects of accountability reforms on teachers' work. However, the reform has definitely contributed to introducing 'education' into the public and media agendas. This chapter has raised the question as to whether the reform and the education debate it has generated can be successful without improved communication, participation and trust relations between the MoE and the schools and, especially, without providing the necessary resources to address the problems identified by the accountability policies.

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CHAPTER 4

EDUCATION DECENTRALISATION AND SCHOOL CLUSTERS IN NAMIBIA: TECHNICAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

D. Brent Edwards Jr. and Paul Mbatia

This chapter analyses the "school clusters" reform approach to education decentralisation in Namibia. The findings discussed herein are particularly salient because, despite the centrality of decentralisation to education reform in Namibia since the country's independence in 1990, a dearth of research is available which assesses the operation of this policy and which reveals why it has not produced the expected results in practice. In addressing this issue, the authors test the theory of action upon which the school clusters programme was founded. Given that decentralisation reforms are often pursued in the absence of evidence of their effectiveness, it is important to understand how they work (or do not work) in practice and why they so often fail. Concomitantly, it may be necessary to reconsider their desirability as a preferred education reform.

While the focus of the chapter is broad in nature, it accomplishes the task set out by moving through a number of specific sections. In the first section, a brief overview is given of the concept of, and trends associated with, decentralisation in development and education governance. In the second section, the conceptual and analytical framework employed is explained. As will be shown, the framework adopted is dynamic and focuses on the technical, institutional, and political dimensions of education reform at multiple levels. The third section turns to the case of education decentralisation in Namibia. It summarises the national context and then presents the findings of the authors' research on the parallel systems of education decentralisation that have emerged – one being led by the central government, the other by international development organisations. The final section briefly discusses the results.

The findings presented in this chapter are based on data collected in Namibia over a 10-week period in 2010. During this time, 96 individuals were interviewed (through a combination of one-on-one conversations and focus groups) from the national, regional (i.e., within Namibia), and local levels. Participants included stakeholders from the Ministry of Basic Education, Sport and Culture (MBESC), a regional directorate of education, school inspectors, subject advisors, cluster management committees, community school boards, teachers, local leaders, and political representatives, among others. A survey to further assess teacher perspectives was also administered to a group of 50 teachers (Mbatia, 2010)[1]. Sub-national data collection focused on the Otjozondjupa region – a large and sparsely populated region in the centre of the country in which school clusters have been under-researched, but which is typical with regard to the unsuccessful operation of the school clusters

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[1] The methods presented in Edwards (2012a) were used for data analysis.

system. On the whole, this region represents a middle ground between the geographic, demographic, and economic extremes of the north (which is densely populated by poor black and coloured people) and the south (which is even more rural, more sparsely populated, and with mostly well-off white farmers).

Moreover, in the Otjozondjupa region, as in the rest of the country, while 95 per cent of students enrol in primary school, progression rates to upper grades are low, with less than 60 per cent of students successfully transitioning from grade 6 to grade 7, and even fewer surviving to upper secondary school (grades 11-12). Low progression is, in large part, due to both the inaccessibility of schools beyond the primary level (which are typically located at great distance from students' homes) and the inability of families to pay the costs of tuition and accommodation. In Otjozondjupa and other central and eastern regions, low progression is also affected by the nomadic pastoralist lifestyles of some families. Overall, quality is determined by a school's location: those schools which were initially intended for the white population (during apartheid) are very well resourced with libraries and learning materials, while schools built for the coloured and black populations have fewer resources, respectively. Initial teacher training, on the other hand, can be considered minimally adequate; subsequent professional development opportunities are lacking, however, a fact which reduces the effectiveness of, and the ability to improve, education in Namibia.

EDUCATION DECENTRALISATION: TRENDS AND CONCEPTS

While decentralisation broadly refers to "the transfer of decision-making authority, respon-sibility and tasks from higher to lower organisational levels", it has not been a static concept (Hanson, 1998, p. 112). Approaches to decentralisation can be separated into three distinct periods. During the first, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, decentralisation was thought of in the context of entire countries and was equated with "the transition to independence, achieving political equity, and responding to rising demand for public goods and services" (Cohen and Peterson, 1999, p. 1).From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, aid agencies pressed decentralisation "in order to promote … improved management and sustainability of funded programmes and projects, equitable distribution of economic growth, and facilitation of grassroots participation in development processes" (Cohen and Peterson, 1999, p. 1). Decentralisation was conceived of as social and economic transformation through the centrally initiated projects of rural land reform, worker-owned farm cooperatives, and local development committees. At the same time, central Ministries of Education attempted to decentralise in the sense that they were expanding their administrative apparatuses to lower levels through rational planning (Zadja, 2002). In contrast to later forms of decentralisation, which would often concentrate on the community level, these policies focused on provincial, regional, or state level administrative decentralisation.

In the most recent period – from the mid-1980s to the present – decentralisation has been promoted by international development organisations in order to "facilitate more efficient and effective production and provision of public goods and services and to establish market-oriented economies in which public sector tasks can be privatised" (Cohen and Peterson, 1999, p.2). In education, in response to large and highly politicised governments and Ministries

of Education, one solution has been understood as a community-level, market-based conception of decentralisation, which, to the extent possible, minimises the role of intermediate levels of state bureaucracy by placing parent councils alone in charge of teachers and school supervision. From a market perspective, this arrangement is desirable because it is assumed to be more efficient (by removing unnecessary layers of government, and by encouraging parents to spend their funds judiciously) and more effective (because parents hold teachers accountable, thereby producing better outcomes) (Edwards, 2012b).

In practice, however, such reforms have not necessarily produced positive results (Hannaway and Carnoy, 1993). The effects of decentralisation on quality (as measure by standardised tests) are either mixed or inconclusive (Edwards, 2012b). Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, the accountability relationships, which are assumed under decentralisation, do not materialise. Often times, the necessary excess supply of teachers does not exist; other times, community members do not have the training and information necessary to manage a school and its teachers. Moreover, it has been shown that community members may possibly mistreat teachers and/or embezzle funds designated for teacher salaries and school maintenance (SIMEDUCO, 2011). With regard to efficiency, through decentralisation, it may cost the state less to provide education, but only because communities provide time, labour, and materials to construct and manage schools (Edwards, 2012b), or because families must pay for educational resources (Bray, 1996; Carnoy, 1999; Swift-Morgan, 2006). Families experience these costs as school fees. Critics, therefore, point out that decentralisation often reinforces inequity across communities in the provision of quality education (Bray, 1996; Reimers and Cárdenas, 2007). Thus, while decentralisation policies may be preferred by central governments as a low-cost measure[2] to increase access to education, the effects are often questionable, if not detrimental.

Apart from the rationales laid out above, another frequently invoked reason for pursuing decentralisation revolves around the idea of democratic participation (Crawford and Hartman, 2008; Edwards and Klees, 2012). As Crawford and Hartman (2008, p. 14) state, "there is … the expectation that decentralisation … increases the overall quality of the democratic process by guaranteeing accountability, fostering civic competence and social capital, or strengthening political parties and civil society". This expectation has been attached as much to the decentralisation of government generally as it has to the decentralisation of education specifically (Naidoo, 2002), especially during a transition away from an autocratic government, as was the case in Namibia (Angula and Lewis, 1997). Additionally, in Africa, it is common to observe the simultaneous decentralisation of government and education management to sub-national levels (Naidoo, 2002).

Just as the historical trends around the rationales for decentralisation are varied, so too are the conceptual frameworks used to differentiate among its forms in practice (Lauglo, 1995). For the purpose of the present work, however, we restrict ourselves to the most well-known typology for defining the range of power-sharing arrangements that

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[2] *Education decentralisation is considered more cost-effective than centrally-managed education; however, when necessary structures and support are factored in to the overall cost, it is not necessarily a cheaper alternative (Sastry, Melamid and Ross, 1995).*

decentralisation commonly takes in practice. Hanson (1998, p. 112) succinctly summarises the three categories contained in this administrative typology as follows:

(1) *Deconcentration typically involves the transfer of tasks and work, but not authority, to other units in the organisation.*

(2) *Delegation involves the transfer of decision-making authority from higher to lower hierarchical units, but that authority can be withdrawn at the discretion of the delegating unit.*

(3) *Devolution refers to the transfer of authority to an autonomous unit that can act independently, or a unit that can act without first asking permission.*

In practice, though, decentralisation systems are rarely so tidy. This is not only because it is pursued for a variety of political, economic, and social reasons, but also because those who possess power may employ the rhetoric of decentralisation to legitimate their power but are not often quick to relinquish it (Weiler, 1983). Furthermore, even when the intent to decentralise is genuine, a number of technical, institutional, and political factors may preclude or complicate its realisation, as the next section indicates.

CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

When trying to understand and explain the dynamics of education reform, Gilles (2010) and colleagues encourage us to consider technical, institutional, and political dimensions. The *technical dimensions* of education refer to those "core elements" which constitute the existence of an education reform. They are the building blocks which give life to the policy and practice of education. The *institutional dimensions*, on the other hand, establish the context in which technical reforms are implemented. In analysing this dimension, one takes into account the institution's framework of rules and regulations, the institution's capacity, and the institution's available resources (financial, material and human) – because, together, these aspects "create the incentives (or disincentives) for the effective implementation of technical solutions" (Gillies, 2010, p. 37-38). Lastly, one examines the *political dimension* because it underpins and permeates education system reform. The fundamental issue here is who has a stake in the success (or failure) of a reform, and how their influence is exercised. Overall, the utility of this framework is that it is both sensitive as well as comprehensive. That is to say, it enables an analysis of a number of specific factors (technical, institutional, political) at multiple levels (international, national, local), while also incorporating relevant characteristics of the larger context which "may facilitate or impede change" (Gillies, 2010, p. 39).

It is through the lens of this framework that we present, in the following section, the findings of original research on Namibia's school cluster approach to decentralisation – an approach which is nested within broader efforts to decentralise government and education governance in this country.

THE CASE OF DECENTRALISATION AND SCHOOL CLUSTERS IN NAMIBIA

Many challenges have been inherent to Namibia's national context, and decentralisation policy cannot be understood without an understanding of them. In particular, these have included 100 years of colonial rule and 23 years of struggle for independence against the illegitimate occupation of Namibia by South Africa – whose apartheid policies forcibly moved black Namibians to ethnic regions. This has led to the general distrust of regional administration by governmental representatives in the post-independence period (Angula and Lewis, 1997; Hopwood, 2005). Culturally, the hierarchical power structures associated with apartheid have tended to challenge decentralised governance arrangements (Angula and Lewis, 1997; Bauer, 2001). In the post-1990 independence era, economic challenges have involved "a severe fiscal crisis, a dependent economy, [and] uneven development", in addition to the implementation of strict neoliberal economic policies (Freeman, 1992, p. 25). Socially, an extremely unequal distribution of wealth challenges development: "Half the population survives on approximately 10 per cent of the average income, while five per cent enjoys incomes more than five times the average" (UNDP, 2000, p. 20, as cited in United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2002, p. 22). In this context, not only have there been great infusions of official development assistance (ODA), but that assistance has frequently overwhelmed the Namibian government (Williams, 1996). Notably, the largest single recipient of ODA has been the education sector, at 20 per cent (or US$368 million) of the whole (World Bank, 2007).

National Decentralisation Efforts Related to Education

Despite these inherent challenges, the post-independence government focused immediately on how to democratise all areas of government (Angula and Lewis, 1997). This was particularly important for the incoming administration given the history of alienation and non-participation for the majority of the population during South Africa's rule. A primary strategy for accomplishing this was the decentralisation of education governance. Of note is the fact that this reform avenue was pursued despite an absence of evidence that decentralisation would have positive effects on education. Official statements and proclamations of the time asserted that "democratisation of education in Namibia [was] understood as … 'participation by the people in policy formulation, programme implementation and monitoring of the educational activities as they affect the nation as a whole or particular communities'" (Angula and Lewis, 1997, p. 237). These ideas were politically popular, and were not scrutinised with regard to their feasibility or desirability in practice. As time would show, despite the proclamation of politically popular ideas in policy documents, decentralisation was not genuinely undertaken in the years following independence. By 1996, it was clear that decentralisation (of all governmental areas) had not proceeded as envisioned (Angula and Lewis, 1997; Hopwood, 2005).

In late 1996, against this backdrop – and with the appointment of an enthusiastic Dr. Nickey Iyambo (1996-2002) as the new Minister of Regional and Local Government and Housing (MRLGH) – a national process was initiated to review the progress of, and challenges to,

decentralisation (Hopwood, 2005). This process led not only to the development of a national decentralisation policy in 1997, but would also spill over into a series of legislative acts in 2000 and 2001 designed to further facilitate the realisation of regional-, municipal-, and community-level decentralisation (see Hopwood, 2005 and Kuusi, 2009 for details). As per the national policy developed by Dr. Iyambo in 1997, primary education was one of the governmental functions which, in the short term, should be taken over by the country's 13 Regional Councils and then, in the medium term, should be under the purview of the municipalities. Delegation to the region was thus seen as a stepping stone to eventual municipal-level devolution (Hopwood, 2005). Building on this, it was stated in the Education Act of 2001 that school boards should be formed by parents, teachers, school directors and (at the secondary level) a student representative.

Since the late-1990s, however, lack of clarity about what it meant for Regional Councils to be in charge of education, as well as the lack of a timeline for when decentralisation would formally occur, has further stifled decentralisation. As such, efforts from 1997 onwards have, at best, led to informal deconcentration "not within the legal framework", according to a senior official with the MRLGH (as cited in Hopwood, 2005, p. 10). Regional Councils may carry out administrative tasks but have not been given any meaningful authority when it comes, for example, to planning or policy development.

Diagram 4.1, below, depicts the status of decentralisation both per official policy and per informal practice. It reflects the fact that the Regional Councils are officially responsible for "region-wide planning and development issues" (delegation), and that school boards are responsible for developing school policies and setting goals and objectives (devolution) (MRLGH, 1997, p. 32). With regard to Regional Directorates of Education (RDE) and the MBESC, it also reflects the deconcentration relationship described above by the senior government official in that, in practice, the former mostly performs administrative tasks on behalf of the latter. Specifically, deconcentration to the RDE means that officials at this level fulfil supervisory functions and are often responsible for teacher appointments, transfers, promotions, leave and discipline, as well as in-service training, professional support, pedagogical supervision, and monitoring of standards. Technically, they should also, according to an MBESC representative, "draw up regional budget plans … implement them … and build up efficient communication with schools for monitoring and evaluation" (MOEOAI1). To that end, Diagram 1 also shows the existence of circuit inspectors (an actor who would take on a new role with the initiation of the school cluster system), Namibia's other form of education management decentralisation (addressed in the following section). Most salient here, however, is that, while Namibia officially seeks to make progress on the deeper forms of decentralisation (delegation and devolution), in reality it more accurately reflects deconcentration.

Diagram 4.1: Modes of Education Decentralisation in Namibia

Source : Authors' Creation

What the above diagram cannot elucidate, however, is the rationale for decentralisation. Since 1997, although the initial rhetoric of democratisation has been maintained to justify the movement towards decentralisation, equally central to this continued policy prerogative (though much less frequently acknowledged in the literature on Namibian decentralisation) has been the fact that it was seen as a way to increase accountability[3]. As the 1997 document, A *Decentralization Policy for the Republic of Namibia,* states, "One of the most important motivations for decentralisation is accountability" (MRLGH, 1997, p. 53). In this regard, Namibia reflects international trends, which have emphasised the accountability dimension of decentralisation. At the same time, as per that same policy document, Namibian decentralisation is motivated by a desire for "cost-effectiveness", which is presumed to arise "when people manage their own resources and there is a more direct relationship between revenue, expenditure and services" (p. 26). In practice, however, the language of "cost-effectiveness" may conceal a desire to partially shift financial responsibilities to lower levels of government. As Kuusi (2009) explains, while Regional Councils – as well as RDEs – are certain to exist and are guaranteed to receive funds from central ministries, sub-regional levels of government (especially, municipal- and town-level councils) cannot be

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[3] *Here, according to the government, accountability means "increased political, resource and bureaucratic accountability and … transparency because of the closeness of the people to the institutions of government and the ability of the re-awakened civil society to participate in and monitor activities being implemented on their behalf" (MRLGH, 1997, p. 53).*

conferred official status unless they cover at least part of the "costs related to the execution of its powers and functions" (p. 7). The net effect is that those municipalities (15 out of a total of 18) which "have a more fragile financial basis … are subject to control exercised by the [MRLGH]" because they are dependent on the transfer of funds (Kuusi, 2009, p. 4).

Viewed in this light, although the mantra of decentralisation in Namibia has been democratisation, one sees that concerns around accountability and cost-sharing have also been at the heart of decentralisation efforts – as they have in other countries. One also sees that, despite the over-arching goal of democratisation through decentralisation, the end result, paradoxically, is a concentration of power in central ministries. This is because municipalities, without a resource base from which to draw, cannot be officially recognised – and therefore cannot be formally charged with the provision of local education (and it is for this reason that they are not present in Diagram 1). School boards, on the other hand, while they may exist, ultimately lack the funds to be effective because they receive only a portion of the required budget from higher levels and often must charge "school development fees" to parents to purchase resources (Mbatia, 2010).

The School Cluster System [4]

A parallel structure has attempted to fill the void left by centrally-led decentralisation efforts. Known as the school cluster system (SCS), it came into being in 1996, at the same time that Dr. Iyambo had expressed recommitment to the government's intention to decentralise. The SCS began and, until 2007, continued with the financial and technical support of German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), an institution that has long supported both decentralisation generally (Bergmann, 2002) and the school cluster approach specifically (e.g., in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Yemen). Since 2004, it has also been supported with technical assistance from USAID, another organisation long known to advocate decentralisation.[5]   Contrary to being a directive of national policy makers, the SCS was born from the sub-national work of GTZ. As Dittmar, Mendelsohn, and Ward (2002) recount, "The cluster system was essentially designed by … staff of the Basic Education Project, the regional offices and consultants" (p.35). That GTZ acted as the primary designer, supporter, and "mother" of the SCS would later have negative repercussions in terms of central actor buy-in (Mendelsohn and Ward, 2007, p.33). Nevertheless, the SCS – after first being well-received by the RDE in the northern Bantu region where it was piloted, and then being endorsed in a 1999 report by a presidential education commission – was scaled up with support from GTZ and, by 2001, could be found in all 13 RDEs (Aipinge, 2007).[6] By 2008, there were 280 clusters throughout Namibia (Pomuti, 2008, p. 71).

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[4] *Historically, the school cluster model of decentralisation developed in the 1940s in Great Britain and India. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, school clusters were popular in Latin America and Asia. Budget crises in the 1980s, however, led many countries to cancel such initiatives (Giordani, 2008).*
[5] *GTZ has promoted the SCS because it believes that increasing participation and decentralising the management of education in this way helps to strengthen institutions and improve the management of education (Bergmann, 2002). USAID supports decentralisation because it is thought that it can promote democracy and strengthen the effectiveness and accountability of public institutions generally and of schools specifically (Dinino 2000; Miller-Grandvaux and Yoder, 2002).*
[6] *After 1997, the number of regional education offices was expanded from seven to 13 to coincide with the number of Regional Councils in the country.*

Diagram 4.2: Organisation of School Cluster System*

| Prior to School Cluster System	Under School Cluster System
1 head office	1 head office
7 regional offices	7 regional offices
5 to 10 circuits per region	5 to 10 circuits per region
	5 to 7 clusters per circuit
25 to 50 schools per circuit	5 to 7 schools per cluster

* Note: The box on the right reflects the organisation of the cluster system in 1996, when it was first implemented. After 1997, the number of regional education offices was changed to 13 so that they would overlap with the 13 regional councils of government generally. The same cluster arrangements were maintained at the sub-regional level, however. Source: Dittmar, Mendelsohn and Ward (2002).

The SCS is complex in its design. Diagram 4.2, above, provides a simplified depiction. As it shows, prior to the SCS, each RDE had five to 10 "circuits", each of which was supervised by a single circuit inspector. Within each circuit, the inspectors then had between 25 and 50 schools to oversee. According to Dittmar *et al.* (2002), a survey in 1995 found that each school was inspected "about every two and a half years" (p.4). To remedy this, under the SCS, an additional management and support level is inserted between the schools and the circuit inspectors. Five to seven schools in geographical proximity are grouped to constitute one cluster, while five to seven clusters then comprise one circuit.[7] A centrally located school within each cluster is selected to serve as the cluster centre, a space where resources are shared and cluster meetings can occur. Within the clusters, teachers should meet in groups and should work with subject facilitators. The principal of the school where the cluster is located is the cluster centre principal (CCP); s/he should be "strong and committed" and should "set good examples for management and teaching practices" (Dittmar *et al.*, 2002, p.4). Additionally, overseeing each cluster is a cluster management committee (CLMC) made up of each of the principals of the schools in a cluster. A group of clusters (i.e., a circuit) is then overseen by a circuit management committee (CRMC) comprising only the CCP from each cluster. Ideally, circuit inspectors, as opposed to supervising 25 to 50 individual schools, will instead interface with the CRMC and the CLMC. Overall, the idea is that CRMCs and CLMCs serve as additional, decentralised levels of management and support for the schools and teachers. What stands out in this design is that it focuses on those (sub-regional) levels which, as described in the previous section, have received in practice the least attention from the central government. Diagram 4.3, below, depicts the chain of command and flow of communication/information which results from the SCS.

[7] *Because junior and upper secondary schools tend not to be in geographically proximity to each other, and because schools must opt in, the SCS tends to function only at the primary level.*

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Diagram 4.3: Structure of Communication in School Cluster System

Inspector of Education

Circuit Management Committee

Admin. Assistant Cluster Centre Principal

Support teacher

Cluster Management Committee

Source: Mendelsohn and Ward (2007)

While the SCS is said to respond to the fact that schools and teachers are isolated, under-resourced and with inadequate support, this system is also advocated for other reasons, all of which are important to understand because they form the basis against which the SCS should be judged (Dittmar *et al.,* 2002). The reasons are numerous and lengthy, and, as such, have been summarised in Table 1, below.[8] The table shows that the SCS is thought to be able to either directly accomplish or indirectly facilitate a broad range of results, which are listed in the left-hand column, the logic for which is summarised in the right-hand column. As Table 1 shows, in theory, the programme should effect many positive outcomes. Teaching quality improves, for example, not because upper levels of the education system provide professional development, but rather because clustered teachers develop themselves by working together and sharing good practices and resources. Among other reasons, school management improves because CCPs can better support and supervise all schools in a cluster, and because a constructive competitive spirit develops among schools. The entire cluster is empowered because teachers and principals develop greater competence through working and dealing with issues together. The communication and collection of information is thought to become more efficient, as is the ordering and distribution of materials. Cost-efficiency also improves as schools pool resources to finance common activities and as the sharing of resources (e.g., classrooms, teachers, learning materials, equipment) increases. Local participation is enhanced as both the school boards and the whole community are better informed, which leads to greater interest and investment in the school's success. Lastly, with the SCS infrastructure in place, it can be used as a synergetic framework for regional planning purposes, or to carry out other specific programmes. Unsurprisingly, positive results along these lines led RDEs outside of the initial SCS pilot region to request that it be implemented in their regions as well (Aipinge, 2007). However, what remains to be determined, especially in the Otjozondjupa region, is if this range of benefits has been realised in practice.

[8] *While not all schools in Namibia needed to address each of the dimensions contained in Table 1, the schools in each region had shortcomings which the SCS was thought to be able to address*

Table 4.1: Theory of School Cluster System in Namibia

	Results Dimension	Logic	
1	Improved teaching and learning quality	• Teachers work together, thereby boosting confidence and morale and developing skills • Good practices and resources are shared	• Greater equity in education quality as skills levelled across teachers and as all learners exposed to similar level of testing
2	Improved school management	• CCPs support and supervise the satellite schools • Cluster centres encourage satellite schools to improve their management practices • Constructive competitive spirit among schools	• Teachers better understand their responsibilities • Principals hold teachers accountable, thereby reducing teacher absenteeism • Schools managed as a networks, not individually • Teacher training via cascade model
3	Cluster Empowerment	• All teachers and principals develop greater competence by working together • CCP is empowered to visit schools, share ideas, identify problems, and make decisions about CCs • Cluster school members deal with issues together, resulting in faster, more effective solutions with increased ownership	• CLMC targets training to needs of cluster teachers • Clusters plan for provision of schooling in wider context, rather than on school-by-school basis • Teacher appointments and transfers considered first by school boards, the CMC, and the CCP before being considered by the RDE.
4	Improved Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness	• Communication and collection of information done more efficiently • Ordering and distribution of materials is done more efficiently • Sharing of resources (e.g., classrooms, teachers, and learning materials, copiers) among schools more cost-effective	• Schools can pool resources to finance common activities • Community members contribute time and labour to improve schools • Teachers allocated by CMC according to school needs, avoiding over/understaffing • Appropriately qualified teachers can be shared among schools
5	Community Involvement	• Both the school boards and the whole community are better informed • Parents identify with and support entire cluster, not only their community school	• Greater grasp of educational issues leads to interest and investment, which leads parents to address teacher and learner absenteeism
6	Synergetic Framework	• Cluster system provides a single structure through which regional planning and a variety of other programmes can be delivered	• Examples include: donor assistance activities, general government administrative tasks, ECD programmes, adult education programmes, health programmes

Key: CC = Cluster Centre; CCP = Cluster Centre Principal; CLMC = Cluster Management Committee; ECD = Early Childhood Development; RDE = Regional Directorate of Education. **Source**: Derived from Dittmar, Mendelsohn & Ward (2002) and Giordani (2008).

The Technical Dimension of the School Cluster System

On the whole, the authors' research indicates that, while a plethora of sub-regional management structures have been established, "clustering is a wonderful idea that doesn't work in reality", as one teacher put it (TCGD1).[9] This characterisation manifests and affects each of the theorised results dimensions discussed above, including: teacher collaboration, school management, cluster empowerment, efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and community involvement. The research also shows how the SCS conflicts with those local-level decentralisation structures established by the national government – namely, school boards.

Improved Teaching and Learning Quality

The idea that teaching quality improves under the SCS rests on the assumption that teachers across schools work together and share good practices and resources. Committees within clusters are often established to facilitate teacher collaboration, and interviewees identified increased interaction among teachers as one of the benefits of the SCS. This interaction, however, has not approximated the collaboration that would engender improved teaching quality. This is evidenced by the fact that the "majority of cluster group members do not even show up during a meeting, … [that] teachers are not committed and … wait for their colleagues to work for them", and that both "teachers from private schools and those who do not teach promotional subjects … are not involved in cluster activities" (TCGD1 and 2). On the sharing of resources, despite some schools being "over resourced", interviewees repeatedly commented that resources are not shared. On the one hand, this is the result of insufficient resources generally; on the other, it is because schools boards purchase materials for their schools with centrally-provided funds and community-contributed fees – and therefore see the resources as theirs alone, not to be shared.

Improved School Management

School management is thought to improve primarily because CCPs supervise and support all schools in a cluster. CCPs, however, adamantly stated that they are overwhelmed with responsibility under the SCS and cannot support other schools in addition to supervising their own as well as teaching their own classes (15 per cent of principals' time goes to the latter). One principal bluntly stated that, as a result of these competing demands, "if other principals want something from me, they come; I don't go to them" (PCCPI1). Regional staff even recognised the limitations on principals: "[CCPs] cannot afford to go to every other school for supervision. These principals are over-worked" (RRCSI3). Needless to say, CCPs did not carry out the cascade training envisioned by GTZ in the design of the SCS. Limited time and long distances between schools mean that principals simply do not play the role envisioned by the SCS' design. Importantly for the principals, the fact that the CCPs do not receive additional compensation for additional responsibility is also a discouraging factor.

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[9] *The following nomenclature is employed in this chapter to refer to, and distinguish among, participant interviews: PCCPI (individual cluster center principal interview), PCMGD (cluster management focus group), PPI (regular principal individual interview), RRCSI (regional representative individual interview), TCGD (teacher focus group), and TSFI (subject facilitator individual interview).*

Cluster Management

In practice, the theory of action behind the third results dimension – cluster empowerment – is challenged in numerous ways. This is because "cluster empowerment" builds on the idea that teachers and principals work together, and also suggests that the CLMC (i.e., the principals from each school in the cluster) will jointly "determine what training programmes are needed to improve the skills of principals, teachers, secretaries and school board members" (Dittmar *et al.*, 2002, p. 16). With regard to the former, the data collected indicate that teachers and principals are not working together. A group of teachers asserted: "We as teachers have no idea what goes on in the [CLMC]. We are not involved in planning cluster activities; neither are our views about our problems and professional needs discussed" (TCGD1 and 2). Survey results reinforce this finding: 77 per cent of teachers responded that clusters are either "never" or "only to a very limited extent" managed collaboratively.

Interviews with cluster principals revealed that they do meet and plan together, but only when it is necessary to redistribute an over-enrolment of students in a given school. Other issues, such as school dropouts, are seen by cluster principals as "a responsibility of the schools concerned and their board members" (PCMGD1). Furthermore, in relation to teacher training, cluster principals commented: "Continuous teacher development [isn't] one of our activities in the [CLMC]. That is the work of the circuit inspector, subject advisors, and the concerned principals" (PCMGD1). Subsequently, teachers have concluded that "all that the [CLMC] does when they go to the meeting is drink coffee and come up with directives for us to implement" (TCGD2). Teacher input and interaction with principals is certainly limited, if present, as is the cluster planning and training that principals undertake. The fact that cluster principals only meet twice per year additionally makes the planning and design of training difficult, if not impossible. Cluster empowerment cannot be said to be realised.

Improved Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness

As previously mentioned, efficiency and cost-effectiveness should be enhanced under the SCS. Supposed efficiency gains relate primarily to the communication and collection of information, as well as the ordering and distribution of materials. Research, however, showed that the latter has not been streamlined. Principals divulged: "We don't use the cluster for ordering school materials. Every principal is responsible for that. What the cluster does is to ensure that these orders are collected and put together for the circuit inspector … After that, every principal is supposed to follow up … with the distributors or the regional office" (PPI6). Furthermore, on the collection and communication of information – and contrary to theory – the SCS can be regarded as a structure that increases bureaucracy. Most of the principals argued that it takes an inordinate amount of time to process school orders or to receive feedback from the regional office because communication must be channelled through the office of the CCP. The fact that the SCS in Namibia creates multiple, additional layers of bureaucracy is of note, especially because the thrust of recent education decentralisation reforms internationally has been to eliminate and reduce intermediate levels of governance.

The theory of cost-efficiency pertains to both the sharing and pooling of resources within the cluster. Though perhaps begrudgingly, cluster principals disclosed that this does occur:

> *All the cluster activities are financed by the contribution from the schools. Every school pays $N1000 [(approximately $US120)] towards cluster activities every year. The regional office has not yet provided us with additional cluster facilities. We use our offices, the school duplicating machines, school telephone and school fax machines for cluster activities (PCMGD1).*

These words reveal that the SCS, rather than being centrally-financed, works to the extent that schools can afford to contribute. Thus, in that cluster activities are carried out on this basis, the SCS can be said to be cost-effective, at least from the perspective of the MBESC, because principals and teachers take on additional roles without increasing central government expenditures. Indeed, regional representatives find that, as the government has taken over the SCS from the GTZ, "support has been lacking" and that "clustering has turned out to be a very expensive activity for the school" (RRCSI2). Time has shown that the MBESC generally – though not financially – endorses the SCS. The government is more concerned with reducing costs (or at least not increasing them) than with ensuring the potential outcomes of the SCS.

Community Involvement
Lastly, research has shown that increased community involvement is a hypothesised outcome with a shaky theory of action. While it is assumed that, upon becoming better informed (though how this happens is not clear, since parents do not participate in cluster activities), parents will identify with and support the entire cluster, in particular by helping to reduce teacher absenteeism. Fieldwork confirms the weak nature of these assumptions: It was found that parents, despite contributing financially to their community school, are completely ignorant of the existence of the cluster arrangements. All parents interviewed answered 'no' when asked if they knew about the SCS. Moreover, community involvement is further lacking when it comes to schools boards, which, by design, and contrary to the SCS, actually should include parental participation. Parents at most stand in for teachers when they are absent (far from alleviating teacher absenteeism), and the school boards are run exclusively by principals and teachers, who perform administrative tasks not related to teaching and learning (since those matters are seen as the purview of the SCS). Community involvement is difficult to marshal when those who are supposed to participate are unaware of – and are not welcomed into – the structure in which they should do so.

The above discussion of results has focused on the technical dimension. That is to say, it has addressed the content – or the core elements – which (should) give form to the SCS. As was shown, the SCS has produced a number of positive results. Committees within cluster groups have been created through which teachers from different schools interact more often. Likewise, structures have been created in which cluster principals can and do work together and address certain issues, such as pupil over-enrolment in a cluster school. It was furthermore evidenced that, when resources and appliances exist, CCPs use them to carry out tasks related to their cluster responsibilities. At the same time, however, the above findings predominantly demonstrated that neither the desired operation nor the desired results of the SCS have been actualised in practice. Explaining why this is so can only be understood by considering the institutional and political dimensions of education reform.

Institutional and Political Dimensions

The SCS exists in an awkward environment, influenced by a number of institutional and political elements. Institutionally, the most important element is that the SCS operates in a policy vacuum. That is to say, official policies do not exist to guide its implementation. Neither the Decentralisation Enabling Act of 2000 nor the Education Act of 2001 makes reference to school clustering. Whereas the latter does recognise circuit inspectors, it does not do so for the CCP, the cluster subject advisors, the CLMC, or the CRMC. Likewise, the Decentralisation Enabling Act of 2000 does not provide for the delegation or devolution of functions to those SCS structures which operate between the RDEs and the schools boards (e.g., the CCP, CLMC, and CRMC). Though not solely responsible, this policy vacuum has at least partially contributed to the ambiguous division of authority, insufficient technical support and technical capacity, and the unavailability of financial resources at lower levels.

At the local level, CCPs, for example, have no legal mandate to supervise other schools. Nor do they have formal authority over teachers. With regard to inputs, the previous section reported that the SCS lacks basic resources (e.g., meeting space, teaching materials to share, appliances for cluster activities, etc.). It also highlighted how the SCS is not supported financially by the MBESC; and that, as such, CCPs draw from the budgets of cluster schools (which themselves are partially dependent upon fees paid by parents). It is also worth noting that neither teachers nor principals are provided with funds to cover the cost of transportation to attend cluster activities. Due to the distance between schools, these costs can be significant in regions such as Otjozondjupa, which would explain the regular absence of teachers from meetings and the fact that CCPs do not travel to other schools.

In addition, training has not been provided to ensure the institutional capacity of either CCPs (at least not in the four years preceding 2010) or subject facilitators. To that end, subject facilitators reported the following:

> We, as the subject facilitators, have no specific responsibility. We do not know what to do in the subject groups. The teachers were asked to form these groups by the principals, they formed the groups, then we were appointed as subject facilitators and that was all. We were never told what to do. We have not received any training, so we only ask teachers to meet when we want to discuss about cluster examinations (TSFI1).

At local level, the end result is that overlapping, conflictual structures have been created for which clear guidelines do not exist and for which sufficient training has not been provided. In this light, the findings of the previous section, on the technical dimensions of SCS, are not entirely surprising.

At the regional level, per official policy documents, administrative and support functions should be performed. These functions include regional planning, ensuring efficient communication with schools, monitoring and evaluation, and teacher training. Regions do not often carry out these tasks, however, because the resources, capacity, and authority have not been provided. Indeed, with regard to authority, the central government may at any moment revoke the right of the regions to perform those functions. At the same time, actors in the SCS do not execute the tasks that are (or should be) duplicated by the regional

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offices, such as those listed above. Due to lack of clarity regarding the division of respon-sibilities and authority, confusion and inaction result on multiple levels. As Gillies (2010) notes, without resources and clear institutional guidelines, nothing happens. A case in point is that higher levels of the SCS, such as the CRMC, have not materialised at all, at least not in the Otjozondjupa region.

Remedying such complex institutional impediments requires political will. However, when it comes to who has a stake in the success of school clusters, research has revealed that, because the SCS was developed by the GTZ in conjunction with consultants and regional (i.e., within Namibia) actors, ownership is not felt by national political actors. This was clear when, in 2010, USAID-supported attempts to institutionalise the SCS were met with political resistance. Policy makers and central ministry staff do not feel that it is "their" programme because they were not consulted during its formation, and because they have been uninvolved in its implementation. Without a genuine commitment from the government, both GTZ and USAID supported a programme which aligned with their institutional agendas. The Namibian government tolerated this because the programme aligned with its rhetoric of democracy and participation while not increasing its costs for providing education. In the long run, this political decision has not strengthened the institutional capacity of the education system and has not adequately met the needs of schools and teachers.

A lack of sufficient fiscal resources is central in this regard. Both regional and national-level officials of the MBESC declare, however, that financial shortfalls affect support for the SCS. It is seen as being too expensive to be financed by the central government. Notably, despite the rhetoric of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the government finds in practice that fully implementing and adequately supporting education management decentralisation, with the additional administrative support that it requires (see Diagrams 2 and 3), is too costly. At the same time, however, the central government does support decentralisation in certain, politically strategic regions, such as in the relatively more densely populated regions of the north, where the majority of the ruling party's base is located. Nonetheless, with regard to formally institutionalising and funding SCS, the will does not exist among an adequate cross-section of national-level actors. The result is that decentralisation remains in limbo.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to illuminate the issues and difficulties that characterise initiatives for education decentralisation in Namibia. It has done so by presenting and discussing the results of original research on both nationally-led efforts as well as programmes sponsored by international actors. The findings have shown that, if education decentralisation remains a policy pursued in Namibia, multiple dimensions need to be addressed to improve the operation and outcomes of it. Specifically, it would be necessary to create a context which encourages – rather than frustrates – support from multiple levels. That would mean developing formal, MBESC guidelines regarding the relationships among each of the actors involved in the realisation of education decentralisation – including, for example, CCPs, CLMCs,

CRMCs, teacher-formed committees within clusters, subject facilitators, and RDEs. At the same time, however, it would be at least as essential to ensure the technical capacity of key actors. Teachers, subject facilitators, and principals – in addition to an unambiguous institutional context – need training to upgrade their professional competencies and to understand how decentralisation is designed to work. The foundation of complex institutional arrangements such as the decentralisation systems in Namibia hinges on the abilities of actors at all levels of the system, not least of which are teachers. Furthermore, the collaboration envisioned by SCS in Namibia builds on, but is not a replacement for, adequate formal teacher preparation. Addressing the above-mentioned shortcoming would undoubtedly require political will on the part of key elected and ministerial actors in Namibia.

That said, the governance structures which are currently in place provide a platform on which to enhance the version of decentralisation which has been implemented in Namibia. To the extent that school boards, CLMCs, CRMCs, and RDEs exist and are operational, they provide the basis of an educational system which contains multiple levels of support for teachers and schools. Nevertheless, while having multiple levels of support for teachers and schools is ideal, it cannot work without an appropriate institutional context and adequate resources. As such, in the case of Namibia, it may be advisable to shift the focus from operationalising complex governance structures to nurturing the foundation of the education system – namely, teachers. Research has shown that teachers are one of – if not the – most important factors in ensuring the provision of an excellent education (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Hanushek *et al*., 1998). Going forward, it may be prudent for both the Namibian government and for international donors to rethink their predominant emphasis on decentralisation processes to consider instead how better to support and meet the training and material needs of teachers.

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CHAPTER 5

PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN UGANDA: MORE PERILS THAN PROMISES FOR UNIVERSAL SECONDARY EDUCATION

Bo-Joe Brans

INTRODUCTION

The involvement of the private sector in education has been one of the most contentious areas of policy debate in the last decade (Rose, 2010). Nevertheless, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in education have been gaining support as a policy tool to ensure the need for Education For All (EFA) and to overcome the challenges for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Fennel, 2010, p. 3). Donor agencies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and regional development banks have become enthusiastic supporters of the PPP idea (Education International [EI], 2009). These influential international organisations manifest themselves as global carriers of PPP programmes by pushing global policies into national politics (Verger and VanderKaaij, 2012). Currently, PPP education reform programmes are being implemented in all parts of the world, particularly across developing countries (Rose, 2010) and they are shaping the provision of education and the working conditions of teachers (EI, 2009).

Strikingly, experts within the education sector are highly ambivalent on the actual success of PPPs. Both advocates and critics provide evidence of the benefits and dangers of PPP reforms (Draxler, 2012). As such, the effects of the national adoption of PPPs for education are not conclusive; even its advocates are unsure of its impact (Patrinos *et al*., 2009). The causal relation between the PPP global idea, the way PPPs are nationally translated, and their impact on national education contexts are, to a significant extent, unknown. In order to provide a qualitative insight in to this causal 'black box'[1] , this chapter will present an analysis of a specific application of PPPs within the field of education: the PPP arrangement as a policy tool for Universal Secondary Education in Uganda.

Evaluating the case of Ugandan PPPs in education is relevant for two reasons. First, Uganda is one of the first countries to experiment with 'free' secondary education instead of the more common low-fee private schools in developing countries (see UNESCO, 2009). Second, despite active global policy debates, the documentation of the experiences of state–non-state relationships has been very limited in practice (Rose, 2010, p. 475). This

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[1] *See Antoni Verger's presentation at the International Seminar, Education and International Development, held in Amsterdam on 29-30 September, 2011. Source:*
http://educationanddevelopment.wordpress.com/events/why-research-matters

is especially the case in Uganda where academic studies, policy reports and statistical data regarding the implemented PPPs are scarce, as this concerns a relatively recently implemented programme.

This case study is based on a three-month fieldwork period in Uganda in 2011. For this research, the perspectives of a wide range of international and national education stakeholders that are active in Uganda were analysed. In addition, the main strategic plans, public statements and policy reports regarding the PPP idea were studied. The sources represent a wide variety of social actors and political interests; they also reflect a wide range of opinions on the existing PPP policy, from strong promoters to strong opponents of the programme. Nevertheless, they demonstrated similarities in the way in which PPPs have an impact on the education sector. From this parallelism, a qualitative insight on the impact of PPPs and its translation into practice has been extrapolated.

The chapter is set out in two parts. The first describes the global conception and diffusion of PPPs in education. The second part examines PPPs in Uganda, by describing the kind of policy tool that has been designed; how this has been implemented in the national policy environment; and the perceived impact on several key education issues, with a focus on the position of teachers.

PPPS IN EDUCATION

PPPs in education cover a broad range of agreements between public institutions and the private sector, which are aimed at the operation of public infrastructures or the provision of public services (EI, 2009). The term 'partnership' is used to portray either a purely contractual arrangement or a more open agreement between different public and private parties to work together to achieve common objectives. Thus, there exists a wide range of PPPs with diverse features and arrangements between involved partners. The partnership can be a highly structured and governed set-up, or it can merely indicate an attitude of reciprocity in development programmes between the involved actors (Draxler, 2008). The most common PPPs in education are 'contracting models', which refer to a process whereby a government procures education or education-related services of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed price from a specific private provider (CfBT, 2008; Patrinos *et al.*, 2009). The contracting approach is part of the main 'PPPs programmatic idea', which is successfully dispersed in developing countries and is promoted by a relatively small transnational network of education experts who are strategically located in influential international organisations, such as the World Bank (Verger, 2011).

PPPs programmatic idea

The promoted PPPs programmatic idea entails different *types of contracts* based on performance outcomes between the public and the private sector. The private sector can be contracted under the following formats: delivery of education (such as charter schools), private operation of public schools (contract schools), education vouchers, and forms of 'contracting out of education services', such as the public funding of existing private schools to guarantee student enrolment (Patrinos *et al.*, 2009, p. 3).

Promoters of PPPs in education theorise, first of all, that these contracts bring in a form of *risk sharing*. The risk on behalf of the public sector relies on the fact that it is the main funder of the partnership initiatives. Risk is also seen to be shared by the private sector due to "the risk of financial loss for noncompliance and incentives to improve its performance" (World Bank, 2006). According to the OECD: "if there is not risk sharing, there cannot be a PPP" (OECD, 2008). Secondly, PPPs are promoted to provide more *flexible management* than most public sector arrangements, since the public sector is seen to have less autonomy in 'hiring' and 'firing' teachers and fewer incentives to pursue education demands. The flexible management of teachers is therefore perceived as one of the primary motivations for PPPs (Patrinos *et al.*, 2009). It is common that PPP promoters see teachers, and especially teacher unions, as constraints to the flexible management aspect of the PPP arrangements, in which teachers can be strictly sanctioned if they under-perform (Verger, 2011). Finally, PPPs are promoted to realise a radical re-configuration of the *role of the state* in education by moving away from direct education provision to planning, funding, regulation, and evaluation of the education system while increasing the role of private education provision (Srivastava, 2010). However, according to its promoters, PPPs do not signify a pure privatisation of education systems, but rather an expansion of government control because the state is supposed to regulate the contractual agreements with "the full force of the law" (Patrinos, 2012).

The promoters of the PPP idea argue that several types of *education problems* will be addressed. When it comes to the improvement of access, PPPs are argued to be a more cost-effective means of providing education than traditional public sector provision, for instance by making use of already existing private schools. In this way, the government has to spend less per school and can therefore scale up provision - i.e. enhancing access (Patrinos *et al.*, 2009; Tooley, 2005). Furthermore, the quality of education is perceived to be enhanced. PPP contracts are seen to be able to specify requirements for a minimum level of quality in the services provided by the private contractor. Moreover, PPPs are expected to bring the private sector's skills and resources into the education sector, thus increasing efficiency and innovation in the delivery of education (Patrinos *et al.*, 2009). In addition, PPP promoters theorise that through competition, the pressure from other schools and parents' free choice of school is going to create incentives for providing "a better quality service" (Verger, 2011, p. 11).

Critique on the PPP programmatic idea for education

There exist multiple critiques of the use of PPPs in education - mostly from academics and civil society actors, such as teacher unions - which are briefly outlined here. First of all, PPPs are criticised for concealing the unpopularity of privatisation with "partnership rhetoric" (Cornwall, 2007), thereby bringing in a form of privatisation while masking objective evaluation of the social benefits (Sheil, 2002). Secondly, PPP theory is criticised for disguising certain effects in theory. Risk sharing is seen to be questionable when public entities hold the ultimate responsibility, including the cost of failure (EI, 2009; Verger 2011). In addition, the flexible management idea behind PPPs is distrusted as a component of privatisation, as it allows lower pay and softer contracts for the sake of efficiency. This, in turn, is argued to have negative implications for the positions available to qualified teachers, their conditions of work once employed; and it challenges the capacities of education unions to bargain collectively on behalf of their members (Ball and Youdell, 2007). Finally, various

PPP critics underline the limited attention to equality, transparency and the little measurable impact on the education sector as a whole (Draxler, 2012). To sum up, a wide array of critical evidence exists that questions the propounded beneficial effects of PPPs to education and therefore dismisses the PPP reforms for education as a whole.

Global diffusion of PPPs for education in developing countries

Despite its contestation, the programmatic approach to PPPs is implemented throughout developing countries. Because education systems are rapidly expanding in these countries but budgets are constrained, governments are often more open to experimenting with "making use of the private sector" (CfBT, 2008) in order to meet demands for education. In addition, the global PPP dissemination is aided by the fact that a wide range of influential international organisations and aid agencies have become global promoters of this idea (Verger, 2011).

PPPs global policy: Ambiguity of PPPs effect

Currently, a wide range of developing countries are either implementing several forms of PPPs in education or are at the point of adopting PPP policy programmes. However, both promoters and critics of PPPs provide contradicting evidence of the impact of PPPs in developing countries, underlining the inconclusiveness as to whether 'PPPs work'. Evidence from several countries that have implemented PPPs in education demonstrates a high degree of ambiguity about the successful implementation of such programmes in reality.

In some cases where the global PPP policy prescriptions meet those of national governments, questions arise about whether their national governing structures are capable of implementing the programme properly. An example can be found in the Philippines with the Educational Service Contracting (ESC) of private high schools in the 1990s to enrol students in areas where there was a shortage of places in public schools. Although the programme was praised for its growing amount of grantees (CfBT, 2008), it was stricken by managerial problems in reality, such as long delays in government payments and insufficient capabilities in identifying fraud, resulting in so-called 'ghost schools' where funds were received for schools that did not exist (Patrinos *et al*., 2009).

Further examinations of PPP cases show that when partnerships meet different complex social contexts, their effectiveness in tackling education issues - especially whether the poorest inhabitants benefited - can be questionable and can potentially have adverse effects (Fennel, 2010). Hence, in the case of India, while the 'grant-in-aid PPP' is promoted because of access and efficiency benefits (Mehrotra, 2011), others point to the negative effects on quality and equity for the poorest (Fennel, 2007; Srivastava, 2010).

THE CASE OF UGANDA

Despite the uncertain impact of PPPs in education, they continue to be promoted and transposed into different education settings, such as in Uganda, where they have been employed as a policy tool for Universal Secondary Education since 2007. Even though the programme has been implemented on a wide scale in the country, its impact in the Ugandan education field is not clear and, to date, evaluations are scarce.

Contextual Background

Politically, although a referendum in 2005 led to the adoption of a multiparty system, power has remained largely concentrated in the hands of President Museveni, who has ruled since 1986. Observers note that since 2005, the space for civil society in Uganda has gradually narrowed. Ironically, this narrowing appears to stem from President Museveni's attempt to maintain political power within the context of the movement to a multiparty democracy (Mundy and Stalker, 2010, unpublished).

Economically, Museveni's governing party, the National Resistance Movement, has been committed to liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation from the beginning, with the aim of enabling the private sector to become the major engine of growth (Brett, 1995). Uganda is considered as one of the most successful economies in Africa, which is attributed by some to its bold, private sector-oriented structural reforms (World Bank, 2010). Nevertheless, Uganda is known to be a donor-dependent country. In 2009, donors financed around 30 per cent of the government's budget (World Bank, 2010). Moreover, Uganda remains one of the poorest countries in the world with an average gross domestic product per capita of US$466 (IMF, 2010) and it ranks 143 of 169 in the 2010 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2010). A key development challenge for Uganda is its high population growth. Uganda has the third-highest total fertility rate in the world (average 6.7 births per woman) and the population has doubled since 1988 (World Bank, 2010). Uganda is therefore one of the few countries where the number of young-age dependents exceeds the number of working-age individuals. This places enormous stress on the demand for education.

The education sector in Uganda is facing severe problems with access, equality, quality, and the availability of resources. Although access to education for the primary sector has strongly improved in the past years due to the Universal Primary Education programme (UPE) - to 91 per cent - secondary education enrolment remains low. It was only 25.2 per cent in 2007 (World Bank, 2010). Access to education is characterised as being highly unequal as it is mainly restricted to urban areas and wealthy sectors of society, with a lower share of girls, especially in rural areas (World Bank, 2009). The lack of quality education is, according to the World Bank, mainly caused by inequitable teacher deployment, an insufficient spread of instructional materials, and weak governance structures at school levels (World Bank, 2010). Lastly, financial resources are perceived to be constrained with an education allocation dropped from 20 per cent to 17.5 per cent of the national budget; 23 per cent of that goes to secondary education (World Bank, 2009).

Furthermore, the education sector in Uganda has been marked by significant education reforms that followed from political pronouncements made during election periods (Stasavage, 2004; 2005; Chapman *et al*., 2010). The most notable reforms are the UPE, launched in 1997, and Universal Secondary Education (USE), introduced in 2006.[2] The latter,

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[2] *USE is part of the broader Universal Post Primary Education (UPPET) policy that also contains a component for Technical, Vocational Education and Training (TVET). TVET covers less than two per cent of students under the UPPET programme.*

affecting senior one to senior four grades, was announced by the Ugandan government during an election campaign in 2006 . At that time, according to Chapman *et al*. (2010), the rising demand for education in times of national presidential elections led to the pronouncement of USE by the incumbent presidents "to draw votes". However, the policy was adopted with little attention to system capacity, organisational planning for implementation, financial resources, and without anticipation of the consequences of rapid expansion of secondary schooling (Chapman *et al*., 2010).

PPPs as a policy tool for Universal Secondary Education

To live up to this political pronouncement, the capacity and organisational problems forced the Government of Uganda to call for the World Bank's technical and financial assistance. The Bank introduced the idea of partnering with the large amount of existing private schools in Uganda's secondary education system as an efficient way of providing education for the resource constrained government (World Bank, 2009). As a result of the World Bank's involvement, the government of Uganda widened the USE programme's focus to all private schools, including the 'for-profit' ones (Interview, World Bank specialist, 2011).[3] The underlying argument is that - as a World Bank education consultant, Norman LaRocque, argues in a report prepared for the Ugandan Ministry of Education and Sports [MoES] -, partnerships with these 'for profit' private schools should be established because it would open up a much broader scope of private schools; i.e. increase education opportunities and lead to competition between schools, as an incentive to provide a better quality service. Moreover, partnerships are argued to be more cost effective due to lower government subsidies given to schools, e.g. the wages of teachers working at these schools would not have to be paid by the government (LaRocque, 2007).

The main kind of PPP that was constructed initially, and that still exists to date, is an arrangement between private schools and government where the private school receives a fixed capitation grant per student[4] when they sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that describes the basic standards and expectations of service delivery with the MoES. The subsidised students can enter this private school when they meet the 'minimum qualifications' from their Primary Leaving Exam. The PPP arrangement is not a subsidy as the grant is based on a fixed price and is paid directly to the school. Additional payments by the parents, a so-called 'top-up', are illegal, even when unit cost parameters at the school level might be higher. The PPP arrangement in Uganda is, therefore, in theory, not a form of low-fee private school that is more common in other developing countries where parents still have to pay a 'small' fee (see UNESCO, 2009). In the literature on PPPs, the arrangement in Uganda is known as a form of 'contracting out' or "the purchasing of private education services" (Patrinos *et al.*, 2009, p. 21; CfBT, 2008, p. 20).

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[3] 3 Instead of specific government selected private-, mostly private 'community schools' (Interview, World Bank specialist, 2011).

[4] The capitation grant is 47000 Ugandan Shillings (approximately US$23) per student, per term for private schools and 41000 Ugandan Shillings (around US$20) per student for government schools (USE/UPPET Head Count Report, October 2009: 7).

The main roles of the state within the context of the PPP arrangement in Uganda are: funding capitation grants; regulation through inspection twice each year by the Education Standards Agency and by signing the MOU as a guideline for the partnership; assessment and examination through the Ugandan National Examinations Board, since all private schools have to follow the same curriculum and legal framework as public schools; and, finally, policy guidance of the MoES's department of private schools, which oversees the schools by 'liaising' with their owners to achieve a certain level of quality by 'enforcing' policy (Interview, Commissioner MoES, I, 2011).

A central aspect of this Ugandan PPP is the management at school level. Comparable to the flexibility of management idea, PPP school proprietors, mostly head teachers, are expected to ensure more efficient school-level management because they do not have to pay the same salaries to teachers and they are able to fire them more easily. In Uganda, where teacher absenteeism is conceived as a serious education problem, this is proposed as a useful way of pressuring teachers "to show up for work" (Interview, government official, IV, 2011).

Implementation of the PPP arrangement in the Ugandan policy context

To understand how the PPP idea fits within the political and institutional environment that prevails in the country (Walsh, 2000), this section describes how the global PPPs discourse has been adopted and implemented in the Ugandan policy context.

Adoption of the PPP idea

The PPP policy in Uganda is very attractive for education policy makers. During the field research interviews, education policy makers argued that, thanks to PPPs, new educational opportunities have been created for students who did not have access to this level of education before, especially in rural areas where there are very few government schools. The government actors claimed to be openly in favour of such 'privatisation' strategies for secondary education. Furthermore, the focal point of the PPP arrangement - fixed capitation grants per student – is perceived to be clear and attractive by a large group of 'private partners'. As a consequence, the number of private schools under this arrangement is swiftly growing, even more rapidly than the public schools (New Vision, 22 June, 2011).

The PPP arrangement is backed by several international organisations from the Education Development Partners Group in Uganda, containing both bilateral organisations and international organisations, such as the World Bank, African Development Bank, and several embassies. The World Bank, in particular, acted as an initiator of the proposal. The World Bank supports the PPPs initially by financially assisting the government's overarching USE programme with loans through the 'Post Primary Education and Training Adaptable Programme Lending Project'. Secondly, the World Bank promotes the PPPs indirectly, e.g. through the works of World Bank consultants for the government of Uganda (e.g. see LaRocque, 2007) and through the growing activities of an organisation that is part of the World Bank group - the International Finance Corporation (IFC). It provides advisory services to private institutions and loans to help private schools improve their operations (IFC, 2011). Thus, the World Bank is seen to be able to steer education policy and to be one of the major reasons why the PPPs concept has been adopted. As one civil society representative commented with frustration:

The issue is that money is scarce and does not come for free. So if you are chasing money, like the Ugandan government, you are going to adapt and take up to the ideas of the money distributor (Interview, civil society representative XIX, 2011).

Furthermore, the promotion of PPPs' policy in the Ugandan education sector is fostered due to a lack of strong resistance from other actors. Although strong critique is expressed, mainly by civil society groups, they fail to form an opposing force for internal and external reasons. Internally, effective participation in PPPs debate has been constrained by factors such as "the limited degree of knowledge and skills required in policy analysis, limitations in consensus building, packaging of policy messages and scientific research" (Uganda National Teachers' Union [UNATU], 2008). Externally, civil society actors have limited space for advocacy in important policy environs that discuss PPPs, e.g. many of their representatives said that they are taken less seriously during education sector meetings to which civil society organisations are invited, in comparison to international organisations. Actors such as international NGOs, that are present in such discussions, indicated that the ability to resist government PPP plans is compromised because of increasingly strict rules in the government advocacy lobbying area. This thwarts resistance to government plans, because of fear of reprimands (by antagonising the government).

Problematic implementation

The PPP policy implementation was repeatedly characterised by interviewed Ugandan education experts as containing "good policy, but bad implementation". As Chapman *et al.* (2010) describe, the overarching USE policy is characterised by the symbolic and political power of 'free' secondary education to mobilise support for government policy. However, significantly less consideration was put into planning an organisational strategy for implementation (Chapman, 2010). The PPP programme is part of this symbolic policy – PPPs are strongly promoted by a discourse that claims to pursue education benefits, such as access, quality and equity – nevertheless, how PPP implementations will lead to such benefits is not specified.[5] In this way, arguments promoting PPPs in Uganda are rhetorically employed to garner support for PPPs without any evidence that such benefits will be assured under partnership frameworks (similarly to the case of India, see Verger and VanderKaaij, 2012, p. 22-23). For instance, Ugandan politicians promote PPPs policy as bringing in quality education from the private sector while knowing that, in practice, the private schools under the PPP arrangements are far from delivering structural quality (Interview, education expert, XVIII, 2011). The danger of this discursive promotion is that it disregards counter-arguments and induces other stakeholders to agree with its promotion in a superficial way.

The flawed implementation of the PPPs is evidenced by the lack of state presence at the school level to monitor quality. As the commissioner for private schools revealed: "We do not have the capabilities to monitor at school level…we do not go there' [and] "we cannot engage in enlarging the interventions with the private providers" (Interview, government official III, 2011). As a consequence, the state's several responsibilities under the PPP arrangement, that in theory should be taken up, are effectively absent in Uganda.

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[5] *Several foundational policy documents that serve as references on which the education sectors policy are built emphasise a strong mode in favour of PPPs. Nevertheless, they do not specify clear implementation mechanisms prescribing the partnership interaction. Examples are the overarching National Development Plan 2010/2011 – 2014/2015 (NDP), the MoES Education Sector Strategic Plan 2007-2015 (ESSP) and several UPPET documents promoting PPPs as part of USE (such as USE/UPPET Head Count Report 2009 and USE/UPPET FAQ 2010).*

Moreover, most stakeholders stated that funding for education in the PPP schools is too low. As a result, private schools are being pushed by government to take in more students than their capacity allows. The existing Education Standards Agency for regulation is perceived to have insufficient capabilities to fulfil its role. While the number of PPP schools is increasing, the number of inspectors has not adequately increased, thereby weakening accountability and quality assurance. In addition, the expectations and performance targets set up in the MOU are not being followed up. Most stakeholders consider the MOU's partnership document to be nothing more than a 'piece of paper with a signature' because the expectations set out in this document are not controlled by government, nor is it clear to the public. As a consequence, local communities are unable to hold private schools accountable. The policy guidance role of the state in reality lacks standard procedures and is a non-transparent process that is vulnerable to political favouring.

Furthermore, the superficial PPP policy implementation is reinforced by the lack of 'built-in partnership policy tools' such as risk sharing and mutual learning. Because of the lack of regulation, the risk of private school owners misusing funds is increased. This is not helped by the lack of penalisation of the private schools. As the commissioner of private schools stated: "If you are so rigid, they may not make the profit and the school might collapse" (Interview II, 2011). The effect is that risk is transferred from the private and public partners to the students, parents and teachers (as described below). In this way, 'risk sharing' results in 'risk accumulation', with students, parents and teachers having the biggest output risk. In addition, benefits in the private sector are not pursued with the government 'not going' to the private schools. There is no longer-term alliance strategy for adopting innovations of certain private schools as national level initiatives. In theory, this would be necessary for mutual learning to function (Börzel and Risse, 2002).

In sum, the implementation of the PPPs in Uganda is highly problematic. As a result, existing education issues are aggravated in the country, as will be described in the next section.

Impact of PPPs on Education

The impact of PPPs on education in Uganda relates to a range of dimensions, including access, quality, efficiency, teachers and equity. In this section, the stakeholders' perspectives on how PPPs affect each of these dimensions are detailed.

Access

Among the stakeholders' perspectives there is consensus that PPPs can contribute to the improvement of school access by providing fees for students who were not able to pay for schools before. As a result, the numbers of PPP schools and students is growing swiftly in Uganda. Currently, the role of private PPP schools in the Ugandan secondary education sector is quickly gaining importance, with the number of private schools growing relatively quicker than the 'government-aided schools' under USE.[6]

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[6] *The ratio of government and PPP schools under USE in the 2009 headcount was around 803 government schools to 550 PPP schools. However these numbers are rapidly increasing. The latest numbers, published in Uganda's newspaper New Vision, showed that 902 schools are Government-aided and 739 are privately owned under the public-private partnership (New Vision, June 22nd, 2011). Evidently, the growth in the number of schools and students in private schools under USE is relatively faster (from 550 to 739 in relation to growth in government-aided USE schools of 803 to 902), which implies that the private schools will play a bigger role in the coming years.*

The PPPs programme will expand this year (2012) as President Museveni made new electoral promises in 2011 to expand the free cycle in USE from the first three years of secondary schooling (the O-level), to the two following years (A-level).

Quality

The PPPs programme is perceived by all interviewed stakeholders to have no or even negative effects on the provision of quality education - with civil society actors more outspoken than government policy makers on this point. Because of a lack of state regulation, quality assurance mechanisms hardly exist. In addition, community accountability is lacking due to a lack of clarity and transparency about the partnership arrangement. Additionally, the interviewed stakeholders perceive that the management systems are generally inadequate in the private schools. As a result, quality issues are vast in these schools, such as untrained teachers, oversized classrooms, poor infrastructure, and the lack of learning materials. Moreover, the decrease in quality education is exacerbated due to the type of private schools that is being partnered with: partnerships are mainly established with low-quality 'for profit' private schools. Because these PPP schools are 'for profit' entities, their aim is to utilise the minimum amount of resources to achieve the highest output possible (i.e. high examination results).

First, because the main focus is on examination results for competitiveness, education is focused on exams, and not per se on improving students' knowledge, developing skills, creativity, critical thinking, etc. Exams can therefore be questioned as a valid indicator of whether actual learning is taking place or whether this has improved due to PPPs. Furthermore, most interviewees stakeholders agreed that bonuses for teachers who achieve improved student results or teachers' allowances that are dependent on such results in private schools create a strong incentive for teachers to increase the focus on results and even induce forms of fraud. As one stakeholder expressed:

> *Private school managers, in comparison with public schools management are known to perform more actions such as cheating with students grades and bribing inspectors to achieve an unnatural representation of the school in order to make it more competitive (Interview, education expert, VIII, 2011).*

Secondly, because profit-seeking PPP schools want to minimise their costs, cuts are made that impact on the quality of learning. Examples include employing low-paid teachers who are under-qualified, and spending fewer resources on subjects that are more costly. For example, many PPP schools lack teachers and laboratory equipment, and their students have not been exposed to practical science teaching, as reflected by their performance in practical science examinations (UNEB, 2010). Subjects that require fewer learning materials and cheaper equipment are taught more compared to practical science subjects that require workshop machinery. According to one African Development Bank specialist, "This has the adverse development effect of creating fewer skilled (manual) labour oriented students which Uganda lacks and badly needs" (Interview, VI, 2011).

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Efficiency

At the macro level of the national education budget, there is no doubt that giving capitation grants for students to enter private schools is a more efficient way to deliver education for the government, than providing public education for all directly. With PPPs, the government does not have to pay the costs related to the provision of education, such as infrastructure and teachers' wages. These budgetary benefits are, however, questioned by mainly civil society stakeholders since they are seen to be creating low-quality schools and incentives to misuse funds. Several civil society actors expressed the view that public education should be strengthened instead of financing 'for profit' private schools. In their view, insufficient financial resources are invested in the public education sector, mainly due to the loan conditions set by international financing institutes to push 'single digit' inflation rates, and because of the president's inclination to prioritise other sectors, such as defence, over education.

Furthermore, at the micro level of the PPP schools, the presumption that private education provision is more efficient is perceived to be in contrast with the reality of private school management which, in the case of Uganda, is affected by adverse corruptive tendencies. As one World Bank specialist indicated about some of the participants in their (head) teacher training projects:

> They have as yet to show that they are capable of being managers. They generally lack passion for the cause and they show to be vulnerable to misuse the capitation grant money for private purposes instead of investing the money in improvement of the learning environment (Interview, World Bank specialist, 2011).

In this way, the argument promoting PPPs, that privately managed schools are generally more efficient, is contradicted by the perception of how PPP schools are managed in Uganda.

Effects on teachers

The effect of PPPs on teachers relates to the increasing number of underpaid and untrained teachers working in schools, as they are considered to be more profitable for the profit-oriented PPP schools. As several stakeholders addressed, contract teachers working in private PPP schools enjoy few rights and lack a strong union representation and, as a result, they can be fired at will by the managers of the school. According to the UNATU, an emphasis is put on a "parallel and informal labour market that undermines the status of professional teachers, and has been weakening the teachers' unions' capacity to negotiate at national level" (UNATU, 2008, p8-10). In addition, these teachers are known to work with large class sizes, long working hours and a minimal welfare system. Expressing complaints to the MoES' department for private schools can be dangerous for private school teachers because of the political ties between the department and school managers. As one teacher union respondent indicated, some policy officers in the MoES are private schools owners (Interview, teacher union representative XXIV, 2011).

Furthermore, since the inception of USE, there have been no noteworthy increases in teachers' salaries, nor have professional development mechanisms been implemented to enhance

the qualifications of untrained teachers working under the programme. In practice, this decreases teacher motivation. Moreover, as a result of often-delayed and uncertain government funding of the private schools, PPP school owners operating with a "profit first and service next mentality" (Interview, teacher union representative, XIV, 2011) have an extra incentive to fire teachers during the programme. Consequentially, this results in increased workloads for the remaining teachers.

For these reasons, Uganda's teachers' unions have been on an 'industrial strike' (since September 5, 2011), claiming a 100 per cent increase in teacher salaries to increase quality teaching incentives. This claim has been met by heavy handed pressure from the government, with teacher unionists suffering intimidation, victimisation and harassment for requesting appropriate collective bargaining (EI, 2011).

Equity

The impact of PPPs on equity is implied to be positive because of the use of the word 'universal' in USE, suggesting free equitable access for all in PPP schools. In reality, the equity is perceived to be highly constrained. PPP schools are generally recognised by all interviewed stakeholders to be of low quality. Better quality schools are more expensive. The tuition fees of the existing private and public schools that are perceived to be of better quality can be exorbitantly high and are known to increase each year. As such, many poor families are excluded from access to such schools and have to rely on subsidised places within PPP schools. In this way, PPPs contribute to existing inequalities, in a system of "Education for All and quality education for some" (Interview, education expert XIX, 2011).

Such an unequal situation is exacerbated because USE schools still request high Primary Leaving Exam results from students coming out of the primary education cycle. When there is a great demand for a specific school, students who perform well are selected first. This reduces the opportunity to access secondary schools for children from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds since they are more likely to attend low quality primary schools. As with secondary education, primary education in Uganda is also known for its unequal access to education quality (Nishimura *et al*., 2005).

When students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds are accepted to secondary PPP schools, they are often still faced with 'hidden costs', where the 'for profit' private schools find non-transparent ways to extract money, which the government has no control over, for instance by frequently changing uniforms. This can have severe effects on poor households, who are unable to afford these additional costs. As the Education For All Global Monitoring Report 2009 cautions, when poor households pay for education, they divert income from other areas, including nutrition, health, shelter, and savings for emergencies (UNESCO, 2009).

Furthermore, the PPP schools are seen to be generally less able to provide measures that take the inequitable situation of girls in to account. Fewer girls than boys in Uganda are enrolled in secondary education and show higher drop-out rates (Millennium Development Goals Report for Uganda, 2010). Doubts exist whether mostly profit-driven PPP schools undertake specific measures that attract and retain girls, such as the installation of separate pupil sanitary

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rooms and changing rooms for boys and girls. As one civil society representative stated regarding the PPP schools managers: "Since it is costly to make a school gender-responsive, those guys aren't bothered about these costs" (Interview, civil society representative, XVII, 2011).

In summary, because of equity considerations, the terms of 'free' and 'universal' secondary education for all can be seen as rhetoric when, in reality, these are far from being assured through PPP frameworks.

Table 5.1 Impact of education issues summarised

Education issue	Summarised Impact
Access	Improved because number of PPP schools increases, but continued inequities in access
Quality	Lack of quality assurance mechanisms and community accountability. 'For profit' schools increase negative consequences due to overemphasis on competitiveness and cutting costs.
Efficiency	Macro efficiency questioned for legitimacy («insufficient for what the sector would need»); Micro efficient capabilities of PPP school managers discredited.
Effects on teachers	Low-cost facilitation, untrained teachers, lack of professional development and union representation, welfare deprivation.
Equity	Aggravation of existing structural inequalities.

CONCLUSION

The *globally* promoted PPPs for education and the PPP arrangements as originally designed in Uganda represent a promising discourse. Yet, in practice, the case of Uganda shows that translating PPPs into complex national education contexts can lead to adverse effects. Because of the discursive allurement, the problems that are brought in are overlooked and a nuanced understanding of the potential effects of implementing PPPs in education is complicated, as is also evident in other countries (Srivastava, 2010). As Draxler (2008) argues, the term 'public private partnership' masks significant differences of motivations, practices and outcomes (Draxler, 2008). As a consequence of this policy in Uganda, the quality of secondary education and the wellbeing of teachers are under pressure; and there are adverse equity effects of PPPs for the poorest. The Ugandan PPP is, therefore, less of an innovative example for EFA delivery and falls more in line with many other countries where non-state provision has been growing by default, due to a failure to provide a clear policy framework that defines the partnership (see Rose, 2010).

Critically reflecting on this PPP education reform in general leads to a conclusion that the implementation of PPP fails to address most of the education issues, as anticipated by the

theories of PPP promoters. These issues are being exacerbated (with the exception of access, see Table 1). Therefore, the Ugandan case highlights the dichotomy between PPPs in theory and their implementation in practice. It is the latter which is flawed, revealing that the universally promoted PPPs do not take sufficiently into account the context in which they are being implemented. This leads to a conclusion that the international dissemination of the PPP concept to national contexts and the universal validity of PPP reforms should, at the very least, be questioned.

This chapter highlights two key aspects that are overlooked in the promotion of PPP education reforms. First, when there is insufficient regulation of PPPs, the effect on education issues may be worsened by the type of 'for profit' private schools with which partnerships are made. While in theory, the 'for profit' character of the schools is not perceived to have different effects on education outcomes (LaRocque, 2007; Patrinos, 2012), the case of Uganda showed that it can aggravate quality issues. Therefore, in line with Rose's arguments (2010), to assess the effect on quality of learning, it is crucial to take into account the 'nature' of the school, i.e. whether profits are primarily used to further support development activities of the organisation or are distributed to owners and shareholders, as with 'for profit' private managers of the school. In Uganda, the general opinion of interviewed education experts was that when the means for regulation exist, the partnerships should be aimed at private schools with a more 'public conscience', such as faith-based and community schools. Strikingly, the World Bank's PPP theory is paradoxical at this point. Although the World Bank in theory underlines the need for strict regulation for PPPs to be an actual 'partnership' instead of privatisation (Patrinos *et al.*, 2009), it promotes a more privatisation-favouring policy in practice. In Uganda, the World Bank has directly and indirectly supported the partnerships with private 'for profit' schools despite the unclear notice of its eventual design and impact.

Secondly, this chapter underlined the 'top-down' characteristic of new education policy reforms. To better represent the public interest, boost transparency and provide teachers, parents and children with the means to demand accountability, structural reinforcement and civil society organisations participation is needed (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning, 1991). This may mean bringing to the table constituencies that are presently powerless or not well acknowledged by the government (Klees, 2012). This would also be in line with several recent shifts in the global education field prioritising civil society involvement (e.g. in the 'Global Partnership for Education' [GCE, 2011]) and the Paris Declaration Monitoring Report for aid effectiveness (OECD, 2011)). Many interviewed teachers and civil society organisations insisted on the need to scale up and to deepen government responsibilities in education. The present PPP reform is seen to focus away from this claim. In this way, this chapter's glimpse into the 'black box' of PPPs distribution in the Ugandan education context revealed that, as one civil society representative stated:

> *A neoliberal privatisation paradigm in Uganda is trying to spread to the education sector. As a consequence, the gate has been opened for a wild dog to cause problems (Interview, civil society representative XVIII, 2011).*

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CHAPTER 6

CONTRACT TEACHER POLICIES IN INDIA: DEBATES ON EDUCATION QUALITY AND TEACHERS' PROFESSIONAL STATUS

Mireille de Koning

INTRODUCTION

The last two decades have been characterised by national and international political commitments to the achievement of universal primary education as part of the Education for All (EFA) movement and the education-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These commitments have brought pressure to bear on developing countries seeking to rapidly expand their public education systems and to find ways of minimising the cost of education reforms. This chapter looks at one of the more widely used approaches within education reform, namely the increased use of so-called contract teachers, locally recruited teachers who are employed on short-term, renewable contracts. Typically, these teachers receive little or no professional pre-service training, face poor working conditions, job insecurity, and considerably lower salaries than permanent teachers (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2010; Pandey, 2006).

Contract teachers have been promoted as a cost-effective intervention to address wide-scale and immediate teacher shortages in developing countries (Kingdon *et al*., 2012). Their appointment has also been actively supported by international agencies, primarily the World Bank, as a key reform intended to make teachers more "accountable to performance" (Bruns *et al*., 2011). In India, contract teachers were initially recruited in the 1980s as a means of addressing teacher shortages in rural and remote areas. However, their appointment has recently been effectively popularised on a much larger scale in formal primary education and actively endorsed by state[1] governments and international agencies (Govinda, 2002; Jha *et al*., 2008; Pandey, 2006). As such, contract teachers have become a central part of education reform and expansion in India.

Examining the recruitment of contract teachers as a policy approach is topical because of its contested implications for education quality and equity, as well as teachers' accountability and status. Within the Indian context, national policy emphasises well-qualified and well-trained teachers as a prerequisite for quality education. This has been translated into practice, for example, through the establishment of the National Council for Teacher

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[1] *India's federal structure is comprised of 28 states and seven union territories, which are further divided into districts.*

Education (NCTE) that regulates and oversees the teacher education system. At the same time, however, many state governments continue to recruit and deploy contract teachers with lower qualifications and/or a lack of induction training in civil-servant posts. There is no strong evidence of this policy approach contributing to quality education or improved student outcomes. Simultaneously, there exists an ongoing public debate about the low quality of government education institutions in India (Govinda, 2002; Probe, 1999; Verger and van der Kaaij, 2012), which requires urgent attention. Rather than focusing on building a quality teaching force by adequately investing in teacher training and management, policy attention has been diverted towards increasing teachers' accountability for performance while simultaneously modifying their working conditions and status.

Based on a larger research project on education reforms and training opportunities for contract teachers in India and Indonesia, this chapter examines why contract teacher reforms have been introduced, how they have been implemented and rationalised, and what the consequences are in the Indian context. The findings are based on interviews conducted with key education stakeholders, including teachers and school leaders, district-level training institutes, representatives of state governments, national and state-level teacher unions, international organisations, academics, non-governmental organisations, and the World Bank. These stakeholders represent a wide range of positions on the contracting of teachers' labour, including both promoters and detractors of the policy approach. In total, 33 interviews were conducted in September 2010 in four Indian cities and surrounding districts, including New Delhi, Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh), Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh) and Calcutta (West Bengal).

The chapter is set out in three sections: the first section discusses contract teacher reforms globally, focusing in particular on the background and justifications for the adoption of this policy approach. The second section considers contextual aspects of the Indian educational landscape and looks at how the wide-scale appointment of contract teachers has developed as an education policy approach during recent years. Finally, in the third section, three main debates around the contracting of teachers are examined from the perspectives of various education stakeholders.

The chapter reveals that the contracting of teachers in India was initially championed as a cost-efficient policy approach to address increased education demand and teacher shortages. More recently, however, it has been legitimised as a means of ensuring teachers' accountability for improving learning outcomes, with little attention being paid to the impact that this reform approach will have on the delivery of quality education in a more comprehensive sense or to the effects on the professional status of the teachers.

CONTRACT TEACHER REFORMS GLOBALLY

Contract teacher policies have become a salient feature of education reforms in developing countries over the last two decades (see: Fyfe, 2007; Kingdon *et al.*, 2012). The increased contracting of teachers coincided with the initiation of the EFA movement and the

education-related MDGs, which demanded universal access to primary education and required the comprehensive expansion of national education systems. In an attempt to respond to urgent teacher needs[2] arising from increased enrolments, governments in developing countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and in parts of Latin America, launched large-scale teacher recruitment programmes that involved the widespread appointment of contract teachers (Duthilleul, 2005; UNESCO-UIS, 2006; Fyfe, 2007). This approach partially overlapped with structural adjustment loans from international financial institutions that required the reduction of public sector spending. For many developing countries, reducing teacher costs (as the largest part of educational expenditure) to address educational demand was a tactical decision. As such, these finance-driven reforms, which legitimised policies that reduced public educational spending, justified the recruitment of contract teachers on lower salaries in the context of limited resources for educational expansion.

The use of contract teachers to address teacher shortages is neither new nor limited to developing countries alone. In Europe and North America, fixed-term contract teachers may be used to replace absent teachers or professionals from other sectors may be employed who are not yet fully qualified to teach. Whilst contract teachers might serve to expand the pool of teachers to solve short-term subject-specific shortages, for example, or to expand services to students and assistance to teachers, policy reforms to systematically employ contract teachers have not been implemented in developed countries (Duthilleul, 2005). However, there are indications that more countries in Europe have increased contract-based employment in an effort to stimulate flexibility (OECD, 2009).

A key aspect of contract teacher reforms entails the hiring of teachers on differentiated terms from regular teachers; contract teachers are usually hired on fixed-term renewable contracts. In developing countries, they typically earn salaries that are a fraction of those of regular civil-service teachers and have limited or no rights to social benefits (Duthilleul, 2005; Göttelmann-Duret and Tournier, 2008; Vegas and de Laat, 2003). Their contracts usually involve immediate appointment combined with a sharply reduced duration or, in some cases, absence of initial professional pre-service training and/or in-service training (Bourdon *et al*., 2007). Moreover, they are typically recruited locally and generally have lower education qualifications than regular teachers.

It is precisely the relatively flexible nature of fixed-term contracts that has appealed to governments seeking to swiftly adjust their teacher supply to urgent demands within the sector, often under the premise that traditional teacher deployment systems respond too slowly to immediate schooling needs. The flexibilisation of teacher labour has been enhanced by a shift towards decentralised teacher management and school autonomy in some countries, where various levels of local government, schools and communities have assumed direct responsibility for teacher recruitment. Countries that have made extensive use of contract teachers include: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Kenya,

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[2] *Teacher shortages are a pervasive issue in many developing countries and have been well documented (EI-GCE, 2012; UNESCO, 2011).*

Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, Pakistan, Senegal and Togo[3] (Fyfe, 2007; Razquin, 2009). Thus, international pressures to achieve EFA, combined with devolved teacher management, has resulted in an increased local recruitment of contract teachers as a means of expanding access as well as to "compensate for inefficiencies in centralised teacher management and deployment systems" (Razquin, 2009, p. 88).

Governments have, however, also increasingly hired contract teachers for official public-service vacancies. The large-scale recruitment of contract teachers in place of regular teachers has been observed in sub-Saharan Africa, for example in Senegal, where the contracting of teachers became a national policy during the mid-1990s, or Niger, where almost half of its teachers are employed under contract (Duthilleul, 2005). Contract teachers account for half or more of the teacher workforce in 10 out of 13 sub-Saharan African countries (UNESCO, 2007). As teachers' salaries account for the largest portion of education budgets, contract teachers were rationalised, and openly endorsed in national poverty reduction programmes and by international agencies, as a means of curtailing the rising cost of education (Razquin, 2009).

Since 2005, an increasing emphasis on the key role of teachers in influencing student learning has led to significant recommendations on the necessity of investments in teachers' quality, specifically in teachers' training and professional development as well as in adequate recruitment and retention policies (UNESCO, 2005). Arguably, this shift in the EFA discourse from quantity to quality and equity came too late. Lewin and Stuart (2003) argue that "teacher education policy has often been seen as an afterthought to policy on Education for All and the MDGs, neither of which foreground teacher education issues" (p. xiii).

While international agencies have, in the past, supported contract teachers as a cost-efficient strategy to *expanding education*, more recently, and responding to a shift in the EFA discourse, they have begun arguing in favour of contract teachers as an efficient mechanism for *ensuring teachers' accountability*. The World Bank openly advocates so-called 'contract tenure reform', i.e. the notion that teachers who are hired locally and directly by the school will be held more accountable to the community and to performance (Bruns *et al.*, 2011). The accountability argument posits that the insecurity associated with these types of contract acts as an incentive for teachers to 'perform' better in order to obtain a permanent position (Duthilleul, 2005). More broadly, this narrative arguably shifts attention from the need to invest in teachers' education, training and working conditions (including the teaching and learning environment) as a means of ensuring educational quality to instead holding teachers responsible for students' learning outcomes. A recent publication, "Making Schools Work: New Evidence on Accountability Reforms", argues: "While there is uncertainty in the Indian context, as elsewhere, about the long-term sustainability of contract teacher policies, the evidence on their cost-effectiveness as a strategy for improving education accountability and outcomes is strong" (Bruns *et al.*, 2011, p. 157).

[3] *For an in-depth discussion of contract teachers in Cambodia, see: Geeves and Bredenburg, 2004, and Togo: Vegas and De Laat, 2003.*

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Educational expansion and teacher shortages in India

Following the introduction of market-based reforms in 1991, India has become one of the fastest-growing economies of the world. However, major socio-economic challenges, such as illiteracy, corruption, deep-rooted social inequalities, and extreme wealth divisions, mean that large parts of the population continue to live in extreme poverty and with limited or no social, economic or political participation (UNESCO, 2010; Jha *et al*., 2008).

During the last two decades, India has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of its primary education system. Nevertheless, given its significant inter- and intra-state socio-economic, cultural and socio-political diversity, the provision of schooling remains highly uneven and a lack of equitable access to, and participation in, primary education remains a major concern (Dreze and Sen, 2005; Fennell, 2007). While there have been substantial increases in central and state investments in education, funding remains problematic (Jha *et al*., 2008). Parallel to the expansion of public education, there has been a rapid growth in the private provision of education, particularly through low-fee private schools targeting socio-economically disadvantaged households (Srivastava, 2006; Fennell, 2007; Nambissan and Ball, 2010).

Govinda and Bandyopadhyay (2008) claim that three inter-related factors have driven the expansion of compulsory education in India over the past two decades. First, the second National Policy on Education (1986) emphasised the need to provide quality education and to decrease social and economic inequalities, and expanded the direct involvement of central government in the delivery of primary education. Second, in the late-1980s and early-1990s, district and village level bodies assumed increased responsibilities for education planning and administration, including the recruitment of teachers (Ramachandran *et al.*, 2005). The decentralisation of teacher management has led to increased disparities in teachers' working conditions, both within and between states (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2008); this is also reflected in the various degrees to which contract teachers are deployed in Indian states as well as in how far these practices are a part of official education policy.

Third, the EFA goals provided the impetus for several major public education policy initiatives. Since the 1990s large-scale centrally-sponsored programmes have been implemented with the objective of closing gaps in student enrolment, countering school drop-outs, and improving learning achievements, specifically in districts with low female literacy rates (Jha *et al.*, 2008). These include Operation Blackboard (OB), the multi-donor financed[4] and centrally sponsored District Primary Education Programme (DPEP), and the current national Education for All programme, *Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan* (SSA) implemented in 2001 (Ayyar, 2009; Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2008).

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[4] *The UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Commission, together with the International Development Agency (IDA) of the World Bank, have been the largest supporters of India's DPEP and SSA programmes.*

Both the DPEP and SSA programmes were intended to bring about large-scale changes in the Indian education system, whereas OB sought to provide 'minimum standards' for primary school infrastructures and resources and to establish provisions for teacher supplies, i.e., a minimum of two teachers per primary school (Batra, 2009). Yet, as Jha *et al*. (2008) point out, the standards that were set under OB were insufficient to ensure educational quality. The distribution of teachers remains highly uneven, and school infrastructure continues to be grossly inadequate, particularly in rural areas. Additionally, under the DPEP and SSA programmes, the teacher supply expanded extremely slowly when compared to the rate of enrolment, resulting in overcrowded classrooms (Mehrotra, 2006). It is argued that both DPEP and SSA have been implemented with insufficient attention to the various contexts and particular challenges, within and between different regions and communities (Blum and Diwan, 2007).

A salient feature of the efforts to expand access to primary education was the significant increase in small, single-teacher schools (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2008). In 2005, approximately 78 per cent of primary schools in India had as little as three or fewer teachers, responsible for all grade levels (DISE, 2006). These small schools are a particular feature of impoverished rural communities, where multi-grade teaching is often sustained due to low levels of enrolment and/or a chronic shortage of teachers (Blum and Diwan, 2007; NCERT, 2007). India is estimated to need more than two million teachers by 2015 (UNESCO, 2010); and this number does not take into account the many under-qualified teachers already in the system.

Contract teacher reforms

Contract teachers (also known as para-teachers in India) were initially recruited during the mid-to-late-1980s as part of informal, community-driven frameworks and strategies to broaden access to education in rural, remote and economically disadvantaged areas (Govinda and Josephine, 2004). The Himachal Pradesh *Volunteer Teacher Scheme* and the *Shiksha Karmi* project in Rajasthan, funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), were the first projects to experiment with the local recruitment of voluntary teachers in areas facing significant teacher shortages, inadequate access to education and low enrolment (Ramachandran and Sethi, 2000). Govinda and Josephine (2004) claim that these schemes were different from later para-teacher schemes in that they represented the creation of additional voluntary resources from within the community, rather than the filling of vacancies in regular schools with low-cost contract teachers. Yet, concerns about the projects were noted in relation to education quality and parity, as well as deficiencies in teacher training prior to appointment (Ramachandran and Sethi, 2000).

It was during the mid-1990s that India saw a dramatic rise in the number of para-teachers in government schools (Fyfe, 2007; Jha *et al*., 2008). So-called "para-teacher schemes" were promoted by the Central Government as a cost-efficient method of addressing teacher shortages in remote rural areas as well as providing an additional teacher in single-teacher schools (Pandey, 2006). Initially, the appointment of contract teachers denoted a practice shift without a concomitant policy sanction (Ramachandran, 2008). Contract teachers were, however, officially endorsed in Central Government policy documents

during the late 1990s, including the oft-cited 1999 report of the National Committee of State Education Ministers that endorsed their recruitment not only in rural remote areas, but throughout the country as a means of increasing efficiency and accountability:

> *Appointment of pay-scale teachers to fill up all teacher vacancies as per teacher-pupil norms would require resources that state governments are finding increasingly difficult to meet. The economic argument for para-teachers is that provision of these teachers as per requirement is possible within the financial resources available within the states. The non-economic argument for para-teachers is that a locally selected youth, accountable to the local community, undertakes the duties of teaching children with much greater interest (GoI, 1999, p. 22-23).*

Pandey (2006) points out that these recommendations negated the 1986 National Policy on Education that called for the improvement of the working conditions and social and economic status of teachers, as well as their continuous education and training, as a means of improving the quality of education.

The DPEP and SSA schemes effectively contributed to further popularising the practice of appointing contract teachers within government schools (Govinda and Josephine, 2004; Pandey, 2006). Contract teachers no longer constituted an urgent short-term measure to a teacher shortage but a cheaper and more flexible way of recruiting teachers within the formal school system to replace retiring teachers and fill official vacancies. This practice resulted in the discontinuation of the recruitment of regular pay-scale teachers in some states, most notably in Madhya Pradesh, where almost all vacant teaching posts were filled by contract teachers on a fixed honorarium (Pandey, 2006).

Contract teachers have also been presented as a solution to problems surrounding high absenteeism, low motivation, and a lack of accountability of regular civil-service teachers in government schools (Chaudhury *et al*., 2006; Mehrotra, 2006; Probe, 1999). It is argued that contract teachers have increasingly been posted in areas where regular teachers are reluctant to teach, i.e. rural and remote disadvantaged areas (PROBE, 1999), due to geographical distance from their homes and/or resulting from historically rooted social hierarchies and elitism based on caste and wealth. High teacher absenteeism among regular teachers has meant that locally appointed contract teachers have been seen as a flexible solution to ineffective teacher management structures and a lack of incentives for and accountability of regular government school teachers (Narayan and Mooij, 2010). Permanent teachers have been largely held responsible for the low quality of public education based on high absenteeism and low accountability to the school resulting from weak incentives (i.e. permanent posts and promotions based on seniority rather than performance). Contract teachers have been legitimised both by governments and international agencies as a means of addressing these issues.

There are broad inter-state variations in policies regarding the appointment conditions, tenure, remuneration, training and qualification requirements of contract teachers (Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao, 2010; Ramachandran, 2008). While these variations exist, the general

trend is towards appointing unqualified teachers with limited induction training (ranging between seven to 60 days in duration), who are expected to have adequate subject knowledge and pedagogical skills to teach in small remote single or two-teacher multi-grade schools with limited resources. It is estimated that more than 500,000 contract teachers are currently employed across India, accounting for 9.4 per cent of primary school teachers in 2009 (NUEPA, 2011).

The Right to Education Act and contract teachers

Much of the debate around contract teachers in India is framed in relation to the Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009, in which India renewed its commitment to guaranteeing universal, free and compulsory education to all children from the age of six. The RTE Act represents a long-awaited response to the serious shortages of teachers and resources in government schools (Mehrotra, 2012). It has mandated that all states must notify and fill teacher shortages within one year of commencement (pupil-teacher ratios have been set at a 1:30 maximum under the act). Moreover, the Act has specified that all teachers must acquire minimum qualifications within a period of five years. What this means in practice and how it is achieved, however, is left to state governments. Moreover, the RTE Act does not address the issue of teacher preparation and development beyond designating the NCTE as the responsible actor. Effectively, the RTE Act does not take into account the large numbers of unqualified or under-qualified contract teachers already within the system. In states where the minimum qualification for contract teachers is a secondary level degree, there is a necessity to ensure that contract teachers acquire the necessary qualifications and professional training within five years. A professor at the National University of Educational Planning and Administration (NUEPA) commented:

> RTE has really put pressure on the state governments to look at the teacher issue in a significant manner, in terms of [how] anybody can be appointed and made a teacher. This cannot happen anymore... But we are to see many problems that will come up when we roll out RTE, particularly related to teachers. The upgrading of existing teachers is a huge issue; there are no teacher-training institutions in many places (Interview no. 32, NUEPA, 2010).

In the context of India's renewed commitment to basic education with the RTE Act, the debates set out below are particularly pertinent if state governments are intent on improving educational access and quality. More teachers will need to be appointed to meet the provisions of the Act, but addressing the needs of contract teachers within the system is equally crucial in the context of teacher shortages. Without addressing the systematic lack of resources, there are reasons to worry that the actual implementation of teachers' upgrading will lead to sub-standard teacher education.

THE CONTRACT TEACHER DEBATE IN INDIA

The appointment of contract teachers versus regular teachers with tenure is a contentious policy issue that continues to evoke debate between its opponents and proponents, including policy makers, teacher unions, academics, the general public and other education

stakeholders. The discussions usually revolve around questions of political responsibility, education financing, education quality and equity, and concerns regarding teachers' work, accountability and rights. Most of these debates attempt to weigh the short-term benefits against the long-term implications of contract teachers. The following section will address three of these debates on contract teachers advocated and contested by education stakeholders in India, including educational quality and equity, teachers' accountability, and teachers' rights.

Educational quality and equity

Indian national and state governments are fully aware of the multifaceted challenges that continue to face their public education systems in terms of educational access, retention, quality and equity. The urgency of these challenges has intensified in recent decades resulting from the increased demand for education and the establishment of education as a fundamental right to be guaranteed by state governments through constitutional amendments and the RTE Act.

Despite these renewed commitments and increased investments in education, government schools, particularly in rural areas, continue to face serious shortages in terms of infrastructural facilities, teaching and learning materials, as well as teacher shortages and unfilled vacancies. These, combined, have resulted in overcrowded and/or multi-grade classrooms, single-teacher schools, and inadequately supported teachers. Arguably, these features may aggravate teachers' low motivation and contribute towards high absenteeism. The low quality of education in government schools is openly recognised; the system receives little public support, and parents who can afford to do so opt for non-state low-fee private schools instead (Probe, 1999; Srivastava, 2006), which means that the poorest segments of society are left to attend government schools (De *et al*., 2002; Härmä, 2011).

Proponents of contract teachers, notably policy makers, argue that the wide-scale appointment of contract teachers has, however, played a critical role in the expansion of access to education and has contributed to reducing high pupil-teacher ratios and the number of single-teacher schools at an affordable cost (Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao, 2010). However, while the contracting of teachers has contributed to increasing school enrolments, the negative consequences for the quality of the education provided are numerous and several studies point to the equity implications of deploying contract teachers (Kingdon *et al*., 2012; Moon, 2007; Pandey, 2006).

Opponents of contract teachers, notably teacher unions and a growing number of academics argue that the lack of qualifications and/or professional training of contract teachers who are not supported to work in environments faced with the challenges described above, adversely impacts, and may sustain, the low quality of teaching in public schools. As a representative of the Madhya Pradesh state union commented: "The lack of training of para-teachers has brought forth serious concerns about the quality of teaching, leading to many children dropping out of school" (Interview no. 6, 2010). As contract teachers are widely appointed in understaffed, remote rural schools with fewer resources that are generally attended by students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds, social inequities between more affluent urban schools and disadvantaged rural schools are

liable to be exacerbated if these teachers are under-qualified and not professionally trained to teach (Kruijer, 2010). In particular, a lack of formal training, combined with multi-grade teaching and poor material conditions, makes it extremely difficult for contract teachers to offer adequate education, often resulting in rote-learning, a practice which they have often been taught with themselves. A National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) representative commented:

> Contract teachers] should be provided the opportunity to improve their qualifications as well as training. Only then can we improve the quality of education in a real sense. Otherwise, they are just engaging the classroom. They don't know how to handle children. Some are doing good work, but some are not up to the task (Interview no. 4, NCERT, 2010.

Such an opportunity, however, seems remote. A representative of UNICEF India referred to a "grossly insufficient number of teacher-training institutions" to address teacher upgrading under the RTE Act, and commented that "the investment in teacher education through the District Institutes of Education and Training (DIETs) under the SSA project has been very low. This has contributed to the current poor state of teacher training" (Interview no. 31, UNICEF India, 2010). Despite this recognition, there is little dialogue between stakeholders on how to address the upgrading of contract teachers. Some ideas have been put forward, including distance education models through Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) and a distance learning national university, but how states intend to implement this is not officially addressed. A World Bank representative commented on the slow developments within national institutions to address the issue of teacher training:

> States that are least able to address the issue of para-teachers have the biggest problems. IGNOU is under a lot of pressure, because in-service teacher training is only looked at by NCERT. The NCTE should be at the forefront of developments if we're talking about professional development… Alternative tracks to teacher education require that the NCTE recognises degrees and experience of para-teachers (Interview no. 30, World Bank India, 2010).

Critics claim that state governments' priorities are not actually vested in improving education quality in the long term, but rather in fulfilling constitutional obligations at a lower cost, including relying on the expansion of private schooling. The All India Primary Teachers' Federation (AIPTF), one of the national level teachers' unions, stated that:

> We can say frankly that the government, both state and central, is not interested in furthering education. In India, more than 35 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line, and their children are coming to our public schools. Those who are marginalised and those who are poor cannot raise their voices like rich people, and the government is not interested whether they are not coming to school or whether they drop out. Rather, the government is interested in opening the private school sector… they are washing their hands of responsibility (Interview no. 8, AIPTF, 2010).

As such, detractors of contract teachers suggest a lack of political will on the part of state governments to improve the quality of the government school system, which has sustained

the low quality of public education as well as perpetuating structural inequities within the school system (Green *et al.*, 2007). A professor working at NCERT supported the statements made by AIPTF:

> *Allowing unqualified, unprepared para-teachers to work on the one hand, and asking for quality improvement in education on the other, these are the two contradicting paradigms which we are promoting simultaneously. So this gap between what we say and what we practice, that has to be reduced if we actually want to universalise elementary education and achieve the millennium goal by 2015 (Interview no. 4, NCERT, 2010).*

Ultimately, the prevailing pattern is a government school system in which the most disadvantaged and marginalised children are taught by contract teachers who are poorly trained and remunerated, while families with greater resources seek out other (private) educational providers (Härmä, 2011).

Accountability

In the Indian context, public debate about the low quality of government schools and concerns about teachers' 'performance' and absenteeism are at the basis of the discourse around teachers' accountability. Teachers' external accountability to the school and the community is emphasised and has gone hand-in-hand with the decentralisation of teachers' management to the local level. While, accountability mechanisms are promoted as a means of improving student outcomes and education efficiency, teachers' accountability is also increasingly portrayed as a goal in itself.

The arguments and assumptions for the deployment of contract teachers to increase accountability are twofold. First, contract teachers hired at the village or district level are assumed to bear greater accountability to the local context from which they have been recruited, and are anticipated to have a better understanding of local student needs and a lower social distance from their students compared to regular teachers. However, such assumptions overlook more complex social relations, as social distance may exist as much *within* local communities as between them and, as such, "local recruitment does not always reduce social distance as compared to centralised recruitment and posting" (Leclercq, 2003). The argument that locally recruited teachers would be more accountable to the local population, would be less absent and hence perform better grossly oversimplifies education and learning processes and almost entirely disregards contextual factors in which education is embedded.

Second, an argument more recently propagated by the World Bank is that, precisely because of the nature of their employment (the absence of job security), contract teachers will be more accountable for their performance (by being present in the classroom) in their desire to obtain civil-servant status (Bruns *et al.*, 2011). Contract teachers are also seen as a solution to rigid teacher policies that make it difficult to dismiss permanent teachers who are found to under-perform, whereas contract teachers' performance determines whether their appointment will be renewed. In other words, advocates assume that higher external pressures faced by contract teachers, compared to regular teachers, will improve their efforts. A World Bank representative reflected: "We were disappointed that teacher unions opposed the decentralisation of teacher recruitment, as it increases the likelihood that teachers

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are accountable to the local panchayat [village leader]" (Interview no. 30, World Bank India, 2010).

Critics of these inferences about teachers' accountability claim that these assumptions effectively undermine the importance of having well-remunerated, well-qualified and supported teachers for quality education. Opponents in the accountability debate around contract teachers postulate that low compensation and job insecurity, combined with a lack of academic and infrastructural support, may in fact reduce teachers' motivation (Kremer *et al.*, 2004). Moreover, the very low wages that contract teachers earn may be considered unfair, leading to tensions between teachers, but may also force contract teachers to take up additional employment (Leclercq, 2003). A respondent at NUEPA criticised the argument that para-teachers perform the same as regular teachers:

> There are many studies that attempt to reveal that there is no difference in the performance of para-teachers and regular teachers. These kind of findings really dilute the very concept of quality teaching...If the whole system is not really functioning properly to make the regular teachers accountable, that does not mean that bringing large numbers of para-teachers into the system is the solution (Interview no. 3, NUEPA, 2010).

Teachers' working conditions and status

Detractors of the appointment of contract teachers argue that the recruitment and promotion of contract teachers undermines not only the quality and equity of education systems but also the teaching profession. Generally, contract teachers face precarious working conditions, receive lower salaries than regular teachers, have poor job security, and lack social benefits. Yet, contract teachers are expected to undertake the same tasks and responsibilities and to work full-time alongside permanent teachers. This dual system of teacher management harms teachers' motivation and may fuel tensions between teachers and active resistance as a result of uneven conditions of service and career prospects. This tension has been reflected where contract teachers organised themselves (in some states with the support of state-level teacher unions) and mobilised numerous protest actions to demand the regularisation of their services, as well as legal cases levied against para-teacher schemes (Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao, 2010; PROBE, 1999), as evidenced by regular reports in print and online media. AIPTF provided some examples:

> In Gujarat, we recently conducted a very big rally with about 50,000 para-teachers. They demanded the increase of their salary and to be mainstreamed after three years… So the government formed a ministers' committee to talk to the union leaders and resolve this problem. After talking around the table, the government decided to increase the salary of para-teachers from 2500 to 4500 rupees. The case was filed in the high court, and the court gave the judgement that the teachers who are working as para-teachers will be mainstreamed within three years… Recently, in September, in Uttar Pradesh, the para-teachers protested by blocking the schools. And in some other states, thousands of para-teachers have blocked the train routes (Interview no. 8, AIPTF, 2010).

Three main concerns are related to the debate on contract teachers' rights. First, most stakeholders agree that the training imparted to contract teachers is insufficient and of low quality (as discussed above). Yet, very little is said about the qualifications or pedagogical

practices of contract teachers or about structures to upgrade teacher qualifications. Quality education systems cannot be built on a teaching workforce that is not professionally qualified to work with children.

Second, the appointment of contract teachers has led to the creation of a separate teacher force and the diversification of teachers' status (Göttelmann-Duret, 2000). The creation of multiple categories of teachers with varying conditions of service and status "could have a demoralising impact on the entire teaching force" (Narayan and Mooij, 2010).

The following quote from an NCERT professor reveals the frustration among contract teachers:

> I found through my study that [para-teachers] are quite frustrated in fact. That is understandable when you don't get a salary, and you have to work from morning to evening. They are the first ones to come to the school, and the last to go out of the school – they have to lock [up], they have to get the school premises cleaned, and they have to do all sorts of jobs, which their regular counterparts are not doing. The service conditions of these teachers are bad: they don't get any leave or any benefits. Some ladies informed us that if they are pregnant, the maternity leave is also not given to them. No medical facilities, whereas, the regular teachers of the same school are enjoying all these benefits. So a sort of frustration can be seen in these teachers… (Interview no. 4, NCERT, 2010).

Third, a lack of incentives such as adequate pay, benefits, career development opportunities and limited teachers' agency has undermined their professional status. In its "National Curriculum Framework for Teacher Education", the NCTE (2009) refers to the degradation of the status of teachers resulting from the recruitment of unqualified contract teachers:

> Para-teachers pose a far more serious challenge to the institution of the professional teacher. An attitude of resignation towards initial teacher education and piecemeal in-service training courses have become an integral part of state provisioning for elementary education. This has led to further degradation of the status of school teachers and diluted the identity of the teacher as a professional… School teachers continue to be isolated from centres of higher learning and their professional development needs remain unaddressed (p. 7).

The development of appropriate incentives including adequate pay and career development opportunities, as well as regularising contract teachers already in the system and preventing further fragmentation within the teaching body is considered crucial by most stakeholders in countering the negative impacts on teachers' status. Duthilleul (2005) also mentions the importance of engaging teacher unions in the policy-development process. As illustrated in the following statement, the engagement with teachers is crucial to education transformation:

> I think engagement is important. Currently, the state is still not fully engaged with teachers and teacher education. We are engaged with the larger macro-level input provision, but we are not engaged with school change. If we engage with school change, engage with teachers, I think gradually there will be a transformation in education… It's also about social transformation, and social transformation is a very, very slow process… Unfortunately, international agencies come with short-term agendas and we should show results in this fashion. …You cannot bring social transformation in three or four years, it will not happen (Interview no. 27, NUEPA, 2010).

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CONCLUSIONS

This chapter examined the large-scale contracting of teachers across India as a strategic approach adopted by state governments to manage the rapid expansion of their education systems over the past two decades. This approach was driven by the dual need to, first, meet an increased demand for teachers and, second, to expand state education systems under budgetary limitations. It is argued that this approach has compromised the quality of India's public education system and has simultaneously undermined the professional status of teachers. More recent justifications for the deployment of contract teachers as a means of boosting teachers' accountability further disregard the importance of qualified, professionally trained and supported teachers for the delivery of quality education. In the long term, this will impede the development of a sustainable quality public education system.

There is no compelling evidence that the hiring of contract teachers improves student outcomes. Various studies in India and elsewhere (Atherton and Kingdon, 2010; Duflo *et al*., 2009; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2010) advocate for contract teachers as a means of increasing accountability, but most of them disregard other crucial factors for education quality and learning outcomes, such as pedagogical methods, time spent teaching, class size, adequate teaching materials, and the socio-economic backgrounds of students. In addition, many of the studies limit their analysis of teachers' performance to measuring the likelihood of their absence. While proponents of contract teachers may assume that they are less likely to be absent and more accountable to school committees or local governments, "these supposed benefits have not been systematically tested" (Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao, 2010, p. 62).

The hiring of contract teachers continues to be a controversial topic among policy makers, teacher unions and academics. The stakeholder perspectives presented in this chapter reveal that the contracting of teachers is widely considered to be an unsustainable approach to expanding and improving a quality public education system. Furthermore, it is considered that the aim of increasing teachers' accountability through appointment on short-term contracts subject to annual renewal has a demoralising effect on teachers' status and the profession. Expecting contract teachers to carry out the same duties as permanent teachers, without commensurate salary, job security and benefits is an unsustainable way to incentivise teachers. Moreover, requiring contract teachers to undertake complex teaching in multi-grade environments, without the necessary material conditions and professional capacity and support, will put enormous strains on them. In the long term, these conditions may also decrease the efforts made by contract teachers. Goyal and Pandey (2009), for example, found that in two states (Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh), contract teachers' performance declined over time as a result of weak local monitoring. India could experience a similar fate to Benin, where Welmond (2002) noted that the appointment of contract teachers with lower salaries and qualifications resulted in "an embittered teacher corps, education of questionable legitimacy, little fiscal respite and political instability" (p. 59-60).

Attempts to address these detrimental developments would require an overhaul of the management of India's education system, with a specific focus on teacher education reforms. This would include ensuring that adequate structures are in place to upgrade contract teachers. Currently, however, the system is ill-equipped to provide training and professional

development, even to regular teachers. This is a major cause for concern, particularly in a context where the intense debate on teachers and education quality is slow to translate into policy action.

Moreover, by expanding access to education without the appointment of adequately trained and qualified teachers, state governments are effectively widening the education equity gap, which is likely to perpetuate caste, social, cultural, and economic divisions in Indian society. Clear practical strategies to upgrade the professional competences and pedagogical skills of contract teachers, beyond broad-based policy directions, are urgently needed to ensure the provision of quality teachers who are crucial to the successful expansion of education systems. Policy must recognise that adequate teacher preparation and support is integral to fulfilling the aims of education.

Finally, while contract teachers continue to be a controversial issue requiring urgent attention, dialogue rarely takes place between all relevant stakeholders; particularly those that shape policy and those who are affected by it, namely teachers. If state governments are serious about improving the quality of public education under the RTE requirements, contract teachers must take part in the debate in a meaningful way to ascertain their needs. As argued by Carnoy, "Teacher commitment and involvement implies a management system that takes teacher needs into account and involves their participation in improving the quality of education" (2009, p. 71). As countries increasingly start to focus on upgrading their teaching force by prescribing minimum teaching qualifications, governments must reconsider their policies on contract teachers, not only in terms of appointment (whether to cease or continue the contracting of teachers), but more importantly how to include, support and train those already in the system to contribute to the further development and improvement of educational quality and equity.

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CHAPTER 7

TEACHERS' PRINCIPLED RESISTANCE TO CURRICULUM CHANGE: A COMPELLING CASE FROM TURKEY

Hülya Kosar Altinyelken

INTRODUCTION

'Competency-based curriculum' has been one of the most pervasive educational reforms in the world in recent decades. This curriculum model has been developed to compensate for the "irrelevance of much knowledge-based education to occupational performance and the failure of educational qualifications to predict occupational success" (Raven, 2001, p. 253). It is based on a demand-oriented and functional approach as it conveys the demands of the economy to the school. In other words, as the world of work started to make stronger demands on what and how schools teach, the notion of competence has become a key parameter (Han, 2008).

In the 1960s and 1970s, a growing interest in competence-based education and training emerged in Western countries. However, a renewed interest worldwide has been observed in the last two decades. Globalisation, the rising importance of information and communication technologies, and the emphasis on knowledge accumulation as one of the most important drivers of economic development, have made competence-based education a leading paradigm for innovation (Dochy and Nickmans, 2005). The popularity of competence discourse is also closely linked to the lifelong learning concept, which began to prevail in the early 1990s. In this respect, the involvement of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been critical. The OECD introduced the concept of competencies as a universal standard for human achievement (both academic and vocational) and linked it to the concept of lifelong learning and learning society. These latter concepts are closely associated with school and work, academic subjects and work performance, academic achievement of school subjects, and the competencies of the workplace (Rychen and Salganik, 2003).

The OECD has recently redirected the measurement of international student achievements from the school stand-alone model (e.g. Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study [TIMMS]) to the core competencies model (e.g. Programme for International Student Assessment [PISA]), choosing competence as an attractor to measure and compare student academic achievement (Han, 2008). Furthermore, in countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada, competencies became a core feature of the national curriculum of primary and secondary schools and higher education institutions (Han, 2008). Similarly, in several developing countries (e.g. in sub-Saharan Africa), a competency-based curriculum was adopted and efforts were made to implement it at various levels of education system (Chisholm and Leyendecker, 2008; Altinyelken, 2010).

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Turkey has followed these international trends and adopted a competency-based curriculum after a major review of the primary school curriculum in 2004. The new curriculum attempts to move away from a content-based curriculum, and emphasises the development of a select number of competencies (MONE, 2005a). Although the revised curriculum reflects the principles and objectives of a competency-based curriculum, the taught curriculum conveys gaps both between proposal and practice, and the aspirations of policy makers and teacher practices. Drawing on a broader study that examined curriculum implementation and pedagogical reforms in Turkey (Altinyelken, 2011), this chapter seeks to examine to what extent teachers welcome or resist changes in curriculum content, and how they mediate the new curriculum in their classrooms. The study was conducted in the spring of 2009, and included interviews with 14 members of school management and 69 teachers from eight public primary schools in Ankara.

The findings revealed that more than half of the teachers did not approve of the substantial reduction in content, as they were concerned about pupils' academic success, nationwide examinations, increasing demand for private tutoring and deepening educational inequalities. These teachers supplemented the curriculum and continued to impart additional knowledge to their pupils. The chapter highlights that there might be positive reasons for resisting certain proposals of curriculum reform, and discusses teachers' motivation for implementing the curriculum in different ways other than those intended by policy makers. Teachers who resist reforms are often stereotyped as conservative and adverse to change by policy makers and some other educational stakeholders. This chapter challenges such characterisation and points to good sense in resisting certain reform changes.

TEACHER RESISTANCE TO CURRICULUM CHANGE

Teacher resistance is typically defined as a desire and intention to maintain existing practices in the face of changes that they consider to be undesirable and threatening (Giles, 2006). Research shows that resistance might occur when teachers do not understand and appreciate the need for change. In such cases, they will be more interested in maintaining the status quo. Habit also plays a role, since it might be easier to continue teaching in the same way rather than working to develop new skills and strategies. Moreover, many people get a sense of security from doing things in familiar ways. Hence, teachers might fear the loss of what is familiar and comfortable, and might feel uneasy about the unknown when their well-established professional and instructional patterns are disrupted (Greenberg and Baron, 2000). Teacher resistance might also stem from a reduced inclination to commit to change in the later years of life and career (Huberman, 1989), and from motives to protect teacher status and self-interest when proposed changes are perceived as threatening (Fullan and Hargreaves, 1996).

Furthermore, teachers or other school-level staff might demonstrate obstructionism or outright resistance when they view proposed changes as being imposed by outside actors, such as by international aid organisations or bilateral donors. In such cases, teachers may believe that proposed reforms are irrelevant to the needs, priorities and concerns of the school

community (Sultana, 2008), and may be even interpreted as a form of cultural imperialism. Resistance can also take the form of collective action, as in the case of organised teacher union response (Grindle, 2004). Depending on its form and intensity, teacher resistance can generate various reactions, such as vocal opposition, outright hostility, efforts to discredit the change agents (Giles, 2006) and refusal to implement reforms.

The classical literature on educational change considers teacher resistance as a significant factor in education reform failure (Zimmerman, 2006), and generally reduces it to a psychological deficit in the 'resistor' or to an unwillingness to change (Achinstein and Ogawa, 2006). Teachers who show signs of resistance to a particular innovation or reform proposal are often characterised as traditional, conventional, stubborn, not having pupils' best interests at heart, passive or lacking professional knowledge (Van Veen *et al.*, 2005). From these perspectives, teachers are viewed as actors who stand in the way of change. Their resistance is judged as conservative and viewed a problem to be overcome (Rosenholtz, 1989) without considering the possibility that such resistance to reform might actually offer some insights to the reform initiatives (Gitlin and Margonis, 1995). Such research studies implicitly lean towards overcoming teacher resistance with short-term solutions so that external mandates can be institutionalised more effectively in schools (Giles, 2006). Suggestions for overcoming teacher resistance include involving teachers in shared decision-making, collaboration, professional development, principles modelling, and preparedness for limiting the forces of resistance (Zimmerman, 2006).

Nevertheless, some studies point to a different perspective, where resistance is characterised as "good sense" (Gitlin and Margonis, 1995), and highlight the positive rationale for resistance from teachers' perspectives (Achinstein and Ogawa, 2006; Giles, 2006; Van Veen *et al*., 2005). Such studies provide instances of 'principled resistance', which involve overt or covert acts that reject instructional policies, programmes, or other efforts that contradict teachers' professional principles. These case studies challenge the dominant portrayal of teacher resistance as a conservative act, and illustrate that resistance also arises from a deep commitment to one's profession rather than from psychological deficits or a basic reluctance to change (Achinstein and Ogawa, 2006). Likewise, declining teachers' enthusiasm for an innovation might also stem from their different perceptions of what constitutes good education and teaching, or might simply reflect different concerns and interests than those highlighted in official reform proposals (Van Veen *et al.*, 2005). As McLaughlin (2006, p. 215) notes:

> *Implementation is not about mindless compliance to a mandate or policy directive, and that implementation pitfalls are not just cases of individual resistance, incompetence or capability. Rather, implementation involves a process of sense-making that implicates an implementer's knowledge base, prior understanding, and beliefs about the best course of action.*

Cuban (1992) also confirms that teachers often see their profession as a reflection of their beliefs; therefore, their beliefs directly influence how and to what extent they implement curriculum reform. Substantial research on teachers has confirmed that teachers are creative, intelligent decision-makers and have well-established beliefs about the needs of

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their pupils and their own roles in the context of education (Wildy and Wallace, 1995). Hence, when a curriculum reform proposal contradicts teachers' beliefs on what their pupils need, then it is likely that the reform will be ignored or significantly modified by teachers. Other studies demonstrate that teachers choose not to implement curriculum materials that conflict with their ideas about content and how this content should be taught (Gess-Newsome, 1999). Therefore, teachers' resistance to reform not only reflects their own personal and professional convictions but may also shed light on the reforms themselves.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

The rationale for curriculum change

Curriculum change was perceived to be urgent in Turkey in recent years to address concerns relating to education quality and equity, and to make the education system more responsive to social and economic needs, such as sustaining a democratic society. Moreover, there were concerns about low pupil motivation in attending school and for reading and learning in general (MONE, 2005a). Furthermore, the achievement level of Turkish pupils in various international tests (such as TIMSS, Progress in International Reading Literacy Study [PIRLS] and PISA) was found unsatisfactory, as they performed well below international averages in these tests (Akşit, 2007).

According to the Ministry of National Education (MONE), a new educational approach had also become imperative due to the new trends and demands that were emerging in the global environment. The most critical dimensions of change include globalisation, the evolution of the knowledge-based economy, and the information and communication revolution. Knowledge accumulation and its application have become important determinants of national economic development and competitiveness in international markets. These major changes have influenced the content and the processes of education, and have made it necessary to reform educational thinking and practices (MONE, 2005a).

> In the contemporary world, knowledge is produced and reproduced at a high speed. In such a world, the future of an individual and a society is dependent on its ability to reach, use and produce knowledge. The development of such skills and their life-long sustainability requires a modern education system based on knowledge production, not one based on memorisation (MONE, 2005a, p. 14).

Consequently, curriculum reform was considered crucial, as it was regarded as a prerequisite for sustainable development and for protecting and improving the country's competitiveness in the globalising world. MONE also acknowledges that educational reforms in a variety of East Asian, North American and the European Union (EU) countries have been influential. The role of the EU, in particular, was prominent. As a candidate for EU membership, Turkey has been adopting related legislation and undertaking reforms for harmonisation (Akşit, 2007). In this framework, adopting a competency-based curriculum, together with a student-centred pedagogy (SCP) was regarded as an important step in harmonising the Turkish education system with that of the EU countries.

The structure of the new curriculum

The *Curriculum 2004* introduced changes in content load and its organisation, pedagogical approach, and assessment methods. With the new curriculum, the authorities aimed to reduce the amount of content and the number of concepts taught. Furthermore, in the new programmes, a thematic approach was adopted. Although, in the previous curriculum, terms such as 'goal', 'objective', and 'targeted attitudes' were frequently used, references to 'competencies' is often made in the new curriculum (Educational Reform Initiative, 2005). The new curriculum places special emphasis on development and reinforcement of eight core competencies, which are further defined and operationalised in each subject. Between the first and fifth grade, the development of the following eight competencies was prioritised: critical thinking, creativity, communication, problem solving, research, using information technologies, entrepreneurship, and language skills in Turkish (MONE, 2005a).

In terms of pedagogical approach, the new curriculum adopts SCP and suggests new ways of learning and teaching. The aim is to move away from a teacher-centred or subject-centred approach to a student-centred model. The new educational programmes recommend that the majority of the lesson time should be spent on classroom activities. The role of teachers has been modified in the sense that rather than directly providing information, they are expected to facilitate, guide and supervise pupils' learning processes. Pupils' roles and responsibilities are also redefined as they are expected to assume more responsibility for their own learning, and participate in learning and teaching activities by raising questions, handling materials, developing projects, doing research, and cooperating and discussing with their classmates and teachers. The new curriculum also advocates increased use of learning and teaching materials and aims to stimulate the use of information and communications technology (ICT). Furthermore, assessment methods have been modified and a range of alternative methods has been suggested. The new approach, called 'authentic assessment', aims to assess the learning processes of pupils. In addition to traditional assessment methods such as oral and written tests and quizzes, a number of alternative methods are suggested, including self-evaluation, evaluation of classmates, project and performance assignments, observation forms and pupil portfolios (MONE, 2009a; MONE, 2009b; MONE, 2009c; MONE, 2005a).

Turkey's exam-oriented education system

Understanding the implementation of a competency-based curriculum in Turkey requires a closer look at how examinations are embedded in the Turkish education system. Indeed, the Turkish education system is defined as a highly exam-oriented system. Pupils are assessed at primary eight through a nationwide exam. The performance at this exam determines (to a large extent) to which type of secondary school a pupil can be admitted. All pupils completing primary education are entitled to attend secondary schools which offer four years of education (MONE, 2005b). However, competition is intense for *Anatolian high schools and Science high schools* due to their reputation for offering high quality education and for providing education in foreign languages, mainly in English. Likewise, admission to higher education programmes is also governed by a highly competitive nationwide exam. For instance, in 2008, around 1.6 million students registered for the university entrance exam, and only around 265,000 of them were placed at higher education institutions that offered Bachelor's degree programmes (ÖSYM, 2008).

Due to its exam-oriented education system, private tutoring is a widespread phenomenon in Turkey. It takes mainly three forms: the first type is one-to-one instruction by a teacher either at the teacher's house or at the pupil's house. The second type is provided at primary schools by teachers after standard lesson hours. The third type is undertaken by profit-oriented, school-like organisations, where teachers with professional teacher training teach pupils in classroom settings. This type of private tutoring is the most widespread form of private tutoring in Turkey. Pupils attend these centres outside formal education hours. Classrooms are much smaller (up to 20 pupils), and depending on the quality of the centres, they are often equipped with better educational materials (Tansel and Bircan, 2006). The content of learning materials in these institutions is entirely determined by the content of examinations, and teaching is geared to achieving high scores in the nationwide exams. According to the statistics of the Private Tutoring Centres Association, there were 4,222 private tutoring centres in May 2009. The number of pupils attending these centres was 1.2 million, and the number of teachers working in these centres was around 51,000 in the same year (ÖZDEBİR, 2009).

Implementation process

Once the preparation of curriculum documents was finalised, the revised curriculum was piloted in the 2004/2005 academic year in 120 primary schools in nine provinces across Turkey. In the following academic year, the nationwide implementation started at the first five grades at the same time (Bıkmaz, 2006); while at upper grades (6-8), the implementation was phased over three consecutive years. Teachers who were teaching at the selected pilot schools were informed about the curriculum change in August 2004, and were invited to participate in an in-service training in the following month, just before the start of the new academic year. Academics from a number of universities in Ankara introduced the new curriculum in a two-week training programme. In one school that was established as a model school to pilot the new curriculum, teachers received intensive training for two months. There was a subtle acknowledgement on the part of official authorities that there were limits to what they could achieve in a two-week training programme. However, they believed that it provided a solid foundation for the piloting process.

Nevertheless, teachers who participated in this study appeared to be highly critical of the training. Very few teachers recognised the benefits of the in-service training; it was viewed as a general introduction to the new curriculum and some sessions were found particularly helpful. However, the majority believed that the training was severely inadequate to prepare teachers for the implementation process. Teachers claimed that the duration of the training was too short, and the quality was low as it was too theoretical and lacked practical guidance. Teachers also alleged that some of the lecturers were reading from their notes or power-point presentations, and they did not seem to have a good understanding of the new curriculum. Moreover, during the lessons, there were often heated discussions on the reform proposals. Therefore, a significant amount of time was spent on discussions and protests between teachers and academics about whether such changes were indeed necessary or would be beneficial to the Turkish education system. Hence, there was less time left for actually comprehending and understanding the proposed changes, and learning how they should be effectively implemented in classroom settings.

Teachers unanimously believed that once the academic year started in 2004, they would feel ill-equipped to implement the new curriculum as the training left them with several unanswered questions, confusions and uncertainties. Many also noted feelings of panic and inadequacy (see Altun and Şahin, 2009). These teachers still considered themselves in a better position compared to teachers in non-pilot schools since the second group received an even shorter training period. In general, the duration and quality of training was perceived as a false start in curriculum implementation. In retrospect, teachers suggested that perhaps one of the most important shortcomings of the training was failure to adequately explain the rationale and philosophy of the revised curriculum. They believed that this inadequacy has resulted in less-than-desired implementation outcomes and, in several cases, strong resistance to change.

TEACHER VIEWS ON CHANGES IN CURRICULUM CONTENT LOAD

Teachers who participated in this study unanimously believed that the previous curriculum was overloaded with information, which was sometimes outdated and redundant. High content coverage requirements resulted in rote learning, stress and overloading of pupils. Likewise, teachers felt pressured to complete a loaded curriculum in a prescribed period. Hence, there was a general acknowledgement among teachers that change was urgently needed. Nevertheless, teachers had different views on what kind of change was required and whether the changes introduced by the new curriculum were indeed helping to overcome previous inadequacies or were producing new ones.

With the exception of two teachers, they all agreed that content load in the revised curriculum was reduced substantially. Yet, their opinions differed on the appropriateness of these reductions. Some teachers, few in number, approved of some of the reductions and disagreed with others. For instance, they criticised omissions in the teaching of Turkish grammar or Turkish history and culture in Social Studies lessons. A larger group of teachers thought that the new curriculum was adequate for this age group. Finally, the biggest group within the sample (more than half of the teachers who participated in this research) appeared to be very critical of the new curriculum, believing that the content load was reduced too much and that the development of competencies was emphasised at the expense of knowledge acquisition. Both the opinions of the teachers welcoming change and those resisting it are further elaborated below.

Welcoming change

The teachers who approved reductions in content load believed that children up to grade five did not need to acquire much information. They emphasised the role of education in behavioural and attitudinal development. Therefore, an increased focus on select competencies and skills, such as communication, oral and written expression, and confidence building was considered appropriate for this age group. In addition, they noted that the content load was reduced at lower grades (up to grade five) since some subjects were moved to upper grades (between six and eight). Indeed, primary and middle schools were combined in 1997, and compulsory education was increased from five to eight years (Eurydice,

2009). However, the curriculum was not revised accordingly. Therefore, there remained a number of overlaps and discontinuities between lower and upper grades which the new curriculum attempted to eliminate.

These teachers suggested that lessons were now easier and more enjoyable. They believed that since pupils were required to learn less at a given grade, they learned better and they retained more of what they had learned. In addition, teachers maintained that the success rate had increased since the majority of pupils were able to accomplish competencies defined for their grade level. For instance, in the previous system, only a few pupils could master required competencies in Mathematics at grade one or two, and the rest struggled to follow higher-achieving children. Yet, in the revised curriculum, the number of those competencies was reduced, resulting in an increased number of 'successful' pupils. The teachers also highlighted the futility of overloading children with too much information: "We used to teach them about countless wars in the Ottoman period or wars before that time; the number of dead, the number of wounded soldiers […] Nobody remembers those, it is not even noteworthy to remember them."

These teachers emphasised that, during in-service training, they were often reminded by their trainers that the new curriculum dramatically altered the role of the pupil and the role of the teacher in classroom settings. Their role as a teacher was no longer imparting knowledge, but teaching children about the ways to seek and attain knowledge. The following statements of the teachers are illustrative in this sense:

> *Information is not important. When children's intellectual capacities improve, they can and will learn themselves. What is important and essential is to teach them how to find information.*

> *You can find knowledge everywhere. Knowledge is abundant in our age; we are flooded with knowledge. What is critical is to have the skills to attain knowledge that one desires to have.*

> *If we teach pupils, it would result in rote learning, yet the new curriculum aims to minimise it. Instead, if we teach pupils how they can find information and if they do, we believe they would learn better.*

> *The dilemma is whether teachers should give information or pupils themselves should seek information from other educational sources. This curriculum aims to promote the latter.*

Opposing change

In contrast, the majority of teachers who participated in this study believed that, with the new curriculum, the amount of content load shifted from one end of the spectrum to the other, like a pendulum swing. Hence, they were convinced that the content load was dramatically reduced; the subjects were either shifted too much to upper grades or several of them were discarded altogether. They complained that the lessons were entirely based on pupil activities. Indeed, the curriculum documents also clearly suggest that most of the lesson time should be spent on classroom activities (MONE, 2005a). In this respect, a teacher complained:

> *We keep doing all sorts of activities without even knowing what the pupils are supposed to learn from them. Pupils are active for the sake of being active. They are active since activity is cool, since it is the 'trendy thing' to do.*

Such teachers believed that the quality of textbooks was very low. According to them, the textbooks provided insufficient information on subject matters; the themes were listed, but there was little content on them, or they were treated superficially. Moreover, teachers reported a lack of cohesion and insufficient integration among themes within the textbooks as well as problems with chronological order (see also İflazoğlu and Çaydaş, 2005). While explaining their views on the textbooks, teachers often used statements such as 'the books are empty', 'they are not even serious' or 'the books are a joke'. Indeed, such comments were common not only among teachers who criticised reductions in content load but among others as well. Consequently, these teachers believed that the lessons were very boring and superficial. They acknowledged that pupils were achieving higher grades now, and that perhaps the students felt more successful and happy. Yet, the teachers questioned: 'Are they really more successful?' Apparently, many of them did not think so, as they seemed entirely concerned with pupils' academic success:

> *These pupils are not more successful. At school, they are less challenged intellectually, so their cognitive development is also slower. This is a real pity, since the new generation of children is actually more intelligent.*

The teachers were also highly concerned about what they called 'the exam dilemma'. The revised curriculum now emphasised the development of competencies. However, the nationwide exams, held at grade eight, have traditionally evaluated pupils on the basis of their knowledge acquisition. The exams have not been aligned yet to the competency-based curriculum, leading to mismatches between the objectives of the curriculum and the exam system. Therefore, teachers believed that since pupils receive less information, mainstream schools fail to prepare them adequately for the exams and the demand for private tutoring increased. Some schools reported that the number of pupils attending private tutoring institutions has doubled in recent years. Such concerns were not only expressed by teachers, but also even with greater concern by head teachers. One head teacher, for instance, exclaimed that:

> *The government is not at peace with itself. It introduces a curriculum, which emphasises competencies and skills and yet keeps an examination system that assesses knowledge acquisition. Then how can we implement this curriculum effectively, with the full knowledge that our pupils want to be admitted to good quality secondary schools, while the education we offer does not prepare them for that goal?*

Indeed, teachers noted that quite a number of parents voiced similar concerns and were alarmed by what 'little knowledge' their children were attaining at school. Depending on their economic situation, some parents reacted by sending their children to private tutoring institutions so that their children would be better prepared for the exams, and change more successfully from primary to secondary schools, and from secondary schools to universities. All teachers and head teachers in visited schools noted that increasing numbers of pupils at upper grades had started to attend private tutoring institutions. According to estimates provided by the school management, in some classes up to 60 per cent of pupils attended

private tutoring centres. The participation levels were lower in schools situated in low-income neighbourhoods.

The expansion of private tutoring raised a number of apprehensions among teachers. They believed that attending both mainstream schools and private tutoring institutions consumed the majority of children's time and left little room for play and interaction with peers. Parents even seemed reluctant to permit their children to participate in sports and cultural activities organised at school, since such activities were regarded as a waste of time. Moreover, attending both mainstream schools and private tutoring centres placed children under considerable pressure and stress, negatively influencing their social and psychological development. As explained by a teacher:

> The children are studying all the time. They do not play. They keep on reading and answering multiple-choice questions. This is very unhealthy. Their mental health is compromised.

Furthermore, private tutoring interfered with schooling; it created disparities between children who received private tutoring and those who did not, and it dramatically increased the rate of absenteeism in the months close to the nationwide examinations. Additionally, parents and pupils often believed that the quality of instruction was better at private tutoring centres; hence, their respect for and confidence in mainstream schools was lower.

These teachers were also concerned about the consequences of private tutoring on intensifying educational inequalities within the system. They believed that the revised curriculum aggravated existing inequalities since it increased the demand for private tutoring and reduced the chances of pupils succeeding in the exams without supplementary private coaching. Private tutoring institutions often charge high admission costs; hence, they are beyond the reach of households with average income. Studies have shown that households with higher income and higher parental education levels invest more resources in private tutoring, and private tutoring expenditures are higher in urban areas in comparison to rural areas (Tansel and Bircan, 2006).

Teachers noted that in the previous system, there was substantial information contained within the books used. Therefore, highly motivated, intelligent, and driven pupils could still succeed in the entrance exams by mastering the books, even if they did not attend any private tutoring centres. One teacher exclaimed with frustration:

> Now, the books only have titles, they are full of inquisitive questions and activities which assume that pupils already know the content or they would gather background information from other sources. Yet, the books are the only educational material for pupils in poor urban neighbourhoods or for the majority of pupils in rural areas.

Therefore, teachers believed that in the absence of private tutoring, pupils from underprivileged backgrounds are destined to fail in the exams. The quality of secondary school education has a direct impact on access to universities and employment opportunities in the labour market. Therefore, there was a strong conviction among these teachers that the educational gap between income groups, and between urban and rural areas would be further accentuated, leading to an increasingly stratified society.

TEACHING PRACTICES

Teachers responded to the inadequacy of curriculum materials by the use of supplementary resources which they gathered from bookstores or from educational websites on the internet. Some also benefited from old textbooks on various subjects. Since teachers and pupils were not permitted to use books other than the new textbooks within classrooms, teachers photocopied these materials to share with pupils or fellow teachers. Thus, some actors who participated in this research called the revised curriculum 'photocopy-centred learning' as opposed to 'student-centred learning', which the new curriculum claims to be. For instance, according to the majority of teachers, the textbook for Turkish dealt inadequately with grammar. They argued that the omission of grammar was a major shortcoming as children were not learning their mother tongue properly and were making numerous spelling and grammatical mistakes. Hence, the majority of teachers were required to teach grammar as well.

Another example concerns topics related to the life and contributions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. Some teachers explicitly mentioned that the new curriculum intentionally omitted topics relating to him for ideological reasons. Therefore, they tried to add new content materials relating to Atatürk in order to counterbalance the omissions in the curriculum. Similarly, teachers were very critical of the new Social Studies textbook, as they believed that the book lacked cohesion and omitted significant information on Turkey's geography and history. Teachers responded to these perceived inadequacies by providing direct information through short presentations and, in some cases, requiring pupils to take notes. These efforts increased teacher workload and intensified demands on lesson time.

Some teachers voiced their concerns to the inspectors visiting their classrooms. However, the inspectors advised them to stick to the curriculum and not to supplement it with additional sources so that the outcomes of the revised curriculum could be clearly observed. If teachers complemented the curriculum, the inspectors argued, the curriculum might then appear perfect. Yet, these teachers were not convinced. They believed that they must not lose a whole generation of pupils for the sake of such an experimental learning experience.

When teachers' statements and claims were compared with their practices observed during lesson observations, a slightly different picture emerged. In the presence of a researcher, teachers seemed to be more concerned with demonstrating that they were capable of practising recommended teaching and learning methods in the new curriculum. Therefore, more than half of the teachers emphasised student talk and activity during lesson observations. This was more discernable at grade five, during Social Studies lessons. Teachers frequently asked questions and gave opportunities to as many pupils as possible. In some other lessons, children had individual or group presentations on a topic that they had been asked to prepare earlier. Therefore, in most of the cases, teachers briefly introduced the topics and explained some of the concepts that came up during question and answer dialogues. Nevertheless, since the vast majority of teachers were observed only once, lesson observations cannot be taken as a rigorous indicator of how and what teachers teach in an entire semester. What is more, the presence of a researcher obviously altered classroom dynamics for both teachers and pupils.

Not only teachers who were critical of the changes in the curriculum content, but also teachers who had a positive view on the changes, appeared to supplement the curriculum with additional knowledge for a variety of reasons. Their main motives are outlined below.

TEACHER MOTIVES FOR SUPPLEMENTING THE CURRICULUM

The 'emptiness' of the books

Several teachers noted that effective implementation of the revised curriculum made it necessary to provide additional information to pupils. For instance, the activities in the pupil workbook assumed that children had background knowledge on the themes studied. However, the books did not provide that kind of information; they only made reference to the themes and introduced them in a rather superficial and casual way. Hence, teachers felt the need to provide a proper introduction to the topics. Otherwise, pupils were not able to carry out the activities at all or they did not learn much.

The myth of research assignments

The curriculum advises exploratory work and research to be conducted by pupils so that they would be prepared for lessons and their research skills in general would be enhanced. However, according to many teachers, in reality this did not work in the ways intended by the policy makers. Very often, when children were given research assignments, they delegated the assignments to their parents or others who could do the research and prepare a printout. Another common practice was to visit stationery shops that had internet access. Children would briefly explain the topic to shopkeepers and shopkeepers would in turn do a quick internet search and print the results. This practice became so common that stationery shops had advertisements in their windows, informing prospective clients that they did research assignments for primary school children. Parents, particularly in low-income neighbourhoods, were increasingly annoyed by the financial implications of such practices. Teachers noted with much frustration that children did not even read these printouts before coming to class. They suggested that only a few pupils did research and read the findings. Consequently, the flawed result of providing research assignments forced several teachers to provide more direct information to their pupils.

Preparing pupils for nationwide exams

The majority of interviewed teachers taught children from low socio-economic background. Teachers seemed very conscious of their pupils' educational disadvantages and, as explained above, they believed that the revised curriculum further exacerbated their disadvantages. Unlike children from middle to upper-income groups, their pupils had fewer opportunities to supplement their knowledge at good-quality private tutoring institutions or at home. Therefore, some of the teachers supplemented the curriculum content in order to better equip their pupils for the exams. They explicitly noted that they would stick to the curriculum once they were convinced that the entrance exams were no longer assessing

knowledge acquisition. They acknowledged improvements in the first Seviye Belirleme Sınavı (SBS, Level Determination Examination in English) in 2008, but they needed to see how the type of questions would evolve throughout the years. They stressed the importance of aligning the exam questions with the philosophy and objectives of the new curriculum.

Competition among teachers and schools

It is important to note that teachers' concerns about the academic achievement of their pupils and performance at entrance exams were not only motivated by personal integrity or accountability, but were also closely related to their own performance as teachers and the success of their schools. Very often, teachers feel competition among colleagues for being one of the most highly esteemed teachers and popular among pupils and parents. They are informally evaluated by their attitudes towards pupils (e.g. warmth, caring behaviour, genuine concern, content knowledge, structure) and towards fellow teachers and parents (e.g. being respectful, cooperative, open and friendly). Another very important dimension of such evaluation is the general academic success of their pupils and their performance level at nation-wide exams. Likewise, the perceptions of a school's success are also very much dependent on the number of its graduates who are admitted to prestigious secondary schools. Consequently, even teachers who believed that a reduction in content load was appropriate tended to provide their pupils with extra content due to the pressure of competition among teachers and schools. This illustrates one of the significant ways as to how the introduction of a competency-based curriculum influenced teachers' work in an exam-oriented education system. They experience the contradictions between the curriculum expectations and the realities of an exam-oriented education system, and feel pressured to respond to both demands. Some teachers, in fact, suggested that their workload has increased as a result, while some other teachers, who were not too bothered by the competitive pressure, suggested that the new curriculum simplified their work.

Strengthening national identity

Some of the teachers believed that, in the past, children learned a great deal about their country, about its history, geography, and people. Yet, they consider that, now, pupils hear about these topics very superficially and, for example, they do not learn much about regions besides their own. As a result, some teachers believed that the new generation of pupils tended to have a more diffuse sense of national identity. Efforts to teach more history, particularly the history of the Republic and the life of Atatürk seemed to be motivated by such concerns.

It was possible to find similar concerns among parents as well. Indeed, one parent applied to the court for the cancellation of new education programmes on the grounds that there were strong religious influences in the textbooks. In March 2009, Danıştay (The Presidency of the Council of State), decided that the education programmes for "Life Knowledge" (for grades one, two and three) were not sufficient to stimulate a democratic culture and patriotism. Therefore, the programmes were abolished. Likewise, the education programmes for Turkish at grades one and two were considered to be 'not recommended', and for grades four and five, they were 'recommended' on the condition that necessary amendments would be made (Öğretmenlersitesi, 2009).

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Old habits

Some teachers also mentioned that teachers who were relatively senior in age and who had many years of experience (i.e. 20 years or more) continued with extensive lecturing because they perceived change as 'tiring' and 'demanding', and had difficulty in changing their traditional teaching styles. These teachers were also 'problematised' during interviews with policy makers, suggesting that once they have left the system through retirement, the new curriculum will be more broadly embraced by teachers. Indeed, some of the more experienced teachers explicitly noted that they continued to transmit information out of old habit. That was what they had been doing for many years and what they believed was real teaching. Otherwise, they thought they were not doing their job properly, betraying their own personal principles and the standards of their profession.

CONCLUSION

The findings revealed that the teachers who participated in this study implemented the new curriculum for primary schools in accordance with their beliefs on the benefits and costs of change. The majority of teachers did not approve of the substantial reductions in content load due to concerns about pupils' academic success (also identified in Korkmaz, 2008), nationwide examinations, increasing demand for private tutoring, deepening educational inequalities, and development of a diffuse sense of national identity among new generations. Therefore, these teachers tended to supplement the curriculum with additional information gathered from other educational resources and they continued to impart knowledge at a level that they believed was adequate.

Moreover, this chapter has shown that when teachers agreed with the reduction in content load, some of them still chose to impart more knowledge than recommended by the curriculum due to competing beliefs and pressures related to their 'performance'. In this case, concerns about the achievement levels of pupils at nationwide exams, and the success and status of teachers and schools were significant. Therefore, the study challenges the stereotypical and unfair characterisation of teachers who resist reform proposals, and argues that teachers demonstrate *principled resistance* when they perceive proposed curriculum changes as detrimental to their pupils and to the society in general (Achinstein and Ogawa, 2006; Gitlin and Margonis, 1995).

In addition, the findings suggest that teacher resistance should not be viewed as a 'problem' since it provides opportunities for policy makers to reflect on the reform proposals and to learn from teacher responses. "Not only can teacher resistance to innovation make good sense, but also, under certain conditions rarely supported by standardised reform, it can evoke a resilient, even activist, self-renewing response to change otherwise perceived to be disruptive or harmful" (Giles, 2006, p. 179). According to Achinstein and Ogawa (2006), teachers' resistance can play a crucial role in reform initiatives, although it works against the implementation of the reform in the short run. Fullan (2007) also suggests that change does not necessarily mean progress. Therefore, resistance to change may be the most appropriate response when there is disagreement about an innovation.

A number of other conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. First, the findings suggest that some of the assumptions made in the revised curriculum are not in line with pupils' backgrounds and the realities of the Turkish education system. For instance, the curriculum states that in the contemporary world, the future of individuals and societies is dependent on competencies to access, use, and produce knowledge (MONE, 2009c; MONE, 2005a). Research assignments were designed as an important tool to improve pupils' competencies to access and retrieve relevant information, and to encourage self-directed learning. However, in reality, it did not work according to the expectations, as pupils delegated their responsibility to others. Moreover, research assignments falsely assume that children have access to the internet at home or in their neighbourhoods, or have access to written educational resources. These assumptions are in contradiction with the realities of many households that do not have computers, an adequate amount of reference books, or financial resources for frequent visits to internet cafés. Furthermore, research assignments require parental involvement, yet parents do not always have time, nor the educational background and commitment to help their children.

Second, some of the principles of the curriculum are in contradiction with the highly exam-oriented education system in Turkey. The curriculum puts emphasis on the development of skills and competencies, yet the education system retains a highly competitive exam structure which primarily assesses knowledge acquisition. Substantial reduction in textbook content seems to lessen schools' capacity to prepare their pupils adequately for the exams. As a result, parental confidence and respect for mainstream public schools appears to suffer. In addition, the demand for private tutoring has increased and this has led to a *de facto* privatisation of the education system as some critics argue. Consequently, private tutoring in Turkey maintains and exacerbates social inequalities and stratification, just as it does in several other countries where private tutoring continues to be a widespread phenomenon, such as Hong Kong, China, Japan, Singapore or Romania (see Bray, 2005).

Third, as illustrated in the previous two points, the findings suggest that the revised curriculum might aggravate social inequalities, because children who have better access to cultural, economic, and social resources are in an advantageous position. Therefore, the new curriculum appears to reproduce or even aggravate existing social and economic inequalities rather than helping to ameliorate them. Such concerns were also reported in other contexts. For instance, the authorities have attempted to introduce a competency-based curriculum in China. However, these reforms have raised serious equity issues in the country as examination-oriented education has long been deeply embedded in Chinese culture and society (Dello-Iacovo, 2009).

Finally, the study highlights a number of misconceptions regarding teaching and learning. It seems that some advocates of the new curriculum, as well as some teachers, perceive teaching and learning as two different processes, almost as dichotomies. Then, one might ask, "What is teaching if not bringing about learning?" (Alexander, 2008, p. 73). In some of the curricular changes in the past decade, 'knowledge' is almost seen as diametrically opposed to 'skills' or 'competencies' (Alexander, 2008). Unfortunately, such a dichotomous understanding seemed to be strong among the Turkish policy makers who were involved in curriculum reform and some of the teachers who participated in this study. There is no

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doubt that education has important roles to play in developing select competencies and skills of pupils, but such a role should not be assumed to the detriment of education's other important objectives, that of improving pupils' understanding and knowledge base. Young (2009) also points to the dangers of 'emptying the content' which he identifies as a trend in the educational policies of many countries. Such 'dangers' appear to be a serious concern for many educators in Turkey as well.

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CHAPTER 8

EVALUATING TEACHERS IN PERU: POLICY SHORTFALLS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Marit van der Tuin and Antoni Verger

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Peru has witnessed positive developments in education, especially in relation to education access. Today, Peru has levels of early childhood education much higher than the regional average, access to primary education is almost universal (with an enrolment rate of 97 per cent), and access to secondary education has grown substantially (87 per cent) (Cuenca, 2010). These overall figures, however, do not adequately reflect the challenges to and inequities within the education system. Some major concerns include the fact that education quality is low and that students' learning outcomes are unsatisfactory; pedagogic methods are based on routine and on rote learning; high level of education inequalities prevail, especially between rural and urban areas; the national budget for education is insufficient; and teachers receive low salaries and count on limited teaching materials (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2003; Cuenca, 2010).

To address the severe issues around education access, during the last decades, Peru invested in the construction of new schools with the assistance of the international aid community. At the same time, in order to minimise the costs of expanding access, different government measures made teacher training more flexible and allowed for the massive entry of poorly trained teachers into the system, including thousands of 'contract' teachers. This emphasis on the 'quantity' of education has negatively affected education quality. It has undermined teachers' capacities and their working conditions to the point that, in Peru today, "it would be difficult to convince bright young people to go into teaching" (Saavedra, 2004, in Benavides *et al*., 2007, p. 39). In fact, teachers in the country, particularly those who do not combine teaching with other jobs, live below the poverty threshold (López del Castillo, 2007).

To address the quality issues, in 2000, the Consejo Nacional de Educación (National Education Council), a consultative body of the Ministry of Education, initiated a consultative process to develop a 'National Educational Project' (NEP) to radically improve the Peruvian education system. The consultations evolved into a very broad participatory process that lasted several years and involved the key education stakeholders in the country. The NEP design was finally completed in 2006 and its main ambition was to contribute to an introduction of new policies and regulations to bring about an integral change in the education system (Delgado and Guerrero Ortiz, 2006). One of the key objectives of the project was to improve the motivation and qualifications of Peruvian teachers. To achieve this, it was suggested that new teacher policies be adopted (Consejo Nacional de Educación 2006).

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Indeed, some of the NEP's proposals on how to improve teachers' quality were adopted by the Government of Alan García which, in 2007, passed the *Carrera Pública Magisterial* law (public teaching career, CPM). Among other measures, the CPM included in-service teacher evaluation policies and linked teachers' promotions and salary increases to professional performance.

Under the auspices of the CPM, teacher evaluation has initiated an important debate on the role of teachers in the delivery of quality education in Peru. Many government bodies, as well as international aid agencies and civil society organisations, perceive teacher evaluation as a mechanism to improve teacher accountability and/or to identify teachers' problems and needs. Yet, simultaneously, and as this chapter argues, it can have adverse effects on teachers' work depending on how it is designed and implemented, and under which material and political conditions.

This chapter analyses how in-service teacher evaluation (TE) has been designed, debated and implemented in Peru, and the main effects of such a policy in teachers' working conditions. The chapter is based on data collected in a three-month fieldwork period undertaken in 2010, during which 22 school directors and 11 education stakeholders both in Lima (urban area) and Cutervo (rural area) were interviewed. In addition, questionnaires were distributed among 160 teachers who work in schools located in Lima and Cutervo (van der Tuin, 2010).

The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the first section, TE policies are discussed within the broader context of globalisation. In the second section, the re-contextualisation and actual form adopted by TE in Peru are outlined. The third and last sections focus on the implementation of TE in Peru by presenting the perceptions and dispositions of key stakeholders on this policy. As will be argued, teachers, as well as other education stakeholders, are generally in favour of evaluation policies, but against the type of TE being implemented in Peru. This is related to teachers' concerns about how the reform will influence their work and may further undermine their already low status. There are also concerns that TE does not address some of the teachers' more pressing issues, including poor training and poor working conditions, or unsatisfactory teaching facilities and their working environment.

TEACHER EVALUATION AS A GLOBAL POLICY

Over the last 20 years, 'globalisation' has deeply altered education priorities and the transformation of education systems worldwide (Tatto, 2007; Verger *et al*., 2012). Globalisation generates growing competition between regions, countries and peoples (Sahlberg, 2004). In a globalised economy, most countries aim at raising their international competitiveness by offering knowledge-intensive products and services, and more qualified manpower (Carnoy, 1999). In this context, education becomes a key asset to raise the competitiveness of countries and their people and, therefore, reforms to improve the 'quality' of education – usually understood as improving students' learning outcomes and skills - have become a key priority in many parts of the world (Sahlberg, 2006).

Among other policy options, many policy makers and aid agencies are eager to promote the adoption of innovative policy tools to manage teachers' motivation and performance as crucial to improving quality. TE is one of these tools. Evaluation is a very common instrument to define areas for improvement in many policy sectors and, in fact, is a current tool in the daily life of schools and universities, although, traditionally, teachers are more often the 'subject' of evaluation than the 'object'. However, today, due to the focus on education quality and the key role of teachers in this respect (see UNESCO, 2005), teachers are becoming more and more frequently the object of in-service evaluations.

TE is not a homogeneous or monolithic policy. It can vary importantly according to variables such as who evaluates (peers, Ministry inspector, university scholars, the head of the school), through which instruments (tests, observation, teaching portfolio, etc.), to which purpose (summative or formative evaluation) and with which intentions and implications (change teachers' practices and/or education policies, introduce salary incentives, fire underperforming teachers) (Isoré, 2010; Verger, 2008). Today, a type of market-oriented model of TE predominates on the global education agenda, which is usually based on standardised testing and quantitative indicators, applied to individual teachers by an external authority and conducted through the imposition of sanctions and rewards according to results (OECD, 2009). Evaluating teachers on the basis of their students' performance is also a common practice, but not without methodological complications and potentially unfair attributions concerning teachers' responsibilities (Isoré, 2010; Verger, 2008). The market modality of TE assumes that individuals working in the public sector do not count on enough incentives or motivation, so they need to be stimulated externally to perform correctly and to become more competitive. According to neoliberalism, in-service TE can be seen as a new way to make teachers more accountable, but also to make them more productive and schools more efficient by, for instance, linking evaluation results to competitive funding formulas.

TEACHER EVALUATION IN PERU

In 2007, the government of Alan García (2006–2011) advanced the *Carrera Pública Magisterial* law that considers in-service teacher evaluation as one of its key components and which ties sanctions and rewards to teachers' performance evaluated through tests. It is important to mention that the way this law was designed and approved deviated from the participatory and dialogue-oriented spirit of the NEP that, to a great extent, formed the basis of the CPM concept (Cuenca, 2010). Many education stakeholders felt that the project they had invested so much energy in was not being taken seriously, which has generated tensions between them and the government. Specifically, they felt that the government took some of the ideas of the NEP, but in a very un-articulated and instrumental way (Consejo Nacional de la Educación, 2007; Mendívil Trelles de Peña, 2011).

Some controversial points included in the law, particularly the sanctions tied to low performance in-service teacher evaluation, were resisted by the national teachers' union. As a response to the CPM law, the teachers' union called a strike during the summer of

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2007. President García responded strongly in the media, not only against the union, but against Peruvian teachers in general:

> *Hay mucho comechado que no quiere ir a dar clases, que no quiere capacitarse, y cuando le ponen un libro delante es como si les tiraran una maldición. [There are too many scrounger teachers that do not really want to teach, that do not want to be trained, that when you give them a book it is like you put a curse on them].[1]*

Garcia's government considered that Peruvian teachers were demotivated and, as the President's words above imply, that many teachers are 'lazy' and 'ignorant'. This is ironic because it was Garcia, during his first presidential mandate at the end of the 1980s, who facilitated the massive recruitment of contract teachers (i.e. teachers without adequate certification).[2] Paradoxically, in his second mandate in 2006, García blamed teachers for not being sufficiently prepared.

However, others in government had a broader understanding of teachers' problems. According to one policy maker who contributed to design of the CPM and who was interviewed as part of this research, the cause of 'teachers' demotivation' lays in many other factors:

(1) The pedagogy in Peru is based on routine, and teaching is not seen as a creative profession; (2) the national budget for education is low and therefore teachers receive low salaries; (3) teachers have to rely on limited educational materials; and (4) teachers are often poorly trained to do their jobs (Interview, Policy maker 02, Lima, May 2010).

Teacher evaluation was seen, at that time, as a way of addressing some of these problems being faced by teachers (Lopez de Castilla Delgado, 2007; Delgado and Guerrero Ortiz, 2006). By evaluating teachers, and providing incentives according to the results, the government hoped to improve their motivation and, consequently, the quality of their teaching.

The CPM distinguishes between two different types of evaluation. First, an ex-ante evaluation, which is the usual procedure in most countries to decide which teachers can get into the system; and second, an ex post or in-service evaluation which would allow teachers to be promoted to higher salary scales on the basis of test results, as well as to identify underperforming teachers. The first type of evaluation is obligatory for all teachers who want to start their teaching career. The second one was voluntary at the time of the research. This means that teachers can decide whether they want their career path to be regulated by the previous teachers' law or by the new CPM. According to the CPM, teachers who are part of the public system should take in-service evaluations every three years and, if successful, be promoted in their careers and receive a salary increase. However, they also take the risk of being fired if they fail the exam several times. Important elements in the CPM design are (Lopez de Castillo Delgado, 2007; Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2011):

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[1] *Alan García, 10 July 2007. Source: http://www.antiprensa.pe/la-politica-educativa-del-segundo-gobierno-de-alan-garcia/ [Last retrieved: 23 September, 2010]*

[2] *In 2006, contract teachers still represented the 14.6 per cent of the total of Peruvian teachers, according to Chiroque (2008).*

1. All graduated teachers should enter CPM by taking part in the ex-ante evaluation via a test.

2. Teachers who are part of CPM and want promotion in their careers must take part in in-service evaluation. In the previous law, promotion was uniquely linked to the numbers of years in the system. With CPM, the years' of experience criterion is substantially reduced and teachers' performance becomes the key element for promotion.

3. The main proxy to measure teachers' performance is teachers' knowledge. A test will determine the level of teachers' knowledge and, consequently, whether they deserve a salary promotion.

4. The salary scales are structured in a pyramidal way. According to the CPM, 40 per cent of the total number of teachers will be placed in the fifth and lowest scale, 30 per cent in the fourth scale, 15 per cent in the third scale, 10 per cent in the second scale, and only five per cent can enter the highest salary scale. This means that the means and opportunities for promotion do not only depend on teachers' performance, but on their peers' performance as well. Figure 8.1 shows how these scales are distributed and what is the economic incentive attributed to each of them.

5. However, taking the tests also entails certain risks for teachers in the sense that failing the test (three times) will result in expulsion from the teaching profession.

6. TE should consist of both a written examination and classroom observation. The evaluation should contemplate different dimensions of teaching: training, identity, experience, ethical commitment, merits and professional performance.

7. TE takes place in the Education Regional Boards (DRE, for its acronym in Spanish) or the Education Management Units (UGEL) located in the provincial capitals or in big cities.

Figure 8.1 Division of salary scale

Source : authors

LEVEL V : 5%   (100% higher salary than Level I)

LEVEL IV : 10% (50% higher salary than Level I)

LEVEL III : 15% (30% higher salary than Level I)

LEVEL II : 30% (15% higher salary than Level I)

LEVEL I : 40%

THE UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION OF TEACHER EVALUATION IN PERU

The implementation of in-service teacher evaluation in Peru occurs in three-year cycles. Before this research was carried out, a pilot phase had been implemented in 2006, and another application at a bigger scale followed in 2009. Both experiences have been riddled with important irregularities and imprecisions.

Policy implementation processes are affected and vary depending on different types of factors, such as the solidity of the assumptions and theories behind the new policy, the interpretation and resistance/acceptance of the policy by teachers and other key educational actors, situated contexts or institutional aspects of a different nature (Ball *et al.*, 2012; Pawson, 2006; see also the introductory chapter or Broekman in this volume). As is shown in this section, the Peruvian TE system faces considerable limitations in relation to many of these factors.

The ideas behind teacher evaluation: Are they shared and understood?

The central hypothesis behind the TE policy in the way it has been portrayed in Peru is that if teachers are frequently evaluated in a way that rewards good performance, they will be stimulated to do a better job. But, what do teachers think about this causal relationship? Are teachers, in fact, motivated by the 'sticks and carrots' associated with TE? Are the actual motivation factors for teachers in line with those taken into account in the Peruvian TE policy, where salary gains are the most important element? This section reflects on how teachers think about these questions.

In Peru, today, teachers' salaries are low (around € 350 per month at the time of this research).[3] In fact, teacher salaries have not recovered from the Structural Adjustment period: in 2008, teachers' purchasing power represented only 34.63 per cent of the purchasing power they had in 1980 (Siroque, 2008). Not surprisingly, 77.5 per cent of the Peruvian teachers interviewed consider that they are "badly" or "very badly" paid. Very often, they need to complement their income with other jobs, which results in less time available for lesson preparation and a focus on teaching. Better salaries could benefit the professionalisation of teaching and would allow teachers to focus more on their careers. Arguably, the 'salary increase' included in the CPM should work as a motivating factor. However, in practice, this does not happen for a number of reasons. Peruvian teachers are quite sceptical about receiving a higher salary through the mechanism of teacher evaluation. In part, this is because, according to many of the teachers interviewed, it is "impossible" to reach the highest salary scale according to the current TE system. In addition, teachers do not trust the government to effectively apply the TE system. For economic reasons, Ministry officials acknowledge that it might not be feasible for the government to pay the salaries of teachers in the higher scales of the pyramid (see Figure 7.1 above). In fact, this had been the case until the time of the research: the Peruvian government budget in education has not included enough resources to pay for the promised salary increases (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2011). Such distrust

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[3] See *http://magisterioperu.blogspot.com.es/2010/06/sueldo-que-un-maestro-debe-ganar-en-la.html [last retrieved: 3 February 2011]*

and scepticism on behalf of teachers, but also the Ministry staff themselves, make the incentives behind TE rather ineffective.[4]

Teachers understand what the broad objective of the TE policy is about (i.e. improving the quality of teachers' work), and share such an objective to a great extent. However, teachers also mention that the content of the CPM policy is not very clear to them, and they perceive it as too complex. Most teachers who responded to our questionnaire had heard about TE, but 40per cent of the teachers had no idea about its specific implications. One of the education experts interviewed in the context of this research, aware of the fact that many teachers are not sufficiently informed about the CPM, opened an online forum where all teachers could ask questions about the new TE policy. It appears that this forum became very popular among, and highly visited by, Peruvian teachers. As this person told us:

> *Teachers have a lot of questions about CPM… and many teachers visit my website… Last week, a teacher asked me, 'Do I still have the same rights regarding my days off?' In the former law, all the teachers had two days off, one for their birthday and another one of their choice. In the new law, there is nothing written about these days…we can conclude that the policy is incomplete and the communication of the Education Ministry is very bad. (Interview, Education Expert 01, Lima, May 2010)*

Teachers who are aware of the implications of TE mostly focus on its negative consequences (i.e. the possibility of being fired) and, in their discourse, do not even consider the potential benefits of evaluations (i.e. salary increase). In fact, as the policy makers interviewed admitted, the salary increases have not been implemented yet, or have only been accessed by a few teachers (see also Díaz, 2012). They also admitted that the Ministry of Education had not been very clear when communicating how and where the policy had to be implemented, and had not been structured enough when planning the intervention. In other words, the strategy to implement the TE policy was rather weak. Not surprisingly, most teachers interviewed had no idea about what they should have to learn for the exam, and even when and where they should take it. According to an observer, the Ministry was more focused on the conflict with the union, due to its opposition to TE, than on its actual implementation:

> *The Ministry is really focused on this disagreement, [instead of doing] a good presentation of the law and offering guarantees to teachers who have nothing to fear. (Interview, Fe y Alegría representative 01, Lima, June 2010)*

Finally, it is important to highlight that most teachers would agree with being subject to a formative evaluation. In fact, of all the teachers in the research sample, only 5.1 per cent strongly disagree with being evaluated. However, at the same time, they also 'strongly disagree' with another key measure - the possibility of them being fired if they fail the exams. Nine out of ten teachers surveyed disagreed with the inclusion of this type of punitive measure, and only 6.2 per cent agreed with it. This lack of acceptability is an important aspect affecting TE's reception in the field and, consequently, its implementation. Specifically, it is vital to understanding the high level of resistance faced by the intervention.

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[4] *Something similar happens with the evaluation to enter the CPM. Several teachers interviewed mentioned their distrust in such types of procedure because they know numerous cases of teachers work without a certificate to teach.*

To sum up, the lack of clarity, communication and planning on behalf of the Ministry of Education concerning TE policies, but also the lack of agreement with the policy itself among teachers, has generated a lack of adhesion to the policy and, at the same time, has given rise to high levels of uncertainty, concern and distrust.

On the consistency of TE as a policy

The same policy can adopt very different forms in different contexts and can have very different implications according to the way the policy is designed and how it fits within a broader suite of previous and existing education policies. This is particularly the case with regard to TE in that, as previously discussed, it can vary substantially according to variables such as who evaluates and how, with which purpose teachers are evaluated and with what implications. Thus, it is difficult to talk about the quality of a policy in abstract terms without looking in detail at how such a policy has been translated, designed and put into practice in particular settings. In the case of teacher evaluation in Peru, this research found that many teachers and other education stakeholders complain about the quality and the practicality of the policy itself. According to them, the following elements are deeply problematic. First, CPM fails to include policies to pro-actively support the professional development of teachers who have just entered into the system. In this respect, some of the interviewees referred to the idea of new teachers working under the direct supervision of the school principal during the first year in service. This policy would ensure that teachers feel more confident and become more familiar with formative evaluation dynamics as well as with feedback from more experienced peers.

Second, the modality of evaluation being advanced currently in Peru consists of written exams, which are a very limited method to assess whether teachers perform well or not in the classroom, or whether they have the necessary pedagogical skills. Classroom visits and classroom observation, which are stipulated in the law itself, but never put into practice, would be a more appropriate and constructive evaluation tool if new capacities were to be developed.

Third, the written exams are based on general knowledge, regardless of what grade teachers are in or what subject they teach. According to some of the education stakeholders interviewed, it is not appropriate to use the same tool to test whether teachers from different grades and subjects possess the appropriate knowledge and capacities to face the different groups of children they have in class.

Fourth, the tests are standardised at a national level. To implement an effective evaluation policy in a country the size of Peru, it would be necessary to design different evaluation tests for different regions. As is shown in the following section, there are differences between urban and rural areas, but also between poor and rich areas, and between different linguistic and cultural groups. In relation to this, the location of the evaluation also contributes to implementation issues, especially in rural areas. Examinations are held in regional offices that can be quite distant from teachers' locations. Many teachers do not have the

necessary time, and even sufficient money, to travel to the offices where the exams are taken.

Fifth, according to the Consejo Nacional de Educación (2007), the individual rationale adopted by TE (i.e. evaluation of individual teachers) undermines the collective nature of teachers' work and teachers' outcomes. Specifically, it undermines the idea that education performance in a school (or in a system) depends on the team work of teachers and on the interaction between different types of educationists (classroom teachers, head of school, support teachers, members of the community, etc.).

Finally, another issue of a more regulatory nature relates to the fact that, today, two laws that regulate teachers' labour are operating simultaneously in Peru: the old law ('Ley del Profesorado'), approved in 1984; and the more recent 'Carrera Pública Magisterial' law. To date, most teachers have not 'abandoned' the 1984 law and, consequently, have not entered the optional CPM (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2011). Because of the reasons highlighted previously, and specifically due to the uncertainties TE generates in terms of job stability and promotion rules, teachers feel safer operating under the old law, even when it potentially means having a lower salary. According to different education stakeholders interviewed, this regulatory overlapping of laws further complicates the situation for teachers.

Situated contexts: The rural-urban divide

Research on policy implementation usually has a methodological nationalistic bias, and considers 'countries' as monolithic categories and flat terrains. However, in countries as regionally, culturally, and socio-economically diverse as Peru, it is very important to distinguish between different realities when designing policies in education, as well as in other policy sectors. According to Ball *et al*. (2012), situated factors, i.e. those that refer to contextual aspects locally linked to the school and to teachers, significantly affect the way policies are implemented and enacted. Among the most important situated factors in Peru, the differences between rural and urban areas stand out, since the contrasting conditions that prevail in each of these types of areas mediate significantly the way teacher evaluation is received and conceived by teachers. In fact, this research revealed how teachers located in rural areas have less information about TE and are even more reluctant about this policy than urban teachers. This reluctance is explained by three main factors.

First, it is quite common that teachers in rural areas are only proficient in their vernacular indigenous language, and not in Spanish. This makes it difficult for them to pass the standardised TE test as it is written in Spanish. Second, in rural areas, there are the higher proportions of teachers without proper certification, which means that there are higher numbers of teachers with low academic training and fewer skills to face this type of exams (Siroque, 2008). Third, teachers in rural areas generally live in much poorer conditions than their urban counterparts, have limited access to transportation and, as mentioned above, would need to travel long distances to take the exam. In the interviews, some of school principals were very aware about this problem:

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> *It is impossible for us to take part in TE. A lot of teachers have to travel a long way to their job and they are only at home for the weekend. TE is in the capital of the province (Cajamarca), which is not easy to reach from here. The little time we have at home, we want to spend at home and we do not want to waste our time travelling to do an exam in Cajamarca. (Interview, Head of School, Cutervo, May 2010).*
>
> *What does the Ministry of Education think? We are not allowed to skip lessons, so if we need to do it, [the teacher evaluation exam] takes at least one working day to get there.... part of TE takes place on Saturday and thus we have to start travelling to Cajamarca on Friday, be there on Saturday to do the exam and return on Sunday. (Interview, Head of School 21, Cutervo, May 2010)*

In conclusion, teachers in rural areas, due to their poor living conditions and poorer training, are those who would potentially benefit the most from the salary increases associated with TE, but also from a formative type of evaluation. But, paradoxically, at the same time, they are those who are least informed about TE and face more difficulties and are more reluctant to take the exam.

The institutional dimension of TE

Several pieces of research point to the technical and political limitations of the Peruvian government to undertake ambitious processes involved in education reform. According to Benavides *et al*. (2007), one of the main reasons for this is the low capacity of the staff in the Education Ministry to implement complex policies. Balarin (2008) considers that another source of institutional problems is the constant changes in the Peruvian Ministry of Education's leadership. As an indication of this, between 1990 and 2004, 17 different education ministers were appointed. This lack of political and, consequently, policy stability is, according to the same author, rooted in the deep institutional weaknesses of the Peruvian state. This type of capacity issue has also affected, in a more direct or indirect way, how teacher evaluation, a complex and sophisticated policy, has been discussed and implemented in the country.

According to the research for this volume, the most frequently mentioned source of scepticism in relation to government action related to the high levels of corruption existing in Peruvian politics. Corruption penetrates all layers of government, and many interviewees think that it also affects the DREs and the UGELs that are in charge of distributing and marking the TE exams. Thus, many teachers are concerned about the lack of transparency surrounding TE and with the fact that officers in the UGELs and DREs might fall into clientelist or even corrupt practices.

> *Sometimes teachers are privy to the evaluation test questions in advance because they have connections with the exam administrators... I have heard stories of teachers who pay to pass the test (Interview, ES 04, Lima, May 2010).*

Beyond these irregularities, the Consejo Nacional de Educación is also concerned about the lack of human resources in Peru with the capacity to evaluate satisfactorily teachers' performance at a high level (Consejo Nacional de Educación, 2011). This could generate

an important contradiction in the sense that there are uncertainties concerning the quality and expertise of those who are supposed to assess the quality and expertise of teachers.

The Ministry is also experiencing additional opposition as a result of the top-down manner in which TE has been approved and implemented. The CPM concept was originally grounded in a participatory process involving the contributions of different education stakeholders operating at different levels. However, the final decisions concerning the definitive content of the law were taken in a very abrupt way by a small group of experts and bureaucrats. According to some policy makers interviewed, because of political timing requirements and political pressures, at a certain point, "everything had to move quickly", which made it very difficult to carefully take into account the wishes of teachers and other education stakeholders (Interview, Policy maker 01, Lima, May 2010).

Finally, the communication issues between the Ministry of Education and teachers concerning the contents of the law were reproduced within the Ministry structure itself. This way, the information between the Ministry and the UGELs and DREs did not flow smoothly. In strategic junctures for the deployment of the policy, local directors of these offices admitted that they "had no idea" what they had to organise or do (Interview, Policy maker 02, Lima, June 2010). In fact, according to some observers, this deficient communication was one of the reasons that allowed for irregular practices to occur in UGELs and DREs.

CONCLUSIONS

Teachers in Peru have been losing social status and purchasing power in the last decades, due to insufficient levels of investment in education and the implementation of de-professionalising policies. In parallel, different policies have downgraded the quality of teacher training over time, as well as the criteria of entrance to the education system. This has happened to the extent that almost 15 per cent of the total number of teachers working in Peruvian schools today do not have the appropriate certificate (Chiroque, 2008). The CPM can be seen as an attempt to address some of these problems and, to some extent, to professionalise teachers' labour. However, as shown in this chapter, the final content of the law, and the way it has been approved and executed has been deeply problematic. Specifically, the most controversial component in the law has been the in-service teacher evaluation component.

The way that teachers - the subjects of this new policy intervention - perceive how evaluation will affect their work and wellbeing is a key element in understanding their predisposition towards it. At the same time, such perceptions represent an important predictor of whether the intervention will or will not produce the expected effects. Due to the way TE has been designed, communicated and implemented in Peru, but also to the nature of this type of policy, TE has generated significant resistance among the teaching community. The following paragraphs will outline the most important reasons behind the opposition to TE in Peru that emerged from this case study.

First, the teachers interviewed were concerned about in-service teacher evaluation because they did not have a clear idea of what the policy was and what it entails, which generated

a lot of uncertainty among them. Moreover, teachers were very much concerned with the possibility of being fired as a consequence of the application of the policy. To them, the punitive consequences of TE are disempowering and might undermine their already low social status. In general, Peruvian teachers would agree with a formative evaluation, but not with one that includes punishments and public shaming.

Second, teachers were frustrated because the promised salary increases for those who passed the exam were not being implemented. This implies that the key mechanism of the intervention, the financial incentive as a 'teacher motivator', does not work because most teachers do not trust the government's capacity and will to increase their salary. In fact, important education analysts in the country such Hugo Díaz conclude that the Ministry of Education, due to the fact that it is not fulfilling its financial commitments adopted in the CPM, is not treating Peruvian teachers with sufficient respect (Díaz, 2012).

Third, the standardised tests are not sensitive to cultural and regional divergences in the country. Specifically, they discriminate against rural teachers who live in remote areas or, on occasion, are not fluent in Spanish. Moreover, TE, as a written test, does not take into account more practical aspects of teaching, which are better evaluated by observation. And, until now, the exams focus on curricular knowledge, and not on other dimensions of teaching-learning processes such as methodology, pedagogy and ethics. These elements are included in the original CPM design, but they have never been executed correctly. Moreover, the individual rationale adopted by TE in Peru undermines the collective nature of teaching and generates resistance among those educationists who consider that students' learning depends on the capacity of teachers (in a school or in a group of schools) to work together to address collectively the problems they face day after day.

The case of Peru shows how difficult it is, but also how unfair it can be, to implement 'carrot and stick' policies in contexts where a minimum threshold of material and technical conditions is not met. In-service teacher evaluation, if implemented correctly, could be a way to detect and train under-qualified teachers who got into the public education system, mostly due to deficient or lax systems of ex ante (or pre-service) teacher evaluation. However, the main issue with this type of policy occurs when its promoters assume that certain conditions and capacities are already in the system, and that actors can be 'activated' via a concrete set of incentives. In the Peruvian TE case, the government considered that teachers were 'demotivated' and had low morale. Thus, it thought that through evaluation policies that include, on the one hand, potential salary increases and, on the other hand, the threat of dismissal, teachers would be stimulated to give their best in the classroom. However, beyond the uneven implementation of the policy, the background issue is that many teachers in Peru, due to the continuous policies that have downgraded their training and working conditions, do not always count on such capacities. State policies need to proactively build these capacities, instead of expecting them to simply flourish via standardised testing and its associated incentives. In conclusion, before debating whether and how teachers should be promoted according to their performance, education systems would benefit from governments adopting more comprehensive policies to dignify the teaching profession and raise teachers' capacities and living conditions.

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CHAPTER 9

THE RECONTEXTUALISATION OF GLOBAL EDUCATION REFORMS: INSIGHTS FROM THE CASE STUDIES

Hülya Kosar Altinyelken and Antoni Verger

This volume is primarily concerned with the emergence of global education reforms of a managerial nature (GMERs), their recontextualisation in particular contexts and their relationship to teachers. Within the field of comparative education, there is much focus on how policy "transfer" or "travelling" occurs and on the content of education policies that have acquired a "global" status. Empirical studies that examine the complete policy process of the global reforms, from its adoption, re-contextualisation and implementation are, however, scarce. This book aims at contributing to our understanding about these key issues and processes, in particular by seeking to examine the interrelationship between GMERs and teachers. In this concluding chapter, the seven country cases outlined herein are discussed from a comparative perspective, in order to recapture their main findings and discuss policy implications.

The case studies include reforms aimed at introducing teacher evaluation (Peru) and teacher accountability measures (Indonesia and Jamaica), competency-based curriculum (Turkey), public private partnerships (Uganda), decentralisation (Namibia) and contract teachers (India). These policies were adopted within the past decade, except for decentralisation reforms in Namibia and contract teachers in India which were introduced in the 1990s. At the time of data collection, the reforms were at different stages: Some were at policy formulation stage and, therefore, had not been piloted or fully implemented yet (Indonesia and Jamaica); one was in piloting and early implementation phase (Peru); and the others had already been implemented for some years (Turkey, Namibia, India and Uganda). In each case study, teachers or school principals are considered as central actors in the analysis. However, reform processes are also discussed with and from the perspectives of other educational stakeholders, including policy makers, consultants, international donors, and NGOs. The analysis in this concluding chapter focuses on four main dimensions: the rationale for the adoption of the "global" policies, teacher responses, recontextualisation at the local level, and the impact of the reforms on teachers' work. Finally, the policy implications of the main findings will be discussed and key suggestions offered.

RATIONALE

The GMERs analysed mainly focus on primary education and seek to improve education quality, except for the case of PPP in Uganda which is introduced at secondary education level and aims at expanding access to education as well as improving the quality of

education. In all the chapters in this volume, it is seen how reform discourses make frequent references to concepts and values such as globalisation, knowledge economy, economic development, growth, competitiveness, education quality, efficiency, (cost-) effectiveness and accountability to justify their adoption. There is also reference to equity concerns in some contexts, such as in Turkey and Uganda. However, an overall analysis of the cases reveals the primacy of economic considerations for the undertaking the reforms. Improving education quality is directly linked to enhancing the capacity of education systems to better contribute to economic development and competitiveness in a global economy. Furthermore, teacher evaluation, accountability or decentralisation policies appear to be envisaged as cost-effective measures to improve the efficiency of the education system.

In Indonesia, for instance, increasing global competitiveness and the productivity of the Indonesian economy was perceived by some actors as the main driving force behind the education reforms. In Turkey, the curriculum documents make frequent references to national economic development and competitiveness in international markets. The need for curriculum reform was legitimised by highlighting the importance of knowledge as a production factor in contemporary societies. Similar statements were made in Jamaica as well, where policy makers use this economic argument to advocate reforms aimed at improving education quality. The prevalence of economic rationales behind the GMERs analysed reflect a worldwide trend in education politics. In fact, since the 1980s, "The need for change in education is largely cast in economic terms and particularly in relation to the preparation of a workforce and competition with other countries" (Levin, 1998, p. 131-132).

Political discourses are grounded on a multitude of implicit and explicit sets of *assumptions* made by policy makers as they attempt to rationalise the reforms in their respective countries. For instance, in Peru, the policy makers assume that, by evaluating teachers through standardised tests and providing incentives according to the results, they can improve teacher motivation and the quality of teaching. Likewise, accountability measures targeting teachers in Jamaica and Indonesia or the school clusters approach to decentralisation in Namibia assume that such interventions would contribute to improved efficiency of the system and enhance education quality. Furthermore, in Uganda, partnering with "for profit" private schools is viewed as a solution to increase education access and improve quality. Likewise, in India, the wide-scale appointment of contract teachers was not only seen as an effective tool to improve access to education and reduce high pupil-teacher ratios, but also as a means of addressing high teacher absenteeism and ensuring teachers' accountable to performance.

The traditional approaches to educational-policy transfer assume that countries borrow educational policies elsewhere because they are considered *successful* in reaching certain objectives. However, several chapters in this book review a range of literature that contradicts this reform optimism, and conclude that many GMERs are far from "successful" in many locations around the world. Even the most ardent advocates of PPPs admit that evidence on the positive outcomes of partnerships at a larger scale is not conclusive yet (Patrinos *et al*., 2009). The same applies to teacher evaluation and accountability as well as to decentralisation policies whose effects on teacher motivation and overall education quality are inconclusive, mixed or negative (Day, 2002; Edwards, forthcoming).

What then explains the educational-policy transfer in these case studies? Why do the countries reviewed appear to engage in a similar global reform discourse? According to Meyer and Ramirez (2000), countries adopt a global culture of schooling because a set of ideas and educational practices are perceived as modern, although they may not actually be the best way to manage schools. In other words, countries adopt policies or educational programmes not because they are truly better or successful, but because policy makers perceive them as such. This might partly explain the enchantment of policy makers with specific education policies. However, the cases analysed strongly point to economic and political imperatives involved in education policy transfer. Steiner-Khamsi (2010) suggests that the '*politics'* and '*economics'* of educational borrowing and lending are highly relevant for discussions on why and how countries adopt certain educational policies. The political aspects refer to the motives of international actors (e.g. donor agencies, NGOs or consultants) for exporting and disseminating specific education policies, as well as political motives at local level for adopting a set of education reforms. The economic aspects of policy borrowing and lending refers to economic reasons for borrowing educational reforms, which is particularly salient for the low-income countries that constitute the majority of case studies contained herein. This is clearly linked to what Roger Dale (1999) calls 'imposition', a policy mechanism through which external actors compel some countries to take on particular education policies. For instance, imposition is activated when development banks lend money to low-income countries with the conditions that specific reform packages or, at least, specific policy components should be adopted by them. Or, low-income countries adopt specific education policies at a time when funds from development banks or other donors are made available for implementing them. The politics and economics of policy lending and borrowing help to explain why educational reforms in low-income countries look increasingly similar to those in Western societies. All the GMERs studied in this book, teacher evaluation, accountability, decentralisation and PPPs fall within this category.

The economics of educational-policy transfer is illustrated by many cases in this book. For instance, the large-scale reform efforts in Namibia were preceded with fiscal crisis and increasing donor dependency. In Indonesia, similar efforts to transform the education sector were initiated after the Asian financial crisis, which coincided with the increasing influence of the World Bank group in Indonesia, and the vulnerability of the country to prescriptions offered by these institutions (e.g. the Washington Consensus). Uganda is another country which is characterised by high levels of donor dependency. Although external donors tend to argue that education policies have been driven largely by the Ugandans themselves, this perception is not fully shared by their Ugandan partners (Higgins and Rwanyange, 2005). High dependence on donor aid, which accounts for more than 50 per cent of the Ministry budget, makes it very likely that the Ugandans conform to donor priorities and refrain from policies that would alienate the donor community. As one of the Ugandan respondents stated, policy makers chase money and adopt policies for which donor funding is available.

The Ugandan case not only illustrates the economics of borrowing but also the politics of it. In 2006, the Ugandan government announced the free Universal Secondary Education (USE) programme, and became the first sub-Saharan African country to adopt such a policy. The programme was motivated by increasing demand for secondary education, but more so because of President Musevini's aim to attract votes during the election campaign with

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the promise of free secondary education. The policy was adopted with little attention to system capacity, organisational planning, financial resources, and without anticipating the consequences of a rapid expansion of secondary schooling. As Chapman *et al*. (2010, p.81) suggests, "USE is best understood as a symbolic and political decision of Government". To live up to this political pronouncement, and meet increasing demand for funds, the government approached the World Bank, which is known to promote PPP in various contexts. The case of Turkey also indicates some political considerations. Accession to the EU has a strong political influence in Turkey. Therefore, harmonisation of the Turkish education system with that of EU countries by adopting education policies that are prevalent in the continent, including competency-based curriculum, continues to be an important political initiative.

The discussion on the politics and economics of policy borrowing and lending closely relates to *the role of international donors* in educational policy transfer. In the case studies documented in this volume, national policy makers often reacted defensively when asked about the ownership of educational reforms. They claim that the reforms are nationally driven and developed by a rethinking of national imperatives and other contextual factors (e.g. Indonesia, Jamaica and Turkey). However, interviews often indicated significant involvement by international actors. The World Bank appears to be the most frequently involved and powerful donor in the case study countries, as it provided loans to finance the reforms and offered technical assistance in Indonesia, Jamaica and Uganda. In Indonesia, several international consultants took part in tasks forces and disseminated their experiences, knowledge and assumptions on so-called "international best practices". International organisations were viewed as highly influential in setting agendas, designing and disseminating concepts, theories, ideas and strategies. Furthermore, in Jamaica, the World Bank and USAID were highly influential in policy formulation as they shaped target setting and contributed to the selection of refinement of policy ideas. Moreover, in Uganda, the Bank introduced the idea of partnership with private schools as an "efficient" way of providing secondary education, and funded the reform by providing long-term loans.

Furthermore, other international actors were influential in promoting managerial reform processes in the cases explored in this volume. For instance, the EU played a significant role in Turkey by financing the curriculum review and influencing the review process to a certain extent. In Namibia, the school clusters approach to decentralisation was first initiated and funded by GTZ, the German Aid Agency, and was later taken over by USAID. The GTZ was viewed as the primary designer, supporter and funder behind the policy. This high-level presence of international donors in the case study countries confirms the importance of considering the role of international organisations in processes around educational policy transfer. As shown in these case studies, such organisations play an active role in reform processes by identifying problems to be solved (agenda setting); disseminating a set of ideas, norms and causal theories (e.g. human capital or rates of return analysis); imposing decisions, defining standards, setting benchmarks, and facilitating the harmonisation of education policies (Verger, 2012).

TEACHER RESPONSES

The GMERs analysed in this volume either target teachers (teacher evaluation, accountability and contract teachers) or directly involve them as the main actors in charge of reform

implementation (e.g. decentralisation and competency-based curriculum). Because of such a high level of involvement, teachers' responses to the reforms have been highly critical in ascertaining to what extent and how the reforms were enacted by them. In the case of reforms that were not yet implemented at the time of research (e.g. accountability reforms in Indonesia and Jamaica), teachers' views were highly influential in determining the likelihood of "successful" implementation. The typology of teacher responses to education reforms includes compliance, incorporation, mediation, retreatism and resistance. 'Incorporation' has been the most common response as teachers most often consolidate reforms selectively into their own educational practices (Pollard *et al*., 1994). Reforms change schools and schools change reforms. Ultimately, teachers translate, interpret, modify and re-contextualise reforms as they enact the change proposals (Ball et al., 2012). What is striking in the case studies is that, in several of them, researchers observed high levels of ambivalence, dissatisfaction, confusion and even resistance to reforms, conveyed individually or collectively via teacher unions.

In Peru, for instance, teacher evaluation generated substantial resistance, particularly due to the content of the policy, and the way it was formulated and communicated to teachers. Likewise, the Ministry encountered significant levels of resistance from teacher unions as they strongly opposed proposals which might undermine the job security of teachers. In Namibia, the policy was not "owned" by the local actors and USAID's attempt to institutionalise schools clusters in 2010 was also met with political resistance. In Turkey, more than half of the teachers who participated in the research resisted changes to the curriculum on the grounds that it emphasised the development of competencies at the expense of knowledge acquisition, thereby marginalising students' access to knowledge and intensifying social inequalities. In Uganda, teacher unions also resisted the PPP reform; however, they had very little discursive power to counter the arguments of the government or the powerful international donors which supported the PPP implementation. Furthermore, in Indonesia, some actors predicted that many teachers and teacher unions would likely resist reforms on teacher accountability as they were concerned about increased workload, poor evaluation procedures and corruption. The education reform proposals were considered unrealistic. Teachers were concerned that although the rhetoric of the reform emphasises accountability, motivation and education quality, in reality it might demotivate teachers and undermine education quality. Likewise, in Jamaica, there was pessimism about the new policy among teachers, growing concerns about its implications, and low levels of readiness for implementation.

Teachers' and their unions' apprehension towards reforms might partly stem from the fact that, in some cases, global reform advocates, policy makers and educationalists "blame" teachers for low education quality and use such arguments to make a case for the suggested reform proposals. For instance, in Peru, President Garcia referred to teachers as "lazy" and "ignorant", and proposed that the new mechanisms introduced by the teacher evaluation reform might improve their performance. In Jamaica, policy makers argued that there are no accountability mechanisms for teachers in the current education system and teachers were held responsible for low levels of education quality. Such attempts to "problematise" teachers and portray them as a group which fails to fulfil its responsibilities are likely to antagonise teachers and instigate defensive and resistant attitudes towards reforms, even at their initial stages.

Having outlined the main teacher responses to GMERs, the next section will review the challenges encountered during the implementation process and how reforms were enacted in different contexts. A closer look at these issues will also help to better understand the reasons behind teachers' dissatisfaction with the proposed reforms.

RECONTEXTUALISATION

The findings from the case studies indicate that teachers and other local actors encounter substantial challenges which compromised the implementation process to a large extent. In fact, a majority of the reforms analysed have failed or only partially managed to reach their objectives. The main issues identified by local actors included the following: teacher involvement in identification of problems and policy formulation, pace of reforms, training and information sharing, resource availability, and context.

Teacher involvement in identification of problems and policy formulation

One of the most frequently cited reasons for reform failure was that policy makers make certain assumptions as they design the policies and, often, these assumptions are not shared by actors at the local level. Or, they do not correspond to the realities at school and classroom level. In Jamaica, for instance, there are clear differences between how policy makers and teachers define teacher accountability. Although policy makers perceive no teacher accountability in the current system, teachers suggest that there are already internal accountability measures that govern their work. When policy makers develop policies without a thorough understanding of local-level actors and their work, the resultant measures are likely to fail in enhancing teacher accountability and might even undermine existing internal accountability mechanisms. Very often, the case studies revealed that teachers play a minor role in policy formulation. Again, in Jamaica, there was resentment among teachers that they were underrepresented in policy formulation process while the influence of international donors and consultants was substantial. Similar concerns and resentments towards the top-down approach to reform processes were expressed in other contexts as well, such as in Indonesia, Peru and Turkey. In fact, in Peru, one of the reasons for the fierce opposition to the reform was rooted in the top-down way the new policy was approved and implemented.

Pace of reforms

One of the aspects that characterise the reform efforts in our case studies is that they were formulated over a short period and the authorities proceeded with piloting and implementation very quickly. For instance, in Indonesia, there were concerns that the World Bank pushed for a quick implementation because of its own financial timeframe. The reform is described as a process of rushing to meet immediate deadlines and spend money. Sometimes, this rush to spend funds in predefined timeframes takes over and becomes the most important factor in decision-making. Likewise, in Uganda, the respondents noted that, due to pressing political impediments, significantly less consideration was given to planning an organisational strategy for the implementation process. In Turkey as well, the very short duration of the curriculum review process and nationwide implementation phase was criticised by several actors. Likewise, in Peru, some actors noted that policy formulation and implementation

had to move very quickly because of political-timing requirements. Hence, it became very difficult to carefully consider the opinions of teachers and other actors, and to plan the implementation phase. As a result, the implementation of teacher evaluation in Peru has been characterised by irregularities and imprecision. Hence, in various countries, the pace of reforms appears to be bruising for various actors involved in implementation at the local level. The only exception to these is Jamaica where the planning for implementation phase took almost a decade due to a lack of stakeholder buy-in.

Training and information sharing

Training teachers and other actors involved in policy implementation, as well as informing various actors about the content and implications of the reforms are highly important in education reform processes. However, there have been significant problems in this regard in all the case studies as teachers felt insufficiently trained and informed. Several actors did not, in fact, know much about the policies. In Peru, for instance, many teachers did not have any idea about what the teacher evaluation policy entailed. The Ministry did not clearly communicate how the policy should be implemented. This produced a lot of uncertainties and confusions among teachers and led to irregular practices. Similarly, in Jamaica, teachers felt insufficiently informed about the reform. They did not know much about the evaluation methods or consequences of underperformance. This limited teachers' ability to critically review the policy and express their concerns. In addition, teachers experienced high levels of insecurity about how the policy will affect their job security and day-to-day work. In Namibia, the decentralisation policy operates in a policy vacuum as there are no official policies to guide implementation of school-clusters. Training was not provided to subject facilitators who do not know what they are supposed to do in subject groups. In India, the need for professional pre-service and in-service training for contract teachers was most salient as they are often appointed to posts after a very limited induction period, ranging between seven to sixty days. Nevertheless, these teachers received limited or no professional development as the system is ill equipped to offer training even to its regular teachers. Furthermore, in Turkey, teachers were highly critical of the short duration and low quality of training they received prior to implementation. Therefore, they felt ill-equipped to implement the revised curriculum, and experienced high levels of uncertainties and confusions.

Resource availability

GMERs assign new responsibilities to schools and very often increase demands on teachers. Meeting these new demands require additional resources. However, in most cases, it was observed that additional resources are not provided to schools, and teachers are highly concerned that the implementation process will fail as a result. In Indonesia, for instance, policy makers appear to neglect the importance of providing adequate facilities to improve teacher motivation. Indonesian teachers believe that better classroom conditions and availability of teaching and learning materials would have the highest impact on their motivation and education quality. Yet, additional resource provision is not considered in the teacher accountability reform in Indonesia. Similarly, in Jamaica, there are substantial concerns that the new policy may not be operational due to a lack of resources. Teachers predict that unless more resources are provided to schools, the new accountability measures will effectively become punitive and will have a minimum effect on education quality.

Furthermore, in Peru, many teachers believe that even if teachers manage to be promoted to higher salary scales, the Ministry will not able to pay them. Hence, the incentives behind the teacher evaluation policy are rather ineffective. In Uganda and Namibia as well, resource scarcity is mentioned as an important implementation challenge. In addition, in India where contract teachers are expected to undertake complex teaching in multi-grade environments, poor material conditions of classrooms are discussed as an important challenge. There are concerns that in the absence of such resources, as well as a lack of pedagogical support, contract teachers would encounter major strains, which might eventually undermine their motivation and performance.

Context

The case studies demonstrate the importance of contextual factors (institutional, historical, cultural, socio-economic) in the mediation of global education reform processes and, consequently, how difficult it is to prescribe policy solutions with the pretension of universality. Various actors have confirmed the importance of taking local context into account when adopting education policies (e.g. see the chapters on Indonesia, Turkey and Peru). There are frustrations among teachers that policies are adopted from elsewhere without adequate consideration of local context. When context is not adequately considered in education policy transfer, it may lead to negative or unintended outcomes. In Turkey, the case of research assignments and the revisions in textbooks illustrate the importance of considering context adequately. When learning is increasingly directed towards students undertaking research activities (with the assumed benefits in terms of rendering students autonomous learners and preparing them for lifelong learning), in a country where access to information resources (e.g. internet and libraries) is uneven, or very limited in some regions or for certain segments of society, such a policy compromises children's right to education and undermines their learning opportunities. Likewise, when textbooks are abandoned, so too is essential information on studied topics in a country where they are the primary and often 'the only' reference book for millions of students. Such a policy then also further exacerbates educational inequalities and marginalises students from lower socio-economic backgrounds as they have limited access to educational resources other than textbooks.

The chapter on Peru also highlights the dangers of considering countries as "monolithic categories". The tests to evaluate teachers are standardised in the country and administered in Spanish. Yet, there are significant differences between urban and rural, rich and poor areas, and between linguistic and cultural groups. Teachers in rural areas are mostly proficient in the vernacular of their indigenous languages, not in Spanish. They also live and work in poorer conditions, and have limited access to transportation (e.g. for travelling to take the exam in an urban centre). Similar concerns were raised in Indonesia and Jamaica suggesting that teachers in rural areas or in poorer urban locations would be disadvantaged by the new accountability policies as the policies do not take different school conditions into account. As Carnoy and Rhoten (2002) confirm, when policy makers ignore contextual capacity and culture at the national, regional or local levels, the reforms may result in some unintended and unexpected consequences. In some cases, they might also contribute to the deterioration of education quality even though the objective of the reforms was to improve education.

IMPACT ON TEACHERS' WORK

Teachers are at the centre of the most GMERs, either because the reforms themselves target teachers, or the reform proposals directly relate to teachers' work. In the case studies presented in this book, we see some indications of how the proposed policies influence teachers' work and their wellbeing. In the countries included, there have been various large-scale reform initiatives in the past decades. Several actors complained about "reform fatigue". In Jamaica, for instance, a teacher noted that the policy makers introduce new reforms with different names and labels attached, often recycling previous reform initiatives.

Where the reforms that directly target teachers are concerned (e.g. teacher evaluation and accountability), teachers recognised some potential benefits within the policy, but expressed strong reservations on the possible outcomes of the reforms. For instance, in Indonesia, a large majority of teachers believed that teacher evaluation can potentially motivate them to perform better, or they indicated that increasing salaries for well-performing teachers is a good policy. In Jamaica as well, teachers considered accountability reforms desirable as long as they are linked to an increase in educational resources and training. Likewise, in Peru, only a small percentage of teachers who participated in the study were opposed to the idea of being evaluated as they acknowledged some potential merits in evaluation.

However, the findings from all the cases indicate some pessimism about how the reforms will influence teachers' work and wellbeing, as several actors either predict or experience increased workload, bureaucratisation, stress, demotivation, alienation, and feelings of insecurity. In India, for instance, various actors argue that the recruitment of contract teachers negatively influences the teaching profession as they often encounter difficult working conditions, receive lower salaries than civil-servant teachers and have poor job security. Furthermore, such uneven conditions of service and a lack of career prospects may lower their motivation and fuel tensions among teachers. Critics also maintain that the creation of a separate teacher force by the appointment of contract teachers diversifies teachers' status and could have potentially a demoralising effect on teachers.

In Indonesia, teachers believe that the new accountability measures might be perceived as a source of stress and interference rather than as a strategy to develop their professionalism. As a result, the reform is likely to demoralise and demotivate teachers, impair the quality of teaching, increase teacher workload and demands on their time, and lead to further bureau-cratisation. Furthermore, the policy might promote individualism and undermine cooperation among teachers. In Jamaica as well, teachers predicted that teachers and schools that receive a negative evaluation would experience increased pressure, especially schools in poor urban neighbourhoods which often lack resources and feel overwhelmed by multiple challenges. They are also concerned that the new accountability policy might undermine their internal accountability mechanisms which are characterised by internal consultations and debates.

Furthermore, teachers in Indonesia, Jamaica and Peru are concerned about the impact of accountability measures on their job security. Since they do not know how the reforms will take shape and affect their jobs, they experience confusion, apprehension and insecurity. They oppose sanctions that might compromise their job security. Such a "punishment" (e.g.

of being fired as a result of underperformance) is viewed as disempowering. Some argue that it might lead to a further deterioration of the social status of the teaching profession. Furthermore, teachers raise serious concerns with regard to the fairness of the evaluation system. Since the evaluations are standardised at national level in all three countries, they are insensitive to the regional or local differences in working conditions, student composition and resource availability. Hence, the measures inadvertently discriminate against teachers working in poor neighbourhoods or rural areas. The second important concern is corruption. Many teachers have serious doubts about the fairness of evaluations as they fear that the system might be corrupted.

Teachers in Turkey had other concerns. They believed that the emphasis of the new curriculum on the development of competencies at the expense of knowledge acquisition undermines the ability of mainstream schools to prepare their students for the nationwide exams, which govern transitions to upper levels of education. Therefore, teachers who were concerned about social equality or had high levels of commitment to their students attempted to compensate for the weaknesses of the curriculum by teaching more subjects. This appeared to increase their workload as they have to meet demands prescribed in curriculum documents in addition to undertaking teaching activities they considered important. Teachers also encountered increased pressure from parents to instil more knowledge. Some other teachers, however, who were not troubled with these concerns, suggested that the revised curriculum simplified their work and they experienced a decreased workload. Similar to the majority of Turkish teachers, principals and teachers in Namibia experienced increased workload and bureaucratisation, even though the decentralisation reform aimed at eliminating and reducing intermediate levels of governance.

Furthermore, the PPP policy in Uganda appears to have more wide-ranging consequences for teachers. It has resulted in the increased employment of underpaid, untrained teachers hired on a contractual basis, as they are considered more cost-effective for profit-oriented PPP schools. These teachers do not have job security, cannot negotiate their working conditions or salaries, and do not have strong union representation either. The PPP policy does not only have consequences for teachers working in those schools, but also for teachers working in public schools as well. The Ugandan actors talk about a "parallel and informal" labour market which undermines the status of professional teachers and weakens teachers unions' capacity to negotiate at national level (UNATU, 2008). It is no coincidence that in the past number of years, there have not been any significant increases in teacher salaries or comprehensive efforts to improve teacher qualifications. These developments appear to undermine teacher motivation both in public and private schools.

CONCLUSIONS

This book has reflected extensively on the relationship between global education reforms of a managerial nature (GMERs) and teachers. Among other things, it has been observed that the effects of such reforms are highly sensitive to context, politics and institutional settings. According to how they are locally mediated and negotiated, the same type of policy can

adopt very different forms and, consequently, can have very different implications for teachers' work. This is, for instance, the case with 'accountability' policies. Today, accountability is a policy concept that has acquired 'global' status and has become very central in global education agendas. However, depending on how it is being recontextualized in particular locations, this global concept can have very different implications for teachers' work and professionalism. For instance, accountability can lead to a more professional approach, which involves peer-evaluation and self-regulation; a more participatory approach, which involves collaboration between teachers and other stakeholders; a more hierarchical approach, through performance-related pay and other surveillance policies; or a more market orientation that would be implemented via parents' choice/exit, competition and related incentives (West *et al.*, 2011; see Gulpers in this volume). Something similar happens with teachers' evaluation, which is a policy that can have a more formative and constructive nature (evaluation to provide an opportunity for teachers to reflect on their practices and to contribute to improve their training) or rather adopt a summative approach that links teachers' results to contingent rewards and sanctions (see Tuin *et al*. in this volume). Thus, before one evaluates and judges the impact of global education policies in abstract terms, one needs to discover the specific forms such policies have taken.

Overall, the country case studies presented reflect on how problematic it is to implement GMERs, but also on how problematic the content and the assumptions of the policies behind these reforms can be. In this respect, the main arguments that can be extracted from the book include:

• *Universal solutions do not always fit within diverse education realities.* In contrast with GMERs ambitions, case studies included in the book show that it is not accurate to advance universalistic managerial reforms because education cultures, teachers' identities, capacities and working conditions are very different around the world. Thus, blueprinted managerial reforms will have very uneven effects and will be received very differently according to these and other institutional and contextual factors.

• *Easier to write than to implement.* GMERs may appear very convincing due to their constant references to market metaphors and the use of other persuasive analogies. However, in practice, GMERs need to be translated into a web of complex policies, whose implementation is problematic for technical, material, but also political reasons. Managerial reforms are based on assumptions, usually coming from economic theory, that are not supported sufficiently by the reality of most education systems. The competitive market requirements such as those of perfect information, high levels of offer, zero barriers for schools to entry/exit the 'education market', etc. are not present in most countries, especially in developing countries or rural regions. Moreover, these requirements are very difficult to promote through state policy and state regulation without generating a significant number of market imperfections, transaction costs and inequalities (see, for instance, the problems associated with Chile in Bellei, 2009, or Patrinos *et al*., 2009).

• *Despite GMERs being aimed at quality improvement, they can, in fact, put quality at risk.* Managerial reforms expect that, if the regulatory conditions are appropriate, a range of mechanisms to improve education quality will be correctly activated (for instance, 'community becoming more vigilant of schools', 'schools competing to increase the quality of the service', 'families exiting underperforming schools', and so on).

However, the activation of these mechanisms is highly speculative and contingent on a long series of causal actions that do not necessarily fit within education agents' motivations and strategies. Today, there is significant evidence that contradicts market analogies in education by showing that, for different reasons, most families do not send their children to the highest quality school available and rather choose schools according to other criteria (Härmä, 2009; Fennell, 2012; Waslander, 2010); or that it might take several years, even decades, for a bad school to be closed due low levels of demand (Stuit, 2010). This implies that, in the meantime, many students would be losing out on quality education and other future opportunities. In quasi-market situations, there is the risk that the state does not feel the urgency to fix the existing and often-pressuring educational problems in its domain. As stated in the 2009 EFA Global Monitoring Report, managerial reforms should not be implemented by states as a way to decline their responsibilities with providing quality education for all. National governments need to "recognise that school competition and choice, and private-public partnerships have their limits". Thus, "if a public education system works poorly, the priority [of the government] must be to fix it" (UNESCO, 2009, p.7).

- *The political economy of GMERs.* The gap between policy-planning and actual practices will increase especially when teachers, who are the key stakeholders in enacting education policies, are excluded from the policy debate, or when policies are poorly communicated to schools, as reflected in many of the cases in this volume. Managerial reforms usually conceive of teachers as an asset to be managed instead of as subjects of educational change, and therefore do not consider them as key stakeholders in developing policy processes. Such divergent and excessively instrumental conceptions generate distrust between education planners and teachers, and implementation becomes even more uneven and contested.

- *GMERs are grounded on broad assumptions about teachers*. Using Le Grand's (2006) famous categories, GMERs advocates think of teachers more as knaves than as knights. They often assume that teachers could do their work better, but that they do not do so because they are lazy, or are not sufficiently 'motivated'. Of course, as Apple (1999, p. 1) put it once, this book does not assume that "all teachers are great and need no improvement"; however, building state policy on the concept of teachers as knaves or free-riders reflects a very generalised understanding of teachers' needs, motivations and identities. The policies emerging from these concepts might be misleading and would be a way of sanctioning many good teachers. These assumptions can be even more pernicious and disrespectful in the case of low-income countries where teachers are poorly trained and their working conditions are not attractive enough. In these cases, governments should try to fix quality issues in a more fundamental way (by, for instance, professionalization strategies and a more demanding selection) rather than on the basis of incentives or competition mechanisms.

The different chapters in this book are critical and, on occasions, sceptical of the dominant paradigm of managerial education reforms. However, this book is not against 'education reform' in itself. In fact, the volume rather provides elements to reflect on educational change processes that could be, on the one hand, more in tune with the education realities and issues prevailing in their particular contexts and, on the other, more participatory and respectful

of teachers' needs and identities. Key suggestions are listed below, based on the findings of the book, which could lead to policy processes and education reforms that fulfil the above-mentioned qualities:

• Adequate attention to context should be given while adopting education policies from global agendas or while borrowing them from "elsewhere". The reforms should be sensitive to regional and local differences within a country, and blueprint and monolithic approaches should be avoided.

• A "quick fix" approach to reform implementation needs to be avoided. The implementation phase should be carefully planned and organised. On-going contact with teachers and other local actors should be facilitated in order to receive their feedback and to better adapt the reform to local realities and practices.

• Teachers and other local actors should be involved in the whole policy process, from formulation to evaluation. This will guarantee that educational reforms are based on needs analysis and correspond to the priorities and necessities identified by schools and other local stakeholders. In fact, reform success largely depends on the extent to which local actors agree with the urgency of the reforms, their objectives and the means to reach them. In other words, reform success depends on the extent to which local actors enact education change.

• The reforms should be communicated clearly and efficiently to the actors involved in implementation at regional and local levels. This would avoid insecurities, confusions and irregularities among local implementation partners.

• Adequate resources need to be provided to local actors in order to improve their capacity to implement educational changes successfully. Among these resources, teachers and other key stakeholders should benefit from training related to the new policy before the implementation phase starts.

• Teacher resistance to education reforms should not be considered always as a "problem" or a "conservative act" in itself. Resistance to reforms, and the consequent negotiations and debate it might generate, provide opportunities for policy makers and aid agencies to reflect on the reform proposals and to improve future interventions.

• Educational policies need to be aligned. If a new education policy (e.g. curriculum emphasis on the development of competencies) contradicts another newly introduced policy or an existing policy (e.g. nationwide exams governing the transition to post-primary education in Turkey), the implementation of the new policy will encounter serious setbacks. Therefore, the alignment of the new policies with existing policies should be carefully examined, and possible conflict between them should be addressed.

• Last but not least, education reforms, beyond punctual and isolated interventions, need to make sure that the necessary conditions (i.e. material, training) and the right environment (including appropriate regulatory frameworks and higher levels of equity within and between schools, OECD, 2009) are guaranteed by the state and available for teachers and schools if society wants them to 'make a difference'.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Hülya Kosar **Altinyelken** is a lecturer and researcher at the Department of Child Development and Education, and the Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. She holds a PhD in International Development Studies from the same university on her comparative work exploring the implementation of pedagogical reforms at primary education level in Uganda and Turkey. Her research engages with issues such as gender, migration, educational policy transfer, educational reforms, pedagogy, and teachers. She has published in journals such as Journal of Education Policy, Comparative Education, and International Journal of Educational Development.

Bo-Joe **Brans** holds a MSc in International Development Studies (with distinction) from the University of Amsterdam (UvA). He also holds a MSc in International Relations at UvA; a minor political science (with distinction) at the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina, Buenos Aires; and a BA in political science at UvA. He worked as a research assistant in the European Union funded project GOETE (Governance of Education Trajectories in Europe) and is currently a trainee at the European Commission Directorate General for Development Cooperation - EuropeAid (sector education).

Art **Broekman** holds a BA in Education from the University of Rotterdam and a MSc in Human Geography (cum laude) from the University of Amsterdam with a focus on international development and education. In the context of his Master, Art conducted research on teacher motivation and the impact of teacher policies in Indonesia. Currently, he is finishing an MSc in Education at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam and works as a geography teacher at a high school in Rotterdam.

Mireille **de Koning** is a Research Coordinator at Education International (EI). She holds a MSc in International Development Studies from the University of Amsterdam (UvA) and a BA in European Studies from Maastricht University. Prior to joining EI, Mireille co-coordinated a comparative research project at the UvA on the re-integration of returning rejected asylum seekers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and conducted research on inclusive education practices for Roma children in Romania. Mireille has coordinated and undertaken research studies on unions' equity policies, education privatisation, contract teacher reforms in India and education reforms in Indonesia, as well as teachers' migration. She currently also oversees the EI "Exiting the Crisis" campaign.

D. Brent **Edwards** Jr. is a visiting scholar at the Universidad Centroamericana in San Salvador, El Salvador, as well as a PhD Candidate in international education policy at the University of Maryland, College Park, United States. His research focuses on processes of education policy formation, the decentralisation of education governance, and the role of education in international development. With a Fulbright Research Grant, he is currently collecting data for his dissertation, which focuses on the EDUCO programme in El Salvador, through which the government decentralised the responsibility for education management to the community level. Previously, he has worked with the World Bank, Save the Children, the Organization of American States, the University of California, Berkeley, and the

University of Amsterdam's Institute for Social Science Research. Prior to pursuing a PhD, he completed his Master's in Education at the University of Pennsylvania and was a Spanish teacher in Philadelphia. He has over 25 journal articles, book chapters, and conference presentations on education policy, decentralisation, and international development. Internationally, he has worked or conducted research in Cambodia, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Nicaragua, and the Netherlands.

Emmelie **Gulpers** holds a MSc in International Development Studies from the University of Amsterdam with a focus on education policy, international development, good governance, and social justice. Currently, she is conducting research for the European Commission's Governance of Educational Trajectories in Europe (GOETE) project, analysing the organisation and conceptualisation of educational trajectories in the Netherlands. Previously, she completed internships at Human Rights Watch in both Amsterdam and New York and at Amnesty International's human rights film festival "Movies that Matter". She also served as a board member at the International Student Network, a foundation that supports the interests of international students in Amsterdam.

Paul Waihura **Mbatia** was trained as a teacher at Egerton University in Kenya. Upon completion of his studies, he joined a non-governmental organisation which worked together with the ministry of education, teachers and parents to promote access to education among the vulnerable children in the region. He later moved to the Netherlands where he studied International Development at the University of Amsterdam with a focus in education policies and politics. Within education, Mbatia's main interest lies in the interplay between policy formulation and implementation. He seeks to understand the factors contributing to the discrepancies between these two processes and the role of the civil society in bridging the gap.

Marit **van der Tuin** holds a BA and MSc in Human Geography from the University of Amsterdam with a focus on cultural and development geography. In the context of this masters' programme, Marit researched the implementation of teacher evaluation policies in Peru in both rural and urban areas. After completing this research, Marit's continuing interest in educational policy issues led her to complete a MSc in Education at the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam. More recently, she started teaching geography at a Dalton School in Almere, the Netherlands.

Antoni **Verger** is a "Ramon y Cajal" researcher (2011-2016) at the Department of Sociology of the *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*. He was awarded a PhD in Sociology from the same university in December 2007 for his work on the World Trade Organisation and the international liberalisation of education. After his PhD, he became a post-doctoral researcher at the *IS Academie* 'Education and International Development' of the University of Amsterdam. Currently, his main areas of research are, on the one hand, the global governance of education reform and, on the other, the analysis of education privatisation, public-private partnerships and quasi-markets in education and their impact on education inequalities.

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